{"id":51690,"date":"2026-04-17T23:07:26","date_gmt":"2026-04-17T22:07:26","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maritimehub.co.uk\/?p=51690"},"modified":"2026-04-17T23:07:26","modified_gmt":"2026-04-17T22:07:26","slug":"emergency-towing-arrangements-and-procedures","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maritimehub.co.uk\/emergency-towing-arrangements-and-procedures\/","title":{"rendered":"Emergency Towing Arrangements and Procedures"},"content":{"rendered":"
\n

ON DECK -> Mooring, Anchoring & Towing<\/p>\n

Position on Deck<\/strong><\/p>\n

Operation Group:<\/strong> Mooring \/ Towing<\/p>\n

Primary Role:<\/strong> Enable rapid connection of an emergency tow to a disabled vessel at sea<\/p>\n

Interfaces:<\/strong> Bridge team, deck crew, shore-based salvage coordinators (MRCC \/ SAR), attending tug master, flag state, P&I club, classification society<\/p>\n

Operational Criticality:<\/strong> Absolute \u2014 a vessel without propulsion in shipping lanes or near a lee shore has hours, sometimes minutes, before the situation becomes irrecoverable<\/p>\n

Failure Consequence:<\/strong> Inability to connect tow leads to grounding, structural failure, pollution, loss of life. The Erika<\/em>, the Prestige<\/em>, and the MSC Napoli<\/em> are case studies in what happens when towing either fails or arrives too late.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

The gear in the locker means nothing if nobody on board has touched it since the last survey.<\/em><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Introduction<\/h2>\n

Every ship’s crew operates on the quiet assumption that the engine will keep turning. The passage plan assumes it. The bridge team’s situational awareness is built around it. The moment propulsion is lost, the vessel becomes a very large, very heavy object subject only to wind, current, and swell \u2014 and a crew trained largely in powered manoeuvring is suddenly required to do something fundamentally different.<\/p>\n

SOLAS Chapter II-1, Regulation 3-4 mandates an Emergency Towing Arrangement on tankers of 20,000 tonnes deadweight and above. The regulation exists because tankers, when disabled and drifting, present a catastrophic pollution risk. But the logic applies to every deep-sea vessel. Bulk carriers break up. Container ships lose steerage and pile onto breakwaters. Cruise ships drift into traffic separation schemes. The ETA regulation covers tankers explicitly; good seamanship covers the rest.<\/p>\n

This article addresses the arrangement itself, the gear, the checks that actually matter, and the operational reality of connecting a tow at sea \u2014 which bears little resemblance to the tidy diagrams in the approved shipboard plan.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Contents<\/h2>\n
    \n
  • 1. The Regulatory Basis \u2014 SOLAS II-1\/3-4 and Beyond<\/li>\n
  • 2. The Arrangement: Strongpoint, Chafe Chain, Messenger, Pickup Gear<\/li>\n
  • 3. The ETA Locker and the Monthly Check That Rarely Happens Properly<\/li>\n
  • 4. Planned Salvage Versus Genuine Emergency Towing<\/li>\n
  • 5. Connecting a Tow in Heavy Weather \u2014 What Actually Happens<\/li>\n
  • 6. Communications with the Tug<\/li>\n
  • 7. Heading Control Without Propulsion<\/li>\n
  • 8. Crew Familiarity \u2014 Why the Time to Practise Is Not When It Is Needed<\/li>\n
  • 9. Closing Reality<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

     <\/p>\n

    1. The Regulatory Basis \u2014 SOLAS II-1\/3-4 and Beyond<\/h2>\n

    Regulation 3-4 of SOLAS Chapter II-1 requires tankers of 20,000 dwt and above to be fitted with an emergency towing arrangement at both the bow and the stern. The intent is straightforward: a tug arriving on scene must be able to connect without anyone from the disabled vessel having to go onto an exposed deck in conditions that may already be beyond safe working limits.<\/p>\n

    The regulation specifies that the arrangement must be capable of rapid deployment, that it should be pre-rigged or deployable without main deck power, and that it must be capable of being connected to a tug’s towing gear. MSC Circular 1255 provides detailed guidelines on the design and stowage of the arrangement.<\/p>\n

    For non-tanker vessels, there is no equivalent mandatory regulation \u2014 a gap that has been debated since the MSC Napoli<\/em> incident in 2007 and remains only partly addressed by class notations and flag state guidance. Some flag states require ETA-equivalent arrangements on bulk carriers. Most do not mandate them on container ships, despite their increasing size and windage.<\/p>\n

    The absence of a regulation does not mean the absence of the need. A 14,000 TEU container ship disabled in the Dover Strait has the same physics acting on it as a loaded VLCC. The difference is that the tanker has an ETA pre-rigged. The container ship may have nothing more than a set of bollards and a crew improvising under pressure.<\/p>\n

