It is Time for Naval Mines to Enter the Missile Age

By Benjamin Massengale

Introduction

A lot has been written during the last 20 years about how cost-effective naval mine warfare might be for the U.S. Navy in nice energy conflict. Mines have demonstrated their utility within the Ukraine battle by each deterring Russia from executing amphibious landings and interfering with Ukrainian grain exports. China has repeatedly cited it because the “murderer’s mace” and adopted by with vital sources to deploy them through conventional means.1 Nonetheless, the present focus for American offensive naval minelaying is completed both as a prelude to open hostilities, or when the U.S. has uncontested air and/or undersea superiority of the battlespace, an unreasonable assumption to keep up towards a peer adversary. The U.S. Navy wants a sensible means to rapidly deploy naval mines towards a peer adversary in a contested surroundings.

Present U.S. capabilities to deploy mines are restricted. B-52s and F/A-18 plane can deploy the Quickstrike mine by air and require suppression of enemy air defenses or uncontested airspace to allow minelaying. Undersea deployment through quick assault submarine or ORCA Further Massive Uncrewed Undersea Automobile (XLUUV) is constrained by a restricted variety of proficient items out there to conduct the mission, restricted talents when working in shallow depths, and relatively sluggish time to ascertain the minefield. On the similar time, platform survivability depends on not being detected, which is a serious assumption towards adversaries with fashionable anti-submarine warfare capabilities. Regaining the power to deploy mines over the facet from floor ships like was completed throughout WWII will probably be unsuitable towards a peer competitor within the missile age except the vessel has efficient safety from assault, is by some means undetected deep within the battlespace, or is deploying them in an space the place adversary forces can not reply in time (basically an uncontested surroundings). Helicopter supply doesn’t supply a greater possibility than already licensed air platforms.

Naval mines want a brand new type of supply platform, particularly by both rocket or missile. Mine missiles will probably be used right here to explain this supply technique and differentiate it from rocket-propelled naval mines activated after deployment, just like the Chinese language EM-52/T-1.

Mine Missile Benefits

Deployment of naval mines by missile considerably hurries up the deployment course of, improves the power to penetrate airspace, and will increase the standoff distance between the minelayer and the sphere, making it the least dangerous minelaying technique. Interpolating from a Naval Postgraduate College (NPS) paper, the quickest means to deploy 40 mines is utilizing two or extra B-52 platforms, however it might take over twenty hours to finish (working solely at evening and accounting for transit time).2

Alternatively, Vertical Launch System (VLS)-equipped platforms (floor, submarine, or land-based) already ahead within the area may deploy the identical variety of mines in lower than an hour, considerably minimizing the window for counterattack or detection whereas restoring extra operational flexibility. Simply as planners will depend on Tomahawk and different cruise missiles to get rid of the toughest fastened air defenses to decrease the chance of shedding assault plane, the identical argument ought to apply to offensive mining. Missiles are considerably more durable to interact than different mining platforms if detected, and the window to cease them earlier than the supply of their payload is slim. By making mining extra survivable and shifting the supply mechanism to penetrating missiles, minefields might be laid in areas that may in any other case be inaccessible to conventional supply platforms.

Probably the simplest conversion possibility for a mine-delivered missile could be from current Anti-Submarine Rockets (ASROC). The present U.S. ASROC system is able to carrying a 600-pound payload (primarily based on the burden of Mark 54 Torpedo which might put it on par with the MK 62 Quickstrike mine.3,4 Different nations have ASROC techniques with better throw weight, just like the Japanese Sort 07 vertical-launch ASROC, which might carry a 700-pound payload (primarily based on the burden of the Sort 12 torpedo) to both carry a bigger mine or lengthen the vary of mine deployment.5

Whereas these stands out as the best to transform, they undergo from vital vary limitations in comparison with different missile techniques and had been designed to interact particular person contacts relatively than work as a salvo for minefield placement. Changing ASROC-like mine missile may nonetheless be helpful for coastal batteries, the place defensive minefields might be deployed inside territorial waters, negating the necessity for prolonged ranges.

A greater possibility towards a peer adversary could be a long-range missile system like the prevailing Tomahawk system. Whereas it has the potential of carrying a 1000-pound payload (equal to the MK 63 Quickstrike mine), we must always conservatively assume a smaller mine to account for the modifications wanted to make sure secure separation from the missile and touchdown within the water. It nonetheless has vital advantages over an ASROC system in that its vary is measured within the tons of of miles, is designed to function in contested airspace, and the prevailing strike planning techniques might be extra simply modified to assist minefield planning. Further worth might be gained from a brand new system if it had been attainable to develop a missile and mine mixture able to delivering two or extra mines per launch. For Tomahawk, this will likely require not simply modifications to the missile however a brand new mine design with a greater type issue to assist at the very least two mines per missile.

