By LtCol James M. Jackson
Introduction
In 2027, Activity Pressure Blade, a U.S. Naval (USN) activity power within the Western Pacific, makes an attempt to neutralize a Folks’s Liberation Military – Navy (PLAN) power by means of Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO). By dispersing its Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, Littoral Fight Ships, and Virginia-class submarines throughout the Philippine Sea and strategic chokepoints, the duty power goals to boost its elusiveness, resilience, and lethality. Nonetheless, the constraints of this method turn out to be obvious when confronted with the distinctive challenges posed by the huge Western Pacific theater and PLAN forces.
The operation begins with intelligence gathering utilizing RQ-4 World Hawk drones, P-8A Poseidon plane, and NRO satellites. Regardless of the superior sensors, the PLAN’s use of electromagnetic spectrum administration and deception strategies hinders the effectiveness of this intelligence gathering. These distant sensors wrestle to assemble and talk focusing on data to capturing platforms, and their lack of riskworthiness prevents them from gathering higher data by gaining nearer proximity to targets. Assault platforms, such because the U.S. destroyers, are subsequently compelled to interrupt from their distributed working posture to achieve nearer proximity to targets so as to collect focusing on data with their natural sensors. These warships then try to coordinate a long-range missile assault utilizing a mixture of weapons reminiscent of Tomahawks and Normal Missile-6s (SM-6s).1 The SAG additionally coordinates with plane to launch Lengthy Vary Anti-Ship Missiles (LRASMs) towards the PLAN forces.
However the means of compromising the distributed working posture gave the PLA sufficient discover to place its platforms into the next state of readiness, optimize its disposition towards the possible risk axis, and surge a number of squadrons value of plane to cowl the warships. This forewarned and strengthened air protection community posed by the PLAN’s superior warships and plane counters the excellent missile assault launched by U.S. forces. The necessity to break the distributed power posture to achieve proximity to PLA forces drew U.S. forces deeper into the PLA weapons engagement zone, setting the stage for a number of rounds of counterattacks by PLA forces. The U.S. missile assault created signatures that clarified the sensing problem for PLA forces, creating stress for the now-targetable U.S. forces to pay attention into standard formations to enhance survivability. The restricted journal capability of U.S. ships and logistical challenges restrict the duty power’s skill to maintain fight operations because it considers whether or not it could actually persist contained in the WEZ.
Although that is solely a vignette, it exposes important limitations within the USN’s present method to DMO when utilized to the Western Pacific. Present distributed working ideas should handle these huge distances, complicated atmosphere, and the PLA’s anti-access/space denial (A2/AD) capabilities. The U.S. Navy can handle some key challenges inherent in executing DMO towards the PLA within the Western Pacific by incorporating classes from Ukraine’s superior scouting and focusing on, uneven ways, and institution of sea denial zones within the Black Sea. Ukrainian actions can inform a novel framework for a way a distributed U.S. maritime power can overcome the operational challenges and uneven disadvantages it’s going to face towards the PLA within the Western Pacific.
DMO – Defining the Idea
Probably the most present and official definition of DMO is within the 2020 Tri-Service Maritime doc “Benefit at Sea.” Accordingly, “Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) is an working idea that focuses on the distribution, integration, and maneuvering of naval forces to mass overwhelming fight energy and results at chosen occasions and areas.”2 Moreover, the “Combating DMO” collection on CIMSE notes a number of frequent themes in public definitions of DMO, together with “the massing and convergence of fires from distributed forces, complicating adversary focusing on and decision-making, and networking results throughout platforms and domains.”3 Others have famous that the “denial of enemy intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities is crucial to DMO,” and that the power should be “exhausting to seek out, exhausting to kill, and deadly.”4,5 These definitions may be synthesized to outline DMO as the next:
The distribution and maneuver of naval forces throughout numerous domains, mixing sea-based and land-based capabilities to successfully focus fight energy and hinder adversary focusing on whereas emphasizing the dispersion of items, diversified use of sensors and weapons, and incorporation of long-range and autonomous techniques.
DMO signifies a strategic evolution from conventional platform-centric warfare to a network-centric paradigm.6 This method allows massing firepower with out co-locating launch platforms, facilitated by elevated weapons vary and networks for long-range coordination. It seeks to garner the benefits of focus – a large, unified strike power – with out the related dangers of grouping belongings too carefully. DMO emphasizes a dispersed but cohesive operational sample, aiming to create a formidable power with out centralizing targets for the adversary.
