Countering the People’s Republic of China’s Maritime Insurgency in the South Pacific

By Jason Lancaster

Guadalcanal, the Coral Sea, Tarawa, New Guinea, and Iron Backside Sound spotlight the strategic location of the South Pacific in the course of the Second World Conflict. As we speak, U.S. and allied preeminence on this very important area is beneath menace. The Folks’s Republic of China (PRC,) via a classy mix of financial inducements, political affect, and maritime coercion, is executing a marketing campaign to erode U.S. and allied presence and reshape the Indo-Pacific order. Such actions mirror the techniques of insurgency, the place management is gained not simply via drive, however by blurring authorized boundaries, exploiting financial vulnerability, and utilizing civilian fronts to advance strategic ends.1

The PRC’s maritime insurgency shouldn’t be restricted to the South China Sea. It’s a world phenomenon. This maritime insurgency shouldn’t be fought with gunfire however with corruption, improvement loans and assist, and the PRC’s deep-water fishing fleet. Greater than 17,000 vessels fishing all through the world routinely interact in Unlawful, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing (IUUF), typically appearing as a civilian vanguard for PRC state aims. The scenario is especially acute within the South Pacific, the place Chinese language fishing fleets exploit the restricted enforcement capability of Pacific Island Nations (PICs), deplete sovereign marine assets, and undermine native economies, eroding governance, and sovereignty within the course of. 

The South Pacific is certainly not a strategic backwater. It lies astride the ocean strains of communication connecting U.S. treaty allies in Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia.  It’s residence to key U.S. territories similar to Guam and American Samoa. It consists of the Compact of Free Affiliation (COFA) states Micronesia, Palau, and the Marshall Islands. At its coronary heart are the fourteen Pacific Island Nations. possess wealthy marine assets, and command strategic actual property that might both anchor regional stability or function launchpads for malign affect.2

Traditionally, the U.S., Australia, and New Zealand have been the area’s major safety and improvement companions. Nevertheless, since 2018, the PRC has dramatically expanded its presence constructing dual-use infrastructure, embedding safety preparations, and providing opaque improvement help. Regardless of sustained Western assist to those nations, Beijing’s affect has surged. The development of Chinese language-funded ports and runways within the Solomon Islands and Kiribati. Lengthy vary missiles stationed within the Kiribati or the Solomons may threaten Hawaii, Australia, and the continental U.S., compromising freedom of navigation, eroding regional deterrence, and difficult the U.S. potential to defend treaty companions Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines.

IUUF is a serious menace to PIC economies. Fishing is a serious contributor to many PIC economies and IUUF challenges the power of states to create income, additional condemning them to a way forward for dependency on worldwide improvement assist. America can improve its exhausting energy within the Indo-Pacific by using mushy energy to counter IUUF and supply humanitarian help, thereby denying PRC regional affect.

Countering IUUF

America doesn’t have to develop a brand new engagement technique with South Pacific nations from entire fabric. The Pacific Island Discussion board produces its personal strategic paperwork. Composed of 18 members and affiliate member states, the Pacific Islands Discussion board (PIF) serves as a unifying voice for the small states of the South Pacific. Australia and New Zealand are full members whereas U.S. territories Guam and American Samoa are affiliate members. The 2050 Technique for the Blue Pacific Continent and the 2018 Boe Declaration on Regional Safety articulate shared South Pacific safety issues and improvement targets. America and its allies are already adopting PIF strategic paperwork for engagement with Pacific Island Nations to attain mutual successes. 

Countering IUUF and different types of transnational crime is a prime PIF precedence, second solely to local weather change and rising sea ranges. Whereas the US pays signatory nations US$60 million a yr over ten years for the privilege of fishing inside PIC Unique Financial Zones (EEZs) beneath the South Pacific Tuna Treaty,3 the PRC flagrantly disregards the sovereignty of Pacific Island states whereas plundering their maritime bounty. Pacific Island nations would not have the capability to police their expansive EEZs in opposition to large fishing fleets with out help. 

Pacific Fusion Middle

The PIF’s 2018 Boe Declaration beneficial varied safety proposals to defend PIF pursuits. One was the event of a Pacific Fusion Middle to assist the collation, sharing, and evaluation of intelligence. The Pacific Island Discussion board stood up a Pacific Fusion Middle in Vanuatu in 2021. The fusion heart “enhances info sharing, cooperation, evaluation and evaluation, and expands situational consciousness and capability throughout the Pacific.”4 The fusion heart gives a possibility to develop multinational cooperation within the area and develop protection and safety drive capability. To efficiently counter transnational crime, the U.S. ought to assist and improve the capability of the Pacific Fusion Middle with the mid-term purpose of turning it right into a maritime headquarters, improve the capability to implement PIC EEZs and legal guidelines, and improve regional maritime area consciousness fed into the Pacific Fusion Middle.

Via US affiliate PIF members Guam and American Samoa, the united statesshould supply USCG assist for the middle to instantly improve its effectiveness. With a mid-term purpose of making a PIC-led multilateral maritime headquarters just like the Mixed Maritime Forces headquarters in Bahrain, this multinational maritime headquarters can be rotationally led by PICs with Australian, New Zealand, and U.S. assist, and would have tactical management of forces regionally assigned to countering transnational crime.

