By LtCol James M. Jackson
Introduction
In 2027, Activity Pressure Blade, a U.S. Naval (USN) process power within the Western Pacific, makes an attempt to neutralize a Individuals’s Liberation Military – Navy (PLAN) power by means of Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO). By dispersing its Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, Littoral Fight Ships, and Virginia-class submarines throughout the Philippine Sea and strategic chokepoints, the duty power goals to boost its elusiveness, resilience, and lethality. Nonetheless, the restrictions of this method turn out to be obvious when confronted with the distinctive challenges posed by the huge Western Pacific theater and PLAN forces.
The operation begins with intelligence gathering utilizing RQ-4 World Hawk drones, P-8A Poseidon plane, and NRO satellites. Regardless of the superior sensors, the PLAN’s use of electromagnetic spectrum administration and deception strategies hinders the effectiveness of this intelligence gathering. These distant sensors battle to assemble and talk concentrating on info to capturing platforms, and their lack of riskworthiness prevents them from gathering higher info by gaining nearer proximity to targets. Assault platforms, such because the U.S. destroyers, are subsequently compelled to interrupt from their distributed working posture to realize nearer proximity to targets with the intention to collect concentrating on info with their natural sensors. These warships then try to coordinate a long-range missile assault utilizing a mix of weapons similar to Tomahawks and Customary Missile-6s (SM-6s).1 The SAG additionally coordinates with plane to launch Lengthy Vary Anti-Ship Missiles (LRASMs) in opposition to the PLAN forces.
However the means of compromising the distributed working posture gave the PLA sufficient discover to place its platforms into the next state of readiness, optimize its disposition in opposition to the possible risk axis, and surge a number of squadrons price of plane to cowl the warships. This forewarned and strengthened air protection community posed by the PLAN’s superior warships and plane counters the great missile assault launched by U.S. forces. The necessity to break the distributed power posture to realize proximity to PLA forces drew U.S. forces deeper into the PLA weapons engagement zone, setting the stage for a number of rounds of counterattacks by PLA forces. The U.S. missile assault created signatures that clarified the sensing problem for PLA forces, creating strain for the now-targetable U.S. forces to pay attention into typical formations to enhance survivability. The restricted journal capability of U.S. ships and logistical challenges restrict the duty power’s means to maintain fight operations because it considers whether or not it could possibly persist contained in the WEZ.
Although that is solely a vignette, it exposes important limitations within the USN’s present method to DMO when utilized to the Western Pacific. Present distributed working ideas should handle these huge distances, complicated atmosphere, and the PLA’s anti-access/space denial (A2/AD) capabilities. The U.S. Navy can handle some key challenges inherent in executing DMO in opposition to the PLA within the Western Pacific by incorporating classes from Ukraine’s superior scouting and concentrating on, uneven ways, and institution of sea denial zones within the Black Sea. Ukrainian actions can inform a novel framework for the way a distributed U.S. maritime power can overcome the operational challenges and uneven disadvantages it’ll face in opposition to the PLA within the Western Pacific.
DMO – Defining the Idea
Essentially the most present and official definition of DMO is within the 2020 Tri-Service Maritime doc “Benefit at Sea.” Accordingly, “Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) is an working idea that focuses on the distribution, integration, and maneuvering of naval forces to mass overwhelming fight energy and results at chosen instances and places.”2 Moreover, the “Preventing DMO” collection on CIMSE notes a number of frequent themes in public definitions of DMO, together with “the massing and convergence of fires from distributed forces, complicating adversary concentrating on and decision-making, and networking results throughout platforms and domains.”3 Others have famous that the “denial of enemy intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities is crucial to DMO,” and that the power have to be “arduous to seek out, arduous to kill, and deadly.”4,5 These definitions might be synthesized to outline DMO as the next:
The distribution and maneuver of naval forces throughout numerous domains, mixing sea-based and land-based capabilities to successfully focus fight energy and hinder adversary concentrating on whereas emphasizing the dispersion of models, diversified use of sensors and weapons, and incorporation of long-range and autonomous techniques.
DMO signifies a strategic evolution from conventional platform-centric warfare to a network-centric paradigm.6 This method allows massing firepower with out co-locating launch platforms, facilitated by elevated weapons vary and networks for long-range coordination. It seeks to garner some great benefits of focus – a large, unified strike power – with out the related dangers of grouping property too intently. DMO emphasizes a dispersed but cohesive operational sample, aiming to create a formidable power with out centralizing targets for the adversary.