DMO synthesizes the ideas of distribution, integration, and maneuver to mass fight energy successfully and is a response to particular challenges posed by the PLA’s subtle naval capabilities.7 The PLA maintains a extremely succesful anti-ship missile arsenal, together with superior weapons just like the DF-21D and DF-26 missiles, which may goal U.S. carriers and main floor combatants over lengthy distances.8 The idea seeks to mitigate these threats by dispersing naval forces throughout a broader space. By using DMO, the U.S. Navy goals to boost its survivability in environments dominated by long-range missile threats and preserve its skill to undertaking energy regardless of an more and more contested maritime area.
Important PLA challenges to DMO
The PLA’s subtle detection skills, superior missile ranges, and mass firepower methods will problem a distributed maritime power’s makes an attempt at being elusive, resilient, and deadly. The PLA’s superior ISR and detection capabilities embody an unlimited community of land-based radars, over-the-horizon (OTH) radars, and a constellation of reconnaissance satellites. Sustaining resilience will show difficult because the PLA’s long-range precision strike missiles, such because the DF-21D and DF-26 “service killer” missiles, goal U.S. naval belongings from lengthy ranges. The PLA’s massed firepower methods, notably their saturation missile assaults, can overwhelm a distributed power’s defenses and deplete its journal depth, successfully neutralizing its offensive capability and talent to strike successfully first.
The PLA can practically relentlessly detect and monitor naval belongings throughout monumental distances. Their land-based radar techniques, such because the JY-27A and YLC-8B, present long-range surveillance protection extending a whole bunch of kilometers from the Chinese language mainland.9 Moreover, the PLA’s OTH radars, just like the SLC-7 and SLC-18, exploit ionospheric reflection to detect floor targets as much as 3,000 km away.10 Moreover, China’s rising fleet of Yaogan and Gaofen collection satellites geared up with artificial aperture radar (SAR) and electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) sensors allow all-weather, day-and-night monitoring of maritime actions.11 These superior ISR belongings, working in live performance, severely undermine a distributed power’s elementary intent to stay elusive. Sustaining operational effectiveness underneath DMO would require an elevated give attention to superior stealth applied sciences, improved evasion ways, and strong counter-surveillance measures.12 Adapting to this risk atmosphere is crucial for the U.S. Navy to counteract the delicate surveillance strategies of the PLA successfully.
The PLA’s superior missile capabilities, together with weapons just like the DF-21D and DF-26 “service killer” missiles, current important challenges to distributed operations. These missiles can goal U.S. naval belongings from 1,500 miles and pose a extreme risk to carriers and different massive vessels.13 The DF-17 hypersonic glide car, with a spread of as much as 1,500 miles, additional complicates this, as its maneuverability and pace current further monitoring and interception challenges.14 Furthermore, the PLA’s continued improvement of the YJ-18 and YJ-21 anti-ship cruise missiles, with ranges exceeding 330 miles and 900 miles, respectively, provides one other layer of complexity to the risk atmosphere. These missiles, able to being launched from numerous platforms reminiscent of submarines, ships, and plane, can saturate and overwhelm a distributed power’s defenses.15 The PLA’s funding within the H-6K bomber, which may carry as much as six YJ-12 supersonic anti-ship missiles, additional extends the attain and suppleness of their strike capabilities.16
Utilizing massed, multi-axis missile assaults can obtain speedy dominance in a battle. This method exploits the finite nature of U.S. naval missile protection techniques, such because the Aegis Fight System and Normal Missile interceptors. By launching a mass amount of missiles from numerous platforms, together with land-based launchers, ships, submarines, and plane, the PLA can saturate and exhaust these defensive capabilities.17 Such a depletion would successfully neutralize a distributed power’s (or platform’s) capability earlier than it could actually launch its personal assaults.18 The affected power may have misplaced its skill to strike successfully first.19
The actions carried out by Ukraine towards the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) illuminate a method to resolve these challenges. The success of Ukraine in countering Russian aggression affords worthwhile classes to handle the PLA challenges of subtle ISR networks, long-range precision strike missiles, and massed firepower methods. By incorporating key parts of Ukraine’s method, reminiscent of the usage of cellular and shore-based anti-ship missiles, the employment of unmanned techniques for ISR and strike missions, and the adoption of unconventional ways just like the “mosquito fleet” idea, the USN can develop a extra resilient and efficient distributed power posture. An developed DMO framework, which emphasizes elevated mobility, flexibility, and the mixing of novel applied sciences and ways, can assist mitigate the dangers posed by the PLA’s superior capabilities and supply a extra strong deterrent within the area. Nonetheless, adapting to this evolving risk panorama would require steady innovation, experimentation, and a willingness to problem conventional paradigms of naval warfare.