    Regulation creates the minimum. The sea does not care about the minimum.<\/em><\/p>\n

     <\/p>\n

    2. The Arrangement: Strongpoint, Chafe Chain, Messenger, Pickup Gear<\/h2>\n

    A properly designed ETA has several discrete components, each performing a specific function in the towing connection chain.<\/p>\n

    The strongpoint.<\/strong> This is the structural foundation \u2014 a pedestal, smit bracket, or reinforced bollard designed to take the towline load. On tankers, dedicated towing brackets are welded to the deck structure, with the supporting steelwork designed to distribute the load into the hull girder. The strongpoint must be rated for the safe working load stated in the ship’s ETA plan. On vessels without a dedicated ETA, the question of what constitutes a suitable strongpoint is often answered with optimism rather than calculation.<\/p>\n

    The chafe chain.<\/strong> The pennant wire or chain that leads from the strongpoint to the ship’s side or stern, passing through a fairlead or panama chock. Its purpose is to absorb the wear and directional change at the point where the towline exits the vessel. Chafe chain must be of sufficient diameter and length, and it must be inspectable. A corroded chafe chain is not an emergency towing arrangement. It is a liability.<\/p>\n

    The pickup gear.<\/strong> This is what the tug actually retrieves. It consists of a floating messenger line \u2014 typically polypropylene \u2014 attached to the outboard end of the chafe chain or pennant, with a pickup buoy to make it visible and recoverable. The messenger is the critical link. If the tug cannot pick it up, the connection does not happen. The messenger must float, it must be visible, and it must be long enough to allow the tug to retrieve it at a safe distance from the casualty’s hull.<\/p>\n

    The towing pennant.<\/strong> On some arrangements, a wire pennant is shackled between the chafe chain and the messenger. This provides a section of flexible wire to absorb shock loads before the main towline takes the strain. The pennant must be correctly sized for the vessel’s displacement, and its condition must be verified \u2014 not assumed.<\/p>\n

    Every component in this chain has a single point of failure. A seized shackle. A corroded link. A messenger line degraded by UV exposure. The arrangement is only as strong as the weakest item, and the weakest item is almost always the one that has not been inspected.<\/p>\n

     <\/p>\n

    3. The ETA Locker and the Monthly Check That Rarely Happens Properly<\/h2>\n

    The ETA gear is typically stowed in a dedicated locker on the poop deck or forecastle, marked and accessible. The ship’s Safety Management System will specify a monthly inspection. Classification societies require the arrangement to be surveyed at each annual or intermediate survey.<\/p>\n

    The monthly check, on paper, involves verifying the condition of all components, ensuring the messenger line is free of tangles and degradation, confirming that shackles are free and mousing wire is intact, and checking that the deployment instructions \u2014 posted in the locker \u2014 are legible and current.<\/p>\n

    In practice, the monthly check on many vessels consists of opening the locker door, confirming the gear is still there, and ticking the checklist.<\/p>\n

    That is not an inspection. That is an exercise in administrative compliance.<\/em><\/p>\n

    The messenger line is the most commonly degraded component. Polypropylene left in a steel locker on a poop deck exposed to tropical sun will degrade. It becomes brittle. It loses buoyancy. When streamed in an emergency, it sinks, or it parts when the tug’s crew haul on it. A failed messenger line in a force 8 is not a minor inconvenience. It means the tow does not connect.<\/p>\n

    Chafe chain and shackles corrode. Lashing points seize. The deployment plan, laminated and posted inside the locker door, fades to illegibility. None of these things happen suddenly. They happen over months and years of neglect disguised as routine checking.<\/p>\n

    A genuine monthly ETA inspection involves physically handling every component. Flaking out the messenger on deck. Running the chafe chain through the fairlead. Working the shackle pins. Reading the deployment plan aloud to a crew member who has never seen it. This takes time. It is unglamorous. It is also the difference between a working emergency system and a locker full of corroded metal and rotten rope.<\/p>\n

     <\/p>\n

    4. Planned Salvage Versus Genuine Emergency Towing<\/h2>\n

    There is a fundamental difference between a salvage tow \u2014 negotiated, contracted, and executed with time, resources, and a cooperative casualty \u2014 and a genuine emergency tow, where a vessel is drifting towards danger and the tug has a narrow window to connect.<\/p>\n

    In a planned salvage scenario, the salvage master boards the casualty. A towline connection plan is agreed. The tug manoeuvres into position in a controlled manner. There may be time to rig a heaving line, pass a messenger by hand, or even use the casualty’s own winches if auxiliary power is available. Lloyd’s Open Form or SCOPIC terms are agreed. The operation proceeds with some degree of order.<\/p>\n