DMO synthesizes the ideas of distribution, integration, and maneuver to mass fight energy successfully and is a response to particular challenges posed by the PLA’s subtle naval capabilities.7 The PLA maintains a extremely succesful anti-ship missile arsenal, together with superior weapons just like the DF-21D and DF-26 missiles, which may goal U.S. carriers and main floor combatants over lengthy distances.8 The idea seeks to mitigate these threats by dispersing naval forces throughout a broader space. By using DMO, the U.S. Navy goals to boost its survivability in environments dominated by long-range missile threats and preserve its means to mission energy regardless of an more and more contested maritime area.
Essential PLA challenges to DMO
The PLA’s subtle detection skills, superior missile ranges, and mass firepower methods will problem a distributed maritime power’s makes an attempt at being elusive, resilient, and deadly. The PLA’s superior ISR and detection capabilities embrace an unlimited community of land-based radars, over-the-horizon (OTH) radars, and a constellation of reconnaissance satellites. Sustaining resilience will show difficult because the PLA’s long-range precision strike missiles, such because the DF-21D and DF-26 “service killer” missiles, goal U.S. naval property from lengthy ranges. The PLA’s massed firepower methods, significantly their saturation missile assaults, can overwhelm a distributed power’s defenses and deplete its journal depth, successfully neutralizing its offensive capability and skill to strike successfully first.
The PLA can practically relentlessly detect and observe naval property throughout monumental distances. Their land-based radar techniques, such because the JY-27A and YLC-8B, present long-range surveillance protection extending a whole bunch of kilometers from the Chinese language mainland.9 Moreover, the PLA’s OTH radars, just like the SLC-7 and SLC-18, exploit ionospheric reflection to detect floor targets as much as 3,000 km away.10 Moreover, China’s rising fleet of Yaogan and Gaofen collection satellites geared up with artificial aperture radar (SAR) and electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) sensors allow all-weather, day-and-night monitoring of maritime actions.11 These superior ISR property, working in live performance, severely undermine a distributed power’s basic intent to stay elusive. Sustaining operational effectiveness underneath DMO would require an elevated give attention to superior stealth applied sciences, improved evasion ways, and strong counter-surveillance measures.12 Adapting to this risk atmosphere is important for the U.S. Navy to counteract the delicate surveillance strategies of the PLA successfully.
The PLA’s superior missile capabilities, together with weapons just like the DF-21D and DF-26 “service killer” missiles, current important challenges to distributed operations. These missiles can goal U.S. naval property from 1,500 miles and pose a extreme risk to carriers and different massive vessels.13 The DF-17 hypersonic glide car, with a spread of as much as 1,500 miles, additional complicates this, as its maneuverability and pace current further monitoring and interception challenges.14 Furthermore, the PLA’s continued growth of the YJ-18 and YJ-21 anti-ship cruise missiles, with ranges exceeding 330 miles and 900 miles, respectively, provides one other layer of complexity to the risk atmosphere. These missiles, able to being launched from numerous platforms similar to submarines, ships, and plane, can saturate and overwhelm a distributed power’s defenses.15 The PLA’s funding within the H-6K bomber, which may carry as much as six YJ-12 supersonic anti-ship missiles, additional extends the attain and adaptability of their strike capabilities.16
Utilizing massed, multi-axis missile assaults can obtain speedy dominance in a battle. This method exploits the finite nature of U.S. naval missile protection techniques, such because the Aegis Fight System and Customary Missile interceptors. By launching a mass amount of missiles from numerous platforms, together with land-based launchers, ships, submarines, and plane, the PLA can saturate and exhaust these defensive capabilities.17 Such a depletion would successfully neutralize a distributed power’s (or platform’s) capability earlier than it could possibly launch its personal assaults.18 The affected power may have misplaced its means to strike successfully first.19
The actions performed by Ukraine in opposition to the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) illuminate a technique to resolve these challenges. The success of Ukraine in countering Russian aggression affords worthwhile classes to handle the PLA challenges of subtle ISR networks, long-range precision strike missiles, and massed firepower methods. By incorporating key elements of Ukraine’s method, similar to using cellular and shore-based anti-ship missiles, the employment of unmanned techniques for ISR and strike missions, and the adoption of unconventional ways just like the “mosquito fleet” idea, the USN can develop a extra resilient and efficient distributed power posture. An developed DMO framework, which emphasizes elevated mobility, flexibility, and the combination of novel applied sciences and ways, might help mitigate the dangers posed by the PLA’s superior capabilities and supply a extra strong deterrent within the area. Nonetheless, adapting to this evolving risk panorama would require steady innovation, experimentation, and a willingness to problem conventional paradigms of naval warfare.