Ukraine within the Black Sea
Ukraine’s Black Sea operations exhibit a potent mixture of superior scouting and focusing on, unconventional ways, and the institution of sea denial zones. By enhanced surveillance utilizing drones just like the Bayraktar TB2, Ukraine executed precision strikes on key targets, such because the sinking of the Russian cruiser Moskva.20 Ukraine enhances this superior scouting with uneven ways, together with using mines, UUVs, shore-based anti-ship missiles, and small, fast-attack craft often known as the “mosquito fleet.”21 By integrating these components with revolutionary floor maneuvers, Ukraine disrupts conventional approaches to naval engagements, reaching stealth and effectiveness in hanging first.
The end result of those approaches is the institution of sea denial zones, the place Ukraine successfully restricts adversary entry and transforms maritime areas into formidable defensive strains.22 These measures restrict enemy motion and supply a strong deterrent towards aggressive naval actions. Adapting and making use of these classes to the DMO idea can assist mitigate the dangers posed by the PLA’s superior capabilities and improve the resilience and effectiveness of U.S. naval forces within the Western Pacific.
Ukraine has successfully employed superior scouting strategies within the Black Sea to boost its skill to strike Russian naval belongings first. Using aerial surveillance drones, such because the Bayraktar TB2, has supplied distant situational consciousness deep contained in the adversary weapons engagement zone and focused precision engagements, as demonstrated by the monitoring and focusing on of Raptor-class patrol boats.23 The sinking of the Moskva cruiser was achieved by means of exact intelligence that cued Neptune missile launches, highlighting Ukraine’s capability to execute high-impact strikes by leveraging a speedy intelligence-gathering and focusing on cycle. Ukraine’s complete scouting methodology additionally incorporates penetrating UAVs and UUVs for intelligence-gathering missions towards numerous targets, together with the minesweeper Ivan Golubets and the cruiser Admiral Makarov.24 These successes showcase Ukraine’s efficient integration of reconnaissance, scouting, and ISR capabilities to focus on Russian BSF operations. By combining superior applied sciences, riskworthy scouts, and streamlined intelligence evaluation and decision-making processes, Ukraine has established an efficient mannequin for conducting maritime surveillance and focusing on in a contested atmosphere. The USN can use comparable scouting ideas to achieve a bonus within the Western Pacific.
Ukraine’s Black Sea naval operations have uniquely utilized unconventional ways, leveraging superior applied sciences and innovation to counter Russian aggression. The employment of Bayraktar TB2 drones for precision strikes towards Russian Raptor-class patrol boats and a BK-16 high-speed assault boat close to Snake Island represents an unconventional use of aerial drones in a maritime context, permitting Ukraine to problem Russia’s naval superiority whereas minimizing threat to Ukrainian forces.25
Equally, the deployment of MAGURA V5 USVs to efficiently assault bigger Russian vessels, such because the Challenge 22160 patrol ship Sergey Kotov and the Tarantul-class corvette R-334 Ivanovets, represents a departure from conventional naval battle, as these small, agile, and expendable platforms can swarm and overwhelm enemy defenses.26 These unconventional approaches, additional enhanced by the mixing of cyber warfare capabilities and particular forces operations, as exemplified by the joint Ukrainian SBU and Navy effort that critically broken the Ropucha-class touchdown ship Olenegorsky Gornyak close to the Port of Novorossiysk, have allowed a smaller, much less highly effective naval power to successfully problem a bigger adversary.27
2027 Revisited: TF Blade within the South China Sea
TF Blade, working within the South China Sea, adopts a type of Ukraine’s superior scouting and focusing on ways to counter a PLA naval risk. The duty power, composed of Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, Littoral Fight Ships, and USVs, detects a PLAN SAG close to the Spratly Islands utilizing a community of MQ-9B SeaGuardian UAVs and Orca UUVs.28 The SeaGuardians present persistent, high-resolution imagery of the PLA SAG, which features a Kind 055 Renhai-class cruiser and several other Kind 052D Luyang III-class destroyers. On the similar time, the Orca UUVs collect acoustic intelligence on the PLA ships, figuring out their distinctive sound signatures and monitoring their actions. Fusing the information from these penetrating scouting platforms, the duty power’s AI-enabled battle administration system generates a complete, real-time image of the PLA SAG’s disposition and vulnerabilities, revealing that the Kind 055 cruiser, a crucial command and management node, is working with degraded air protection capabilities.