The Pacific Fusion Middle won’t be efficient with out forces at sea enabling maritime area consciousness (MDA). MDA helps two very important pursuits: enabling US, Australian, New Zealand, and native PIC forces to intercept and eradicate IUUF, and monitoring the PLAN within the area. IUUF fleets are huge. This was illustrated off South America, in February 2025, when the Argentine Navy tracked over 380 PRC flagged fishing vessels close to the Argentine financial exclusion zone, requiring Argentina to ship two warships and two plane—a large portion of its deployable blue water forces—to watch these fishing vessels.5 America can assist MDA via a number of asset sorts to determine potential threats throughout the maritime area, supporting each the Pacific Fusion Middle and a PIF response at sea.6 

Enhancing Capability

Most PICs have little functionality to implement their very own EEZs. Australia’s mitigation for the PIC’s lack of assets is the Pacific Maritime Safety Program. This safety help program gives Guardian-Class patrol boats, an equal of the USCG’s quick response cutter (FRC), together with crew coaching and upkeep for each PIC.7 This system has offered a complete of twenty-two patrol boats over 30-year program. This effort has been a blended success, because the area is filled with marked and unmarked reefs and a number of ships have met with accidents. In December 2024 the brand new Fijian patrol boat RFNS Timo was broken whereas docking. Timo is a substitute vessel for RFNS Puamau, which hit a reef and sank in June 2024.8 Timo accomplished her first patrol in April 2025.9 Regardless of this program many of those nations nonetheless would not have the capability to patrol everything of their EEZs. The geography is a demanding one—the EEZ of Kiribati is roughly the scale of the continental United States. The RAN and RNZN even have capability points. The RAN and RNZN serve twin features, conducting each battle at sea and legislation enforcement missions. The RNZN’s new drive design will scale back the provision of RNZN vessels to conduct regional constabulary duties.

The US Coast Guard (USCG) faces budgetary and ship quantity restrictions, however they’re the areas most well-liked US service for cooperation. With native agreements, the USCG can assist improve regional capability. USCG District Oceania, previously District 14’s space of duty is the Pacific with ships primarily based in Honolulu and Guam. The USCG has two nationwide safety cutters, one medium endurance cutter, three Quick Response Cutters (FRCs), and three buoy tenders stationed in Honolulu, in addition to three FRCs and a buoy tender primarily based in Guam. The U.S. Navy helps USCG missions as ready. These efforts are primarily centered on the U.S. and COFA state EEZs. USCG ships are accountable for patrolling 1000’s of miles of each U.S. and COFA EEZs. The distances concerned are huge: it’s 850 miles from Guam to Palau and over 5,000 miles from Honolulu to American Samoa. Along with fisheries safety, these cutters are additionally accountable for counter-narcotics, smuggling, different legislation enforcement necessities, and search and rescue.10

America should improve its regional naval presence to reassure residents, companions, and potential companions. Using USCG property reassures regional allies and companions whereas minimizing the specter of escalation with the PRC, decreasing fears and potential misgivings of U.S. intent. America ought to improve USCG District Oceania’s property by relocating 4 Quick Response Cutters at present homeported in Bahrain to the South Pacific. The elevated presence of Littoral Fight Ships in U.S. Central Command’s space of duty would mitigate the reallocation of the 4 FRCs. 

Eradicating IUUF

Elevated and improved provision of command and management and MDA and elevated capability to intercept IUUF fishermen is required for the eradication of IUUF. Officers on the New Zealand embassy said that there have been not adequate naval forces within the area to implement EEZs throughout the multitude of nations. Authorized motion gives a necessary instrument to discourage additional incursions regardless of restricted forces at sea.

PICs must be offered authorized, home, and safety help to prosecute transnational crime. Most PRC fishing captains work for state owned enterprises tied to vital CCP bosses. Linking senior CCP social gathering members to unlawful conduct that prices PIC residents jobs, cash, and assets for the longer term might be a technique to finish IUUF in addition to deter future PRC unlawful actions. Convictions in absentia after truthful public trials are a technique to discourage PRC exercise and spotlight PRC malign affect. 

Healthcare and Pacific Partnership

Medical assist is among the most continuously requested types of assist from PICs. The U.S. Navy’s Pacific Partnership is massively common within the area and gives life-changing care. The recognition of the mission ought to drive the U.S. and allies to extend the frequency of visits with elevated allied assist. USNS Mercy doesn’t take part yearly, however there was an try at her participation each two years.

The Division of Protection ought to talk about RAN, RNZN, and Japanese Maritime Self-Protection Power assist for rising the variety of Pacific Partnership missions. Though none of those navies have a devoted hospital ship like USNS Mercy, every nation has a ship appropriate for these missions and the capability to ship a single vessel for a 3–4-month humanitarian deployment to the South Pacific. A deliberate rotation of USN, RAN, USN, RNZN, USN, JMSDF gives a six-year cycle that allows upkeep, coaching, and different operational necessities to be scheduled. The U.S. off-years would nonetheless see U.S. mission assist with a ship in addition to medical personnel. U.S. years would have USNS Mercy assist.