Ukraine within the Black Sea
Ukraine’s Black Sea operations reveal a potent mixture of superior scouting and concentrating on, unconventional ways, and the institution of sea denial zones. By way of enhanced surveillance utilizing drones just like the Bayraktar TB2, Ukraine executed precision strikes on key targets, such because the sinking of the Russian cruiser Moskva.20 Ukraine enhances this superior scouting with uneven ways, together with using mines, UUVs, shore-based anti-ship missiles, and small, fast-attack craft generally known as the “mosquito fleet.”21 By integrating these parts with progressive floor maneuvers, Ukraine disrupts conventional approaches to naval engagements, reaching stealth and effectiveness in placing first.
The fruits of those approaches is the institution of sea denial zones, the place Ukraine successfully restricts adversary entry and transforms maritime areas into formidable defensive strains.22 These measures restrict enemy motion and supply a strong deterrent in opposition to aggressive naval actions. Adapting and making use of these classes to the DMO idea might help mitigate the dangers posed by the PLA’s superior capabilities and improve the resilience and effectiveness of U.S. naval forces within the Western Pacific.
Ukraine has successfully employed superior scouting strategies within the Black Sea to boost its means to strike Russian naval property first. Using aerial surveillance drones, such because the Bayraktar TB2, has supplied distant situational consciousness deep contained in the adversary weapons engagement zone and focused precision engagements, as demonstrated by the monitoring and concentrating on of Raptor-class patrol boats.23 The sinking of the Moskva cruiser was achieved by means of exact intelligence that cued Neptune missile launches, highlighting Ukraine’s capability to execute high-impact strikes by leveraging a speedy intelligence-gathering and concentrating on cycle. Ukraine’s complete scouting methodology additionally incorporates penetrating UAVs and UUVs for intelligence-gathering missions in opposition to numerous targets, together with the minesweeper Ivan Golubets and the cruiser Admiral Makarov.24 These successes showcase Ukraine’s efficient integration of reconnaissance, scouting, and ISR capabilities to focus on Russian BSF operations. By combining superior applied sciences, riskworthy scouts, and streamlined intelligence evaluation and decision-making processes, Ukraine has established an efficient mannequin for conducting maritime surveillance and concentrating on in a contested atmosphere. The USN can use comparable scouting ideas to realize a bonus within the Western Pacific.
Ukraine’s Black Sea naval operations have uniquely utilized unconventional ways, leveraging superior applied sciences and innovation to counter Russian aggression. The employment of Bayraktar TB2 drones for precision strikes in opposition to Russian Raptor-class patrol boats and a BK-16 high-speed assault boat close to Snake Island represents an unconventional use of aerial drones in a maritime context, permitting Ukraine to problem Russia’s naval superiority whereas minimizing danger to Ukrainian forces.25
Equally, the deployment of MAGURA V5 USVs to efficiently assault bigger Russian vessels, such because the Challenge 22160 patrol ship Sergey Kotov and the Tarantul-class corvette R-334 Ivanovets, represents a departure from conventional naval battle, as these small, agile, and expendable platforms can swarm and overwhelm enemy defenses.26 These unconventional approaches, additional enhanced by the combination of cyber warfare capabilities and particular forces operations, as exemplified by the joint Ukrainian SBU and Navy effort that critically broken the Ropucha-class touchdown ship Olenegorsky Gornyak close to the Port of Novorossiysk, have allowed a smaller, much less highly effective naval power to successfully problem a bigger adversary.27
2027 Revisited: TF Blade within the South China Sea
TF Blade, working within the South China Sea, adopts a type of Ukraine’s superior scouting and concentrating on ways to counter a PLA naval risk. The duty power, composed of Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, Littoral Fight Ships, and USVs, detects a PLAN SAG close to the Spratly Islands utilizing a community of MQ-9B SeaGuardian UAVs and Orca UUVs.28 The SeaGuardians present persistent, high-resolution imagery of the PLA SAG, which features a Sort 055 Renhai-class cruiser and several other Sort 052D Luyang III-class destroyers. On the identical time, the Orca UUVs collect acoustic intelligence on the PLA ships, figuring out their distinctive sound signatures and monitoring their actions. Fusing the information from these penetrating scouting platforms, the duty power’s AI-enabled battle administration system generates a complete, real-time image of the PLA SAG’s disposition and vulnerabilities, revealing that the Sort 055 cruiser, a important command and management node, is working with degraded air protection capabilities.