In 2027, TF Blade seizes the chance, launching a coordinated, multi-domain strike towards the PLA SAG. A swarm of USVs deploy digital warfare payloads to jam the PLA ships’ sensors and communications whereas emitting misleading signatures. On the similar time, the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers are capable of launch a salvo of SM-6 missiles from broadly distributed firing positions. These missiles, guided by the focusing on information from the SeaGuardians and Orcas, converge on the Kind 055 cruiser, overwhelming its weakened defenses and neutralizing the ship with a number of hits. This strike’s precision and coordination significantly weakens the PLA SAG, forcing it to withdraw from the realm and reassess its technique.
Following the profitable strike towards the PLA Floor Motion Group (SAG) close to the Spratly Islands, TF Blade continues to watch the scenario utilizing its superior scouting and focusing on capabilities. The duty power launches a collection of uneven assaults to additional disrupt PLA operations and degrade their fight capabilities. A Zumwalt-class destroyer employs its stealth to achieve proximity to a PLA amphibious group and deploys a swarm of small, expendable USVs to conduct a coordinated assault on a PLA Kind 071 transport dock. These USVs, armed with miniaturized torpedoes and guided missiles, evade PLA defenses and ship a compromising strike on the vessel by considerably damaging its nicely deck.
TF Blade’s CSG and its related Destroyer Squadron (DESRON) set up a sea denial zone towards the PLA Navy within the Western Pacific. By deploying a community of MQ-4C Triton drones for high-altitude surveillance, supplemented by satellite tv for pc reconnaissance, the CSG and DESRON successfully monitor crucial PLA belongings, together with Kind 055 destroyers working close to the Paracel Islands, and monitor their actions towards the primary island chain. One other layer of close-in penetrating scouts and drones is located in higher-risk areas to achieve top quality focusing on data that may be relayed again by means of the Tritons to cue standoff engagements from distributed forces.
TF Blade positions its penetrating UUVs close to the Spratly Islands to additional limit PLA naval operations whereas laying sensor-laden sensible mines to regulate essential sea lanes and chokepoints. These UUVs discreetly monitor PLA submarine exercise, notably the actions of their Kind 093 and Kind 039 courses, offering real-time intelligence on their positions and patrol patterns. Leveraging this intelligence, Arleigh Burke-class destroyers distribute themselves into firing positions exterior PLA submarine patrol containers, launching Tomahawk strikes towards PLA command and management facilities on Mischief Reef and Subi Reef, damaging their A2/AD community.
These actions problem and reshape PLA’s conventional maritime methods, imposing important operational constraints on their naval forces and pushing their efficient vary additional again from crucial areas just like the Taiwan Strait. By this multi-domain method, the CSG and DESRON set up a strong sea denial zone within the Western Pacific.
Logistical and Sustainment Challenges in Prolonged Maritime Operations
Making use of Ukrainian Black Sea ways towards the PLA within the Western Pacific presents important logistical challenges because of the area’s huge distances and the USN’s want to keep up lengthy provide strains. In contrast to Ukraine’s operations within the Black Sea, which profit from shut proximity to land-based assist, the U.S. Navy would want to maintain operations as much as 6,000 nautical miles from its major bases within the continental United States. The PLAN, in distinction, enjoys a logistical benefit with its inside strains of communication and entry to quite a few bases alongside the Chinese language coast, the furthest being just one,500 nautical miles from the potential areas of operation within the South China Sea.
