African Maritime Forces Week
By Pascaline Alexandre, Africa Heart for Aggressive Intelligence (ACCI)
Introduction
In recent times, maritime safety within the Western Indian Ocean1 (WIO) has risen to the forefront of world priorities, pushed by the fast growth of worldwide commerce and the strategic significance of the world’s oceans. As transport lanes develop busier, the threats to secure and open maritime passage – equivalent to piracy, unlawful fishing, territorial tensions, and ecological degradation—have change into extra pronounced. Confronting these evolving challenges requires greater than remoted efforts; it requires a shared understanding of dangers, enhanced situational consciousness, and sturdy