In 2027, TF Blade seizes the chance, launching a coordinated, multi-domain strike in opposition to the PLA SAG. A swarm of USVs deploy digital warfare payloads to jam the PLA ships’ sensors and communications whereas emitting misleading signatures. On the identical time, the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers are capable of launch a salvo of SM-6 missiles from broadly distributed firing positions. These missiles, guided by the concentrating on knowledge from the SeaGuardians and Orcas, converge on the Sort 055 cruiser, overwhelming its weakened defenses and neutralizing the ship with a number of hits. This strike’s precision and coordination significantly weakens the PLA SAG, forcing it to withdraw from the realm and reassess its technique.
Following the profitable strike in opposition to the PLA Floor Motion Group (SAG) close to the Spratly Islands, TF Blade continues to observe the state of affairs utilizing its superior scouting and concentrating on capabilities. The duty power launches a collection of uneven assaults to additional disrupt PLA operations and degrade their fight capabilities. A Zumwalt-class destroyer employs its stealth to realize proximity to a PLA amphibious group and deploys a swarm of small, expendable USVs to conduct a coordinated assault on a PLA Sort 071 transport dock. These USVs, armed with miniaturized torpedoes and guided missiles, evade PLA defenses and ship a compromising strike on the vessel by considerably damaging its effectively deck.
TF Blade’s CSG and its related Destroyer Squadron (DESRON) set up a sea denial zone in opposition to the PLA Navy within the Western Pacific. By deploying a community of MQ-4C Triton drones for high-altitude surveillance, supplemented by satellite tv for pc reconnaissance, the CSG and DESRON successfully observe important PLA property, together with Sort 055 destroyers working close to the Paracel Islands, and monitor their actions towards the primary island chain. One other layer of close-in penetrating scouts and drones is located in higher-risk areas to realize top quality concentrating on info that may be relayed again by means of the Tritons to cue standoff engagements from distributed forces.
TF Blade positions its penetrating UUVs close to the Spratly Islands to additional limit PLA naval operations whereas laying sensor-laden sensible mines to regulate essential sea lanes and chokepoints. These UUVs discreetly monitor PLA submarine exercise, significantly the actions of their Sort 093 and Sort 039 lessons, offering real-time intelligence on their positions and patrol patterns. Leveraging this intelligence, Arleigh Burke-class destroyers distribute themselves into firing positions exterior PLA submarine patrol packing containers, launching Tomahawk strikes in opposition to PLA command and management facilities on Mischief Reef and Subi Reef, damaging their A2/AD community.
These actions problem and reshape PLA’s conventional maritime methods, imposing important operational constraints on their naval forces and pushing their efficient vary additional again from important areas just like the Taiwan Strait. By way of this multi-domain method, the CSG and DESRON set up a sturdy sea denial zone within the Western Pacific.
Logistical and Sustainment Challenges in Prolonged Maritime Operations
Making use of Ukrainian Black Sea ways in opposition to the PLA within the Western Pacific presents important logistical challenges as a result of area’s huge distances and the USN’s want to take care of lengthy provide strains. Not like Ukraine’s operations within the Black Sea, which profit from shut proximity to land-based assist, the U.S. Navy would want to maintain operations as much as 6,000 nautical miles from its major bases within the continental United States. The PLAN, in distinction, enjoys a logistical benefit with its inside strains of communication and entry to quite a few bases alongside the Chinese language coast, the furthest being only one,500 nautical miles from the potential areas of operation within the South China Sea.