The USN should set up a strong community of ahead working bases, pre-positioned provides, and cellular logistics platforms to beat these challenges and successfully implement DMO ways knowledgeable by the Ukrainian expertise. This might require important funding in logistics infrastructure, reminiscent of growing the variety of assist ships from the present 29 to an estimated 60-70, because the Middle for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments beneficial.29 Moreover, the USN would want to develop its entry to amenities in allied nations, reminiscent of Japan, South Korea, and Singapore, and develop new applied sciences to increase the vary and endurance of its platforms, notably unmanned automobiles. As an illustration, the U.S. Navy’s present MQ-4C Triton drone has a spread of 8,200 nautical miles, however working within the Western Pacific might require much more prolonged endurance capabilities.30
Conducting DMO utilizing Ukrainian ideas would require making logistics extra distributed, with smaller depots which might be much less targetable. This can enhance the redundancy of the logistics community the place no logistics node is so crucial that its loss severely impacts the broader power. Methods employed by Ukraine, reminiscent of the usage of diversified, smaller platforms, may be scaled up and supported by the USN’s superior logistical capabilities, enabling sustained operations even within the prolonged operational areas of the Western Pacific. Smaller, greater portions of capabilities would require fewer beautiful capabilities, permitting for the usage of quite a few smaller ports and airfields that might not be accessible to the USN’s massive ships. Using extra but smaller logistics nodes all through the theater would enhance logistics resiliency and suppleness.
Variations in Maritime Theater Traits
The operational environments of the Black Sea and the Western Pacific differ considerably, presenting distinctive challenges in making use of Ukrainian naval ways towards the PLA Navy. The Black Sea is a comparatively confined physique of water with a most width of 600 nautical miles. In distinction, the Western Pacific is an unlimited expanse of ocean, with the potential space of operations spanning hundreds of nautical miles from the South China Sea to the Philippine Sea. These variations in scale and geography considerably affect the effectiveness of varied naval ways and applied sciences, and the viability of making use of Ukrainian classes to the Pacific theater.
The Black Sea’s confined nature permits for the efficient use of smaller, extra agile craft and the deployment of dense networks of sensors and mines to regulate key chokepoints. These ways could also be much less efficient within the vastness of the Western Pacific, because the PLAN has larger room for maneuver and might leverage its bigger, extra succesful ships to undertaking energy over larger distances. Ukraine’s profitable use of shore-based anti-ship missiles, such because the Neptune, and drones, just like the Bayraktar TB2, equally rely closely on the Black Sea’s restricted distances and the flexibility to combine land-based assist. Nonetheless, extra prolonged detection and engagement ranges, in addition to the restricted availability of land-based assist infrastructure, might scale back the effectiveness of those techniques within the open ocean atmosphere of the Western Pacific. Adapting Ukrainian ways to this theater would require important funding in creating long-range platforms, reminiscent of bigger USVs and UUVs, in addition to enhancing present techniques to increase their attain and endurance.
Whereas the Black Sea’s confined nature permits for the usage of dense networks of sensors and mines to regulate key chokepoints, the USN can nonetheless undertake this method in crucial areas of the Western Pacific. These embody crucial maritime chokepoints just like the Taiwan Strait, Philippine Strait, the Ryukus Island chain, and the littorals within the South China Sea. In these areas, the USN may create localized sea denial zones knowledgeable by the Ukrainian expertise. By adapting these ways and applied sciences to the distinctive geography of the Western Pacific, reminiscent of specializing in strategic chokepoints and key archipelagic terrain, the USN can successfully apply the teachings realized from Ukraine’s Black Sea operations to counter the PLAN, regardless of the variations within the scale and traits of the operational environments.
Suggestions
For the USN to higher implement these ways, the Workplace of Naval Analysis (ONR) ought to sponsor research to discover the optimum integration of penetrating and riskworthy USVs and UUVs into the DMO idea, specializing in their roles in ISR, EW, and offensive operations. These research ought to particularly examine the best USV/UUV platforms and payloads for particular missions, command and management architectures for coordinating drone swarms, USV/UUV facilitation of distributed killchains, ways for using drone swarms in littoral environments, and countermeasures towards adversary drone threats.
The USN ought to develop and check uneven warfare ways impressed by Ukrainian operations. These ought to give attention to the coordination of USV/UUV swarm assaults on enemy floor combatants, the mixing of cyber and EW capabilities to degrade enemy C4ISR networks, the employment of mines and coastal protection techniques to determine localized sea denial zones, and the usage of small, agile items for amphibious raids and seizure of key maritime terrain. The combination of those ways ought to be refined by means of wargaming, simulations, and stay workout routines, such because the Navy’s Massive Scale Train (LSE), to validate their effectiveness and determine areas for enchancment.