Mine missiles would enable any U.S. Navy ship or submarine with VLS capabilities to put mines, eliminating the necessity for a devoted minelaying vessel and significantly increasing the choices for supply platforms. Creating a functionality to ship naval mines through missiles permits extra platforms and joint companions to deploy naval mines, together with Military and Marine items. As a result of supply could be a lot quicker, deploying craft may rapidly shift to different tasking or extra successfully evade retaliation. Moreover, by increasing mine supply to VLS, submarines may execute any mining mission each additional away from enemy patrols and in deeper waters whereas making it more durable for invading forces to intercept them.

UUVs have been seen as the way forward for offensive mining, given the reported success of Ukraine’s SeaBaby system in delivering mines towards Russian forces.6 However UUVs have limits and restrictions that conventional platforms or mine missiles would not have. Small to midsize UUVs are extra inclined to digital and cyber warfare assaults that may disable them in comparison with conventional minelayers. Moreover, within the Ukrainian battle, 60-70 % of Ukrainian naval drone assaults had been self-assessed to be defeated whereas fewer missile and rocket assaults had been intercepted by Russian air protection techniques, making a mine missile a extra dependable means to succeed in the goal space, particularly as empty coastlines or channels are unlikely to be lined by level defenses.7

A missile-delivered minefield might be an costly choice to ship a discipline, given how the price of the missile is added to the mine. Utilizing the beforehand cited NPS paper, utilizing two B-52s to deploy 40 mines will price about $11.6 million, assuming $88,000 per flight hour.8 Contemplating a single Tomahawk missile prices about $3.8 million (together with payload), seeding the identical 40 mines would price $152 million.9 Alternatively, utilizing a less expensive missile just like the older RUR-5 ASROC at $1.85 million every (after adjusting for inflation) or $74 million for the sphere would price much less, although it has different operational drawbacks like lowered vary.10 Both possibility remains to be cheaper than shedding a single plane or submarine and associated crew if an opponent detects and efficiently engages the platform throughout a mine-laying operation in a contested surroundings. The lack of an ORCA XLUUV (at an adjusted $124.4 million every) is perhaps extra fiscally palatable in comparison with high-end missiles, nonetheless, the restricted variety of ORCAs anticipated to affix the fleet, the time it takes to convey a brand new ORCA on station, and the unsure manufacturing plan for substitute items may make their destruction as undesirable as every other platform.11

Ideas of Operation

Creating the mines through missiles permits allied nation coastal batteries underneath risk of amphibious assault to quickly reseed an space beforehand thought cleared. Mines is also launched towards an adversary’s ports to delay the deployment of an invasion fleet with out involving different naval items. For added deterrence, coastal mine missile batteries is also positioned to launch on warning and sow preplanned minefields whereas inflicting the enemy to waste ordnance on launchers which have already delivered their payloads, just like how some nations operationalize nuclear deterrence. These would offer higher deterrence towards amphibious landings than commonplace coastal batteries, which might be destroyed by uneven platforms earlier than they’ve the chance to interact a goal.

The protection of Tawain situation is an instance the place mine missiles might be used successfully. As quickly because the defenders have indications of PRC assaults, pre-planned minefields are instantly deployed by coastal batteries (ideally by transport-erector-launchers, TELs) both towards opposing ports (mustering amphibious forces) or defensively towards projected touchdown areas earlier than the launchers might be destroyed. Any surviving TELs can reposition and reseed the minefields as required.

A attainable various to the mine missile is conducting missile strikes straight on ships and amenities. Nonetheless, one of many main targets of a minefield is to form the battlefield and affect enemy psychology, not simply get rid of the enemy drive. With the right employment, a restricted variety of mines correctly deployed can redirect forces and take away resupply/restore ports from consideration, or hazard enemy ships extra successfully than if these vessels or ports had been attacked straight. In WWII, one bomber in October 1943, between two sorties, dropped solely six mines, which resulted in two ships destroyed, redirected a convey (permitting it to be principally destroyed), and closed that port for the remainder of the conflict.12 In Might 1972, 32 mines had been dropped into the North Vietnam harbor of Haiphong, a big transport hub, underneath full statement and anti-aircraft fireplace. In consequence, all transport by that port was stopped for 300 days.13

Each instances present {that a} modest variety of mines had been less expensive in suppressing enemy operations than a standard assault due to the deep uncertainty they inflict on the commander’s thoughts. This impact might be additional amplified if a mixture of mine missiles and land assault cruise missiles strike a harbor the place the adversary is not sure if it shot down a land assault missile or simply missed stopping a missile from dropping a mine. Forcing this unknown variable on the enemy commander’s calculations ought to adequately justify the upper price to rapidly and assuredly ship the mines in restricted portions.