The USN should set up a sturdy community of ahead working bases, pre-positioned provides, and cellular logistics platforms to beat these challenges and successfully implement DMO ways knowledgeable by the Ukrainian expertise. This is able to require important funding in logistics infrastructure, similar to growing the variety of assist ships from the present 29 to an estimated 60-70, because the Heart for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments beneficial.29 Moreover, the USN would want to increase its entry to amenities in allied international locations, similar to Japan, South Korea, and Singapore, and develop new applied sciences to increase the vary and endurance of its platforms, significantly unmanned automobiles. As an example, the U.S. Navy’s present MQ-4C Triton drone has a spread of 8,200 nautical miles, however working within the Western Pacific could require much more prolonged endurance capabilities.30
Conducting DMO utilizing Ukrainian ideas would require making logistics extra distributed, with smaller depots which are much less targetable. This can enhance the redundancy of the logistics community the place no logistics node is so important that its loss severely impacts the broader power. Methods employed by Ukraine, similar to using diversified, smaller platforms, might be scaled up and supported by the USN’s superior logistical capabilities, enabling sustained operations even within the prolonged operational areas of the Western Pacific. Smaller, increased portions of capabilities would require fewer beautiful capabilities, permitting for using quite a few smaller ports and airfields that will not be accessible to the USN’s massive ships. Using extra but smaller logistics nodes all through the theater would enhance logistics resiliency and adaptability.
Variations in Maritime Theater Traits
The operational environments of the Black Sea and the Western Pacific differ considerably, presenting distinctive challenges in making use of Ukrainian naval ways in opposition to the PLA Navy. The Black Sea is a comparatively confined physique of water with a most width of 600 nautical miles. In distinction, the Western Pacific is an unlimited expanse of ocean, with the potential space of operations spanning 1000’s of nautical miles from the South China Sea to the Philippine Sea. These variations in scale and geography considerably influence the effectiveness of assorted naval ways and applied sciences, and the viability of making use of Ukrainian classes to the Pacific theater.
The Black Sea’s confined nature permits for the efficient use of smaller, extra agile craft and the deployment of dense networks of sensors and mines to regulate key chokepoints. These ways could also be much less efficient within the vastness of the Western Pacific, because the PLAN has larger room for maneuver and might leverage its bigger, extra succesful ships to mission energy over larger distances. Ukraine’s profitable use of shore-based anti-ship missiles, such because the Neptune, and drones, just like the Bayraktar TB2, equally rely closely on the Black Sea’s restricted distances and the flexibility to combine land-based assist. Nonetheless, extra prolonged detection and engagement ranges, in addition to the restricted availability of land-based assist infrastructure, could scale back the effectiveness of those techniques within the open ocean atmosphere of the Western Pacific. Adapting Ukrainian ways to this theater would require important funding in growing long-range platforms, similar to bigger USVs and UUVs, in addition to enhancing present techniques to increase their attain and endurance.
Whereas the Black Sea’s confined nature permits for using dense networks of sensors and mines to regulate key chokepoints, the USN can nonetheless undertake this method in important areas of the Western Pacific. These embrace important maritime chokepoints just like the Taiwan Strait, Philippine Strait, the Ryukus Island chain, and the littorals within the South China Sea. In these areas, the USN might create localized sea denial zones knowledgeable by the Ukrainian expertise. By adapting these ways and applied sciences to the distinctive geography of the Western Pacific, similar to specializing in strategic chokepoints and key archipelagic terrain, the USN can successfully apply the teachings realized from Ukraine’s Black Sea operations to counter the PLAN, regardless of the variations within the scale and traits of the operational environments.
Suggestions
For the USN to higher implement these ways, the Workplace of Naval Analysis (ONR) ought to sponsor research to discover the optimum integration of penetrating and riskworthy USVs and UUVs into the DMO idea, specializing in their roles in ISR, EW, and offensive operations. These research ought to particularly examine the best USV/UUV platforms and payloads for particular missions, command and management architectures for coordinating drone swarms, USV/UUV facilitation of distributed killchains, ways for using drone swarms in littoral environments, and countermeasures in opposition to adversary drone threats.
The USN ought to develop and check uneven warfare ways impressed by Ukrainian operations. These ought to give attention to the coordination of USV/UUV swarm assaults on enemy floor combatants, the combination of cyber and EW capabilities to degrade enemy C4ISR networks, the employment of mines and coastal protection techniques to determine localized sea denial zones, and using small, agile models for amphibious raids and seizure of key maritime terrain. The combination of those ways ought to be refined by means of wargaming, simulations, and stay workouts, such because the Navy’s Massive Scale Train (LSE), to validate their effectiveness and determine areas for enchancment.