The USN ought to prioritize creating and integrating a system just like Collaborative Fight Plane (CCA) with USVs and UUVs to boost the situational consciousness and distributed lethality of standard naval forces.31 Key focus areas ought to embody the AI-driven autonomous coordination techniques for human-machine groups, superior communication and data-sharing applied sciences for safe and dependable connectivity, and the mixing of collaborative fight techniques with different maritime belongings working in a distributed method. These techniques ought to endure rigorous testing in lifelike A2/AD environments to make sure reliability in a contested electromagnetic spectrum.
The USN must also discover methods to combine DMO with Marine Stand-In Forces (SIF) and Expeditionary Superior Base Operations (EABO).32 These efforts ought to give attention to creating quickly deployable, self-sustaining EABO items that may present ISR and focusing on assist to distributed naval forces. Moreover, the Navy ought to discover the employment of SIF utilizing USVs, UUVs, and coastal protection techniques to create localized sea denial zones.33 To grab and defend crucial maritime terrain in contested environments, coordination between DMO and SIF/EABO belongings ought to be a key precedence. Lastly, these experiments and workout routines ought to refine ways, strategies, and procedures (TTPs) for built-in DMO-SIF/EABO operations, guaranteeing a cohesive and sensible method to distributed maritime warfare.
Lastly, the USN ought to set up and codify clear DMO doctrine, and it ought to consider the proficiency of naval formations at executing this doctrine throughout their certification cycles. Concurrently, the Navy ought to create a devoted warfighting improvement group to steer, coordinate, and prioritize DMO-related efforts throughout the Navy and Marine Corps. It ought to develop and preserve a repository of classes realized and finest practices from DMO workout routines and operations, present coaching and schooling to Navy and Marine Corps personnel on DMO ideas and ways, and foster collaboration with allies, companions, and trade to advance DMO capabilities and interoperability. By taking these steps, the U.S. Navy can create a complete framework for the profitable implementation and steady enchancment of DMO, guaranteeing its forces are well-prepared to function successfully in contested environments and counter the evolving threats posed by near-peer adversaries.
Conclusion
Ukraine has demonstrated the worth of exploiting vulnerabilities in Russian naval operations with uneven capabilities. These strategies have successfully pushed Russian naval forces away from the western Black Sea and compelled them to function primarily close to their bases in Crimea and Novorossiysk. This forfeiture of sea management has discovered Russia largely confining its naval forces to defensive positions with restricted skill to undertaking energy or assist land-based operations in southern Ukraine. Regardless of the numerous disparity in maritime energy and the lack of a considerable portion of its fleet early within the battle, Ukraine’s revolutionary method to sea denial, centered on penetrative scouting, precision focusing on, and uneven capabilities, has allowed it to successfully dispute Russia’s sea management within the Black Sea coastal waters, considerably undermining its strategic place within the area.34 Whereas the teachings realized from Ukraine’s Black Sea operations present worthwhile insights, their direct software to the Western Pacific requires cautious consideration of this huge and sophisticated theater’s distinctive geographical and operational challenges.
By analyzing the theoretical underpinnings of DMO, the sensible challenges within the Western Pacific, and Ukrainian actions towards the Russian Black Sea Fleet, a framework may be developed that straight addresses the challenges of a distributed power going through the PLA. Regardless of the distinction in operational environments, the basic ideas and ways employed by Ukraine within the Black Sea may be tailored and utilized to counter the PLAN within the Western Pacific. The USN can improve the effectiveness of DMO by specializing in superior scouting, uneven ways, and the institution of sea denial zones alongside key maritime terrain, as demonstrated by Ukraine’s success. This won’t solely broaden the applicability of DMO as an operational idea, however may also present a tangible framework for addressing asymmetry in naval warfare.
LtCol James Jackson is a profession logistician within the U.S. Marines. He’s a graduate of the Maritime Superior Warfighting College and is at present an Operational Planner at Marine Corps Forces Our on-line world Command.
References
[1] “Normal Missile-6 (SM-6),” Missile Risk, Middle for Strategic and Worldwide Research, accessed April 7, 2023,
[2] Benefit at Sea: Prevailing with Built-in All-Area Naval Energy, U.S. Division of Protection, pg. 25, December 2020,
[3] Dmitry Filipoff. “Combating DMO, PT. 1: Defining Distributed Maritime Operations and The Way forward for Naval Warfare”. Middle for Worldwide Maritime Safety. Accessed March 8, 2024.