    A genuine emergency tow at sea is a different animal entirely.<\/p>\n

    The casualty may have no power. No deck lighting. No crew available forward or aft because conditions are too dangerous. The tug may be arriving in darkness, in heavy weather, with limited information about the casualty’s heading or drift rate. The ETA gear \u2014 assuming it has been deployed \u2014 may be streaming in confused seas with a pickup buoy barely visible in the swell troughs.<\/p>\n

    In these conditions, the tug master is making an approach to a large, unlit, uncontrolled vessel that is beam-on to the sea and rolling heavily. The approach itself is hazardous. The connection attempt may take multiple passes. Every failed pass costs time, and time is measured in the distance to the lee shore.<\/p>\n

    Nobody negotiates LOF terms while the ship is two miles from the rocks.<\/em><\/p>\n

    The ETA exists precisely for this scenario. It is not salvage equipment. It is survival equipment \u2014 designed to allow a connection when nothing else works and when the people on the casualty may not be able to assist at all.<\/p>\n

     <\/p>\n

    5. Connecting a Tow in Heavy Weather \u2014 What Actually Happens<\/h2>\n

    The approved ETA plan shows a neat sequence: deploy messenger, stream pickup buoy, tug retrieves messenger, heaves in pennant wire, connects towline, takes strain. In moderate weather with a competent crew and serviceable gear, this sequence works.<\/p>\n

    In a genuine emergency, the sequence looks more like this:<\/p>\n

    The vessel is disabled. The engine room reports propulsion will not be restored. The master calls for the ETA to be deployed. The bosun and a deck party proceed aft \u2014 or forward, depending on the drift heading and the side the tug will approach from. Conditions on the exposed deck are severe. The crew are in immersion suits. Securing the area and moving the gear takes longer than anyone planned for.<\/p>\n

    The messenger line, when streamed, does not behave as it does in the diagram. It tangles on the ship’s hull fittings. The pickup buoy is driven under the counter by the swell. The chafe chain fouls a fairlead that was never actually tested under load. The deployment that the plan says takes fifteen minutes takes forty-five, and that is before the tug has even arrived on scene.<\/p>\n

    The tug makes its approach. The tug master is watching the casualty’s roll period, judging the safe distance for the approach. The tug’s crew are on the foredeck with a grapnel or a boat hook, trying to recover a polypropylene messenger in six-metre seas. The first pass fails. The second pass fouls on the casualty’s rudder. On the third attempt, the messenger is recovered and the heaving-in process begins.<\/p>\n

    Taking strain on the towline is not instantaneous. The tug must pay out enough towline to provide catenary \u2014 the sag in the line that acts as a shock absorber. If the towline is too short, or if the tug surges forward before the catenary is established, the towline parts. If the chafe chain has a weak link, it parts. If the strongpoint was never designed for the actual load, it pulls out of the deck.<\/p>\n

    A towline connection is not complete when the line is fast. It is complete when the strain is steady and the heading is under control.<\/em><\/p>\n

     <\/p>\n

    6. Communications with the Tug<\/h2>\n

    Communication between the casualty and the attending tug is a persistent weak point in emergency towing operations. VHF is the primary means. In theory, a working channel is agreed and the two vessels coordinate the approach and connection in real time.<\/p>\n

    In practice, there are language barriers. There are multiple vessels on the same frequency \u2014 coastguard, other traffic, rescue coordination. The casualty’s bridge team is managing a crisis with limited manning. The tug master needs clear, concise information: casualty’s heading, drift rate, which end the ETA is deployed from, and what to expect when the messenger is in the water.<\/p>\n

    Much of this information should be in the vessel’s ETA plan, which SOLAS requires to be readily available to the tug master. Some vessels carry this as a dedicated document; others bury it in the ship’s fire and safety plan. The IMO guidance recommends that a copy of the ETA plan be kept in a weathertight container on the bridge wing or near the ETA locker itself, for potential transfer to the tug by line or even by floating container. How many vessels have actually tested this transfer? Very few.<\/p>\n

    The most effective communication in an emergency tow is the simplest. A standard information card \u2014 vessel name, LOA, beam, displacement, ETA deployment location, strongpoint SWL, messenger type and length \u2014 transmitted by VHF, email, or even held up on a whiteboard. Anything that reduces ambiguity during the approach saves time and lives.<\/p>\n

     <\/p>\n

    7. Heading Control Without Propulsion<\/h2>\n

    Once the tow is connected and the tug begins to pull, the casualty’s heading must be controlled. Without propulsion, there is no thrust to assist with steering. The rudder, if operable, provides limited directional control at towing speeds, but only if the emergency steering gear is functional and manned.<\/p>\n

    A vessel under tow with no heading control is a pendulum. It will sheer from side to side, placing enormous dynamic loads on the towline and making the tug master’s job exponentially harder. In extreme cases, the casualty sheers so far off the towing axis that the towline parts, or the tug is pulled beam-on to the sea.<\/p>\n