The USN ought to prioritize growing and integrating a system just like Collaborative Fight Plane (CCA) with USVs and UUVs to boost the situational consciousness and distributed lethality of typical naval forces.31 Key focus areas ought to embrace the AI-driven autonomous coordination techniques for human-machine groups, superior communication and data-sharing applied sciences for safe and dependable connectivity, and the combination of collaborative fight techniques with different maritime property working in a distributed method. These techniques ought to endure rigorous testing in practical A2/AD environments to make sure reliability in a contested electromagnetic spectrum.
The USN must also discover methods to combine DMO with Marine Stand-In Forces (SIF) and Expeditionary Superior Base Operations (EABO).32 These efforts ought to give attention to growing quickly deployable, self-sustaining EABO models that may present ISR and concentrating on assist to distributed naval forces. Moreover, the Navy ought to discover the employment of SIF utilizing USVs, UUVs, and coastal protection techniques to create localized sea denial zones.33 To grab and defend important maritime terrain in contested environments, coordination between DMO and SIF/EABO property ought to be a key precedence. Lastly, these experiments and workouts ought to refine ways, strategies, and procedures (TTPs) for built-in DMO-SIF/EABO operations, making certain a cohesive and sensible method to distributed maritime warfare.
Lastly, the USN ought to set up and codify clear DMO doctrine, and it ought to consider the proficiency of naval formations at executing this doctrine throughout their certification cycles. Concurrently, the Navy ought to create a devoted warfighting growth group to steer, coordinate, and prioritize DMO-related efforts throughout the Navy and Marine Corps. It ought to develop and preserve a repository of classes realized and greatest practices from DMO workouts and operations, present coaching and schooling to Navy and Marine Corps personnel on DMO ideas and ways, and foster collaboration with allies, companions, and business to advance DMO capabilities and interoperability. By taking these steps, the U.S. Navy can create a complete framework for the profitable implementation and steady enchancment of DMO, making certain its forces are well-prepared to function successfully in contested environments and counter the evolving threats posed by near-peer adversaries.
Conclusion
Ukraine has demonstrated the worth of exploiting vulnerabilities in Russian naval operations with uneven capabilities. These strategies have successfully pushed Russian naval forces away from the western Black Sea and compelled them to function primarily close to their bases in Crimea and Novorossiysk. This forfeiture of sea management has discovered Russia largely confining its naval forces to defensive positions with restricted means to mission energy or assist land-based operations in southern Ukraine. Regardless of the numerous disparity in maritime energy and the lack of a considerable portion of its fleet early within the battle, Ukraine’s progressive method to sea denial, centered on penetrative scouting, precision concentrating on, and uneven capabilities, has allowed it to successfully dispute Russia’s sea management within the Black Sea coastal waters, considerably undermining its strategic place within the area.34 Whereas the teachings realized from Ukraine’s Black Sea operations present worthwhile insights, their direct software to the Western Pacific requires cautious consideration of this huge and complicated theater’s distinctive geographical and operational challenges.
By analyzing the theoretical underpinnings of DMO, the sensible challenges within the Western Pacific, and Ukrainian actions in opposition to the Russian Black Sea Fleet, a framework might be developed that straight addresses the challenges of a distributed power going through the PLA. Regardless of the distinction in operational environments, the elemental ideas and ways employed by Ukraine within the Black Sea might be tailored and utilized to counter the PLAN within the Western Pacific. The USN can improve the effectiveness of DMO by specializing in superior scouting, uneven ways, and the institution of sea denial zones alongside key maritime terrain, as demonstrated by Ukraine’s success. This won’t solely broaden the applicability of DMO as an operational idea, however can even present a tangible framework for addressing asymmetry in naval warfare.
LtCol James Jackson is a profession logistician within the U.S. Marines. He’s a graduate of the Maritime Superior Warfighting Faculty and is at present an Operational Planner at Marine Corps Forces Our on-line world Command.
References
[1] “Customary Missile-6 (SM-6),” Missile Risk, Heart for Strategic and Worldwide Research, accessed April 7, 2023,
[2] Benefit at Sea: Prevailing with Built-in All-Area Naval Energy, U.S. Division of Protection, pg. 25, December 2020,
[3] Dmitry Filipoff. “Preventing DMO, PT. 1: Defining Distributed Maritime Operations and The Way forward for Naval Warfare”. Heart for Worldwide Maritime Safety. Accessed March 8, 2024.