[4]Harlan Ullman. “Are There Flaws within the U.S. Navy’s Distributed Maritime Operations?,” Protection Information, January 23, 2023.
[5] Richard Mosier. “Distributed Maritime Operations: Arduous to Discover,” Middle for Worldwide Maritime Safety. Accessed March 8, 2024.
[6] Dmitry Filipoff. “Combating DMO, PT. 1: Defining Distributed Maritime Operations and The Way forward for Naval Warfare”. Middle for Worldwide Maritime Safety. Accessed March 8, 2024.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Dr. Sam Goldsmith, “VAMPIRE VAMPIRE VAMPIRE The PLA’s anti-ship cruise missile risk to Australian and allied naval operations,” Australian Strategic Coverage Institute, April 2022, 10.
[9] “Introduction to Chinese language Navy Radar,” GlobalSecurity.org, accessed March 12, 2024,
[10] Ibid.
[11]James Andrew Lewis, ‘No Place to Conceal: A Take a look at China’s Geosynchronous Surveillance Capabilities,’ Middle for Strategic & Worldwide Research (CSIS), accessed March 20, 2024,
[12] Richard Mosier. “Distributed Maritime Operations: Arduous to Discover,” Middle for Worldwide Maritime Safety. Accessed March 8, 2024.
[13] “Missiles of China.” Missile Risk. Accessed March 12, 2024.
[14] “Missiles of China.” Missile Risk. Accessed March 12, 2024.
[15] “YJ-18,” Missile Risk, accessed March 24, 2024,
[16] Navy At present, ‘H-6K Strategic Bomber,’ accessed March 20, 2024,
[17] “The Chinese language Navy: Making ready for ‘Informatized’ Struggle at Sea,” Workplace of Naval Intelligence, Suitland, MD, 2021,
[18] Dmitry Filipoff.”Combating DMO Pt 4: Weapons Depletion and the Final Ditch Salvo Dynamic.” CIMSEC. Accessed March 12, 2024.
[19] Wayne P. Hughes Jr. and Robert P. Girrier, Fleet Techniques and Naval Operations, Third Version (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2018), 269. See Hughes’ idea of “hanging successfully first”.
[20] H.I. Sutton, “Timeline-2022 Ukraine Invasion At Sea,” Accessed March 22, 2024,
[21] Ibid.
[22] USNI Information. “Western Navies See Strategic, Tactical Classes from Ukraine Invasion.” Accessed March 20, 2024.
[23] H.I. Sutton, “Timeline-2022 Ukraine Invasion At Sea,” Accessed March 22, 2024,
[24] Sutton, “Timeline-2022 Ukraine Invasion At Sea”.
[25] H.I. Sutton, “Timeline-2022 Ukraine Invasion At Sea,” Accessed March 22, 2024,
[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Naval Information, “Boeing Delivers First Orca XLUUV to U.S. Navy,” Naval Information, April 28, 2022,
[29]Timothy A. Walton and Ryan Boone, “Sustaining the Combat: Resilient Maritime Logistics for a New Period,” Middle for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2019, Viii.
[30] “MQ-4C Triton Broad Space Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) Unmanned Plane System (UAS),” Naval Know-how, accessed March 24, 2024,
[31] “Air Pressure, Navy collaborating on 4 ‘fundamentals’ of CCA drones,” DefenseScoop, accessed 1 April 2024,
[32] United States Marine Corps, Tentative Handbook for Expeditionary Superior Base Operations, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Division of the Navy, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 2023), 1-2.
[33] U.S. Marine Corps, A Idea for Stand-in Forces (Washington, DC: Division of the Navy, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 2021), 4.
[34] Vego, Milan (2015) “On Littoral Warfare,” Naval Struggle School Evaluate: Vol. 68: No. 2, Article 4. This paper makes use of Dr. Vego’s definition of sea management: “the flexibility to make use of a given a part of the ocean or ocean and related airspace for navy and nonmilitary functions and deny the identical to the enemy throughout open hostilities.”
Featured Picture: A satellite tv for pc picture showing to indicate the broken Russian touchdown vessel Olenegorsky Gornyak leaking oil whereas docked in Novorossiysk, Russia. Ukraine stated its sea drones broken the warship. (Photograph by Planet Labs PBC through AP)