    Heading control options on a disabled vessel are limited:<\/p>\n

      \n
    • Emergency steering from the steering gear room \u2014 assuming hydraulic power is available from the emergency generator or an accumulator.<\/li>\n
    • Deploying an anchor to act as a drogue, slowing drift and providing some directional stability. This is seamanship of the old school, and it works \u2014 but only if the anchor party can work the forecastle safely in the prevailing conditions.<\/li>\n
    • Asymmetric flooding or ballast shifting to create a list that biases the drift direction. This is a last resort and introduces stability risks that must be assessed by someone competent.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

      The bridge team must communicate the vessel’s heading behaviour to the tug master continuously. A vessel that is ranging and sheering unpredictably is telling both crews that the tow is not yet under control, regardless of what the towline tension suggests.<\/p>\n

      A connected tow is not a controlled tow until the heading is stable.<\/em><\/p>\n

       <\/p>\n

      8. Crew Familiarity \u2014 Why the Time to Practise Is Not When It Is Needed<\/h2>\n

      The ISM Code requires drills and exercises for emergency procedures. The ETA deployment is listed in most vessels’ drill schedules. On the majority of ships, it has never been physically practised.<\/p>\n

      The reasons are familiar. The gear is heavy. The messenger is difficult to recover once streamed. The chafe chain fouls and must be re-stowed. It takes crew away from cargo operations. The chief officer considers it a low-priority evolution when there are holds to inspect and a port call to prepare for.<\/p>\n

      All of these reasons are valid right up until the moment the engine stops and the vessel is drifting towards a coastline.<\/p>\n

      A genuine ETA deployment drill means taking the gear out of the locker, laying it out on deck, running it through the fairleads, and confirming every shackle, every link, every metre of messenger. It means identifying the crew members who will be assigned to the deployment, briefing them on the plan, walking them through the sequence, and timing the evolution. It means discovering that the fairlead is partially blocked by a welded bracket that was added during the last drydock. It means finding out that the messenger line has degraded and ordering a replacement before the next voyage.<\/p>\n

      These discoveries cannot be made during a real emergency. They can only be made during practice. And practice only happens if the master and chief officer treat ETA readiness as a genuine operational priority, not as a box on a drill schedule.<\/p>\n

      Every drill that finds a fault is a drill that has justified its existence. Every drill that confirms the gear works is a drill that gives the crew confidence they will not have otherwise. There is no downside to practising ETA deployment except the time it costs \u2014 and that time is trivial compared to the cost of failure.<\/p>\n

      The crew who have never deployed the ETA in good weather will not deploy it successfully in a storm.<\/em><\/p>\n

       <\/p>\n

      9. Closing Reality<\/h2>\n

      The emergency towing arrangement is a system that sits unused for the entire operational life of most vessels. It is inspected on paper, surveyed periodically, and stowed in a locker that many crew members have never opened. It exists for a scenario that most seafarers will never face.<\/p>\n

      But when that scenario arrives, the ETA is the difference between a vessel that is brought to safety and a vessel that goes ashore. The strongpoint must hold. The chafe chain must run. The messenger must float. The crew must know where to go, what to do, and how long it will take. The tug master must have the information needed to make a safe approach. None of this happens by accident, and none of it can be improvised under pressure if the preparation has not been done.<\/p>\n

      A locker full of corroded gear and a checklist full of ticks is not an emergency towing arrangement. It is a regulatory fiction. The sea will test it without notice, and it will not accept paperwork as a substitute for readiness.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

      ETA gear required by SOLAS II-1\/3-4 on tankers, pickup procedures, and the reality of connecting a tow in heavy weather without propulsion.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"fifu_image_url":"","fifu_image_alt":"","c2c-post-author-ip":"2a02:c7c:2ef8:2400:931:afb1:9971:4a62","footnotes":""},"categories":[1,14],"tags":[9180,9292,9296,9298,9295,9297,9293,9294],"class_list":["post-51690","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-latest","category-on-deck","tag-deck-safety","tag-emergency-towing-arrangement","tag-eta-deployment","tag-heavy-weather-operations","tag-mooring-and-towing","tag-salvage-towing","tag-solas-ii-1","tag-towing-procedures"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maritimehub.co.uk\/?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/51690","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maritimehub.co.uk\/?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maritimehub.co.uk\/?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maritimehub.co.uk\/?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maritimehub.co.uk\/?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=51690"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/maritimehub.co.uk\/?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/51690\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":51696,"href":"https:\/\/maritimehub.co.uk\/?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/51690\/revisions\/51696"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maritimehub.co.uk\/?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=51690"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maritimehub.co.uk\/?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=51690"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maritimehub.co.uk\/?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=51690"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}