Iran is already shifting on this path for mine warfare with the Fajr-5 rocket system, demonstrating the power to ship naval mines from a coastal launcher in January 2025.14 Little is understood concerning the sort, quantity, or dimension of the naval mines that had been deployed, although they seem like floating mines primarily based on an Iranian state video.15 The Fajr-5 rocket system has a most vary of roughly 65 nm, which is beneficial for standoff deployment in territorial seas and confined waters, however is restricted to a 198-pound payload.16 Whereas gentle in comparison with U.S. or Chinese language naval mines, they’re nonetheless heavier than diver -delivered limpet mines and will conceivably disable a ship if struck by sufficient mines from the sphere. Most significantly, this discipline might be delivered quickly and with little warning. Regardless that the explosive capability of this mine individually is small, the psychological affect from inflicting minor injury on a small variety of retailers may nonetheless be sufficient to drive transport corporations to keep away from the realm. Whereas distressing for nations counting on free transit by the Strait of Hormuz, it does present an operational instance that Taiwan may use in a defensive contingency.

Conclusion

The U.S. Navy doesn’t have a powerful mining technique for working in a contested surroundings at the moment towards a peer adversary. Present air platforms are too susceptible towards fashionable air protection techniques and require enabling capabilities and operations to succeed in minelaying areas. Submarines is perhaps succesful relying on the circumstances, however the penalties of them being sunk in a contested space would discourage all however essentially the most very important mining operations. UUVs is perhaps a viable technique ultimately, however require a radically totally different procurement plan to develop them low cost and in mass that has not been noticed within the ORCA XLUUV. Iran, an adversary finest recognized for uneven energy projection, is demonstrating curiosity on this idea and the way it might be completed affordably. It’s time for America and like-minded international locations to usher naval mines into the missile age.

Ben Massengale is a Submarine Officer and was the AY25 Visiting Navy Fellow to the Stimson Middle. He’s a graduate of Texas A&M Galveston and holds a Masters in Protection and Strategic Research from the Naval Conflict School.

These opinions are expressed in a private capability and should not supposed to mirror official views or insurance policies of the U.S. Protection Division, the Division of the Navy, or the U.S. authorities.

1. Erickson, Andrew S, William S Murray, and Lyle J Goldstein. 2009. Chinese language Mine Warfare: A PLA Navy ‘Murderer’s Mace’ Functionality. Newport, Rhode Island: China Maritime Research Institute, U.S Naval Conflict School.

2. Holder, John T., IV, Adrew M Murray, Jason P Pinnow, Grant Rodgers, and Samantha Sperry. 2023. ASSET SUITABILITY ASSESSMENT IN SUPPORT OF OFFENSIVE MINING OPERATIONS. Techniques Engineering Capstone Report, Monterey: Naval Postgraduate College, 77.

3. Lockheed Martin. 2019. “Baseline VLA Product Card.” Lockheed Martin. Accessed March 5, 2025.

4. U.S. Navy. 2023. MK 54 – Light-weight Torpedo. November 15.

5. The Sort 12 Torpedo – Japan’s Newest Submarine Killer. Might 12. Accessed March 5, 2025.

6. Marson, James. 2024. How Ukraine’s Naval Drones Turned the Tide within the Battle of the Black Sea. June 25.

7. Rennolds, Nathan. 2023. Ukraine’s hi-tech naval assault drones have paralyzed Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, spy chief says. Augest 26. Accessed March 13, 2025.

8. Mizokami, Kyle. 2022. “How A lot it Really Prices to Fly U.S. Army Plane.” Standard Mechanics, November 16.

9. USD Chief Monetary Officer. 2024. Program Acquisition Price by Weapon System United States Division of Protection Fiscal 12 months 2025 Funds Request. Division of Protection, Washington: U.S. Authorities.

10. World Safety. 2017. RUR-5 ASROC. June 12. Accessed March 11, 2025.

11. United States Authorities Accountability Workplace. 2022. EXTRA LARGE UNMANNED UNDERSEA VEHICLE Navy Must Make use of Higher Administration Practices to Guarantee Swift Supply to the Fleet. Report back to Congress, Washington: United States Authorities Accountability Workplace, 25. Accessed March 10, 2025.

12. Greer, William L, and Bartholomew C James. 1982. Psychological Features of Mine Warfare. Skilled Paper 365, Naval Research Group, Alexandria: Middle for Naval Analyses, 15.

13. Ibid.

14. The Maritime Govt. 2025. January 26.

15. Information Army. 2025. Iran Demonstrates Fajr-5 Rocket Launcher for Sea. Febuary 22.

16. Military Recognition Group. 2025. Fajr-5 Fadjr-5 333mm MLRS. Febuary 3.

Featured Picture: The U.S. Navy Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Mustin (DDG-89) launches an RUM-139 VL-ASROC anti-submarine rocket throughout a live-fire train off Guam. (U.S. Navy picture)