[4]Harlan Ullman. “Are There Flaws within the U.S. Navy’s Distributed Maritime Operations?,” Protection Information, January 23, 2023.
[5] Richard Mosier. “Distributed Maritime Operations: Arduous to Discover,” Heart for Worldwide Maritime Safety. Accessed March 8, 2024.
[6] Dmitry Filipoff. “Preventing DMO, PT. 1: Defining Distributed Maritime Operations and The Way forward for Naval Warfare”. Heart for Worldwide Maritime Safety. Accessed March 8, 2024.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Dr. Sam Goldsmith, “VAMPIRE VAMPIRE VAMPIRE The PLA’s anti-ship cruise missile risk to Australian and allied naval operations,” Australian Strategic Coverage Institute, April 2022, 10.
[9] “Introduction to Chinese language Navy Radar,” GlobalSecurity.org, accessed March 12, 2024,
[10] Ibid.
[11]James Andrew Lewis, ‘No Place to Disguise: A Have a look at China’s Geosynchronous Surveillance Capabilities,’ Heart for Strategic & Worldwide Research (CSIS), accessed March 20, 2024,
[12] Richard Mosier. “Distributed Maritime Operations: Arduous to Discover,” Heart for Worldwide Maritime Safety. Accessed March 8, 2024.
[13] “Missiles of China.” Missile Risk. Accessed March 12, 2024.
[14] “Missiles of China.” Missile Risk. Accessed March 12, 2024.
[15] “YJ-18,” Missile Risk, accessed March 24, 2024,
[16] Navy Right this moment, ‘H-6K Strategic Bomber,’ accessed March 20, 2024,
[17] “The Chinese language Navy: Making ready for ‘Informatized’ Struggle at Sea,” Workplace of Naval Intelligence, Suitland, MD, 2021,
[18] Dmitry Filipoff.”Preventing DMO Pt 4: Weapons Depletion and the Final Ditch Salvo Dynamic.” CIMSEC. Accessed March 12, 2024.
[19] Wayne P. Hughes Jr. and Robert P. Girrier, Fleet Techniques and Naval Operations, Third Version (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2018), 269. See Hughes’ idea of “placing successfully first”.
[20] H.I. Sutton, “Timeline-2022 Ukraine Invasion At Sea,” Accessed March 22, 2024,
[21] Ibid.
[22] USNI Information. “Western Navies See Strategic, Tactical Classes from Ukraine Invasion.” Accessed March 20, 2024.
[23] H.I. Sutton, “Timeline-2022 Ukraine Invasion At Sea,” Accessed March 22, 2024,
[24] Sutton, “Timeline-2022 Ukraine Invasion At Sea”.
[25] H.I. Sutton, “Timeline-2022 Ukraine Invasion At Sea,” Accessed March 22, 2024,
[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Naval Information, “Boeing Delivers First Orca XLUUV to U.S. Navy,” Naval Information, April 28, 2022,
[29]Timothy A. Walton and Ryan Boone, “Sustaining the Combat: Resilient Maritime Logistics for a New Period,” Heart for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2019, Viii.
[30] “MQ-4C Triton Broad Space Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) Unmanned Plane System (UAS),” Naval Expertise, accessed March 24, 2024,
[31] “Air Pressure, Navy collaborating on 4 ‘fundamentals’ of CCA drones,” DefenseScoop, accessed 1 April 2024,
[32] United States Marine Corps, Tentative Guide for Expeditionary Superior Base Operations, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Division of the Navy, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 2023), 1-2.
[33] U.S. Marine Corps, A Idea for Stand-in Forces (Washington, DC: Division of the Navy, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 2021), 4.
[34] Vego, Milan (2015) “On Littoral Warfare,” Naval Struggle School Overview: Vol. 68: No. 2, Article 4. This paper makes use of Dr. Vego’s definition of sea management: “the flexibility to make use of a given a part of the ocean or ocean and related airspace for army and nonmilitary functions and deny the identical to the enemy throughout open hostilities.”
Featured Picture: A satellite tv for pc picture showing to point out the broken Russian touchdown vessel Olenegorsky Gornyak leaking oil whereas docked in Novorossiysk, Russia. Ukraine mentioned its sea drones broken the warship. (Photograph by Planet Labs PBC through AP)
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