The Navy ought to hub a medical expeditionary ship (T-EMS) in Yap, Federated States of Micronesia to assist smaller scale however persistent humanitarian medical assist within the area. These vessels comprise one or two working rooms and are extraordinarily appropriate for this mission due to their shallow draft and hospital stage amenities and talent to embark helicopters. The T-EMS’s sister ships, the quick expeditionary transports (T-EPFs) have been continuously used for Pacific Partnership stations, demonstrating the utility of this class to be used within the South Pacific.

Conclusion

The South Pacific area holds immense strategic worth for the US and its allies. Situated on the coronary heart of key U.S. alliances and territories, the area has drawn rising consideration from the PRC, whose maritime grey zone rebel actions threaten to undermine regional safety, financial stability, and political alignment.

The PRC’s deepening engagement with PICs, notably via dual-use infrastructure, strategic partnerships, and coercive financial practices has shifted the stability of affect away from conventional allies like the US, Australia, and New Zealand. The potential for Chinese language army property in Kiribati or the Solomon Islands must be seen as a extreme menace to U.S. territories and Indo-Pacific allies. Coupled with elevated PLAN presence and aggressive operations, this development indicators a problem to U.S. freedom of motion and regional dominance.

To successfully counter this encroachment, the U.S. should decide to a complete, multi-pronged technique that integrates regional safety assist, humanitarian help, and institutional cooperation. Increasing the Pacific Fusion Middle will strengthen intelligence sharing and regional coordination and MDA. Elevated USCG presence would deter unlawful actions like unregulated fishing and assist native legislation enforcement capabilities. These efforts must be pursued in partnership with Australia, New Zealand, and different like-minded nations to advertise regional possession and scale back perceptions of neocolonial affect.

Combating transnational crime, notably unlawful, unreported, and unregulated fishing requires not solely bodily presence but additionally authorized and political resolve. Holding senior PRC officers accountable via worldwide authorized mechanisms can deter additional violations and reinforce the rule of legislation. In parallel, bolstering regional healthcare via expanded Pacific Partnership missions and sustained medical presence similar to stationing a T-EMS in Micronesia will deal with pressing humanitarian wants and improve U.S. mushy energy. In the end, securing the South Pacific shouldn’t be solely about countering PRC affect. It entails empowering Pacific Island Nations, reaffirming the US’ dedication to its allies, and guaranteeing that the area stays free, open, and resilient.

Commander Jason Lancaster is a Floor Warfare Officer. He has served at sea in amphibious ships , destroyers, and a destroyer squadron. Ashore he has served as an teacher on the Floor Warfare Officers Faculty, on the N5 at Commander, Naval Forces Korea, and in OPNAV N5, and is the Operations Officer for the Joint Employees J-7 Joint Deployment Coaching Middle. He holds Masters’ levels from the Nationwide Conflict Faculty and the College of Tulsa and accomplished his undergraduate work at Mary Washington Faculty.

Endnotes 

1. Commander Jennifer Runion, “Fishing for Hassle: Chinese language IUU Fishing and the Danger of Escalation,” Proceedings 149, no. 2 (February 2023), Geoffrey Until, “At Conflict with the Lights Off,” Proceedings 148, no. 7 (July 2022),

2. Pacific Islands Discussion board Secretariat. *2050 Technique for the Blue Pacific Continent: Implementation Plan 2023–2030*. Pacific Islands Discussion board Secretariat, Mar. 2024, Accessed 5 Sept. 2025.

3. New Zealand Ministry of Overseas Affairs and Commerce, Fishing within the Blue Pacific, 2018,

4. Pacific Fusion Centre, Residence, Pacific Fusion Centre, n.d., accessed June 11, 2025,

5. Micah McCartney, “Argentina Deploys Navy as PRC Leads Fishing Swarm Close to Waters,” Newsweek, 2025,

6. CDR Mike Holland, “Overview: Maritime Area Consciousness, Securing the Seas: 12 International Tides and Currents of Maritime Area Consciousness,” The Coast Guard Journal of Security & Safety at Sea 63, no. 3 (2006).

7. Australian Defence Forces, Australian Defence Forces Pacific Maritime Safety Program, n.d.,

8. Max Walden, “RFNS Timo Sustains Injury throughout Docking,” ABC Information, December 22, 2025,

9. Ana Madigibuli, “RFNS Timo Completes First Patrol,” Fiji Instances, April 16, 2025,

10. U.S. Coast Guard, United States Coast Guard Sector Pacific Space, n.d., accessed March 16, 2025,

Featured Picture: Twelve Chinese language fishing boats are banded along with ropes on December 21, 2010 to attempt to thwart an try by a South Korean coast guard ship to cease their alleged unlawful fishing within the Yellow Sea off the coast of South Korea. (Photograph by Park Younger-Chul, Agence France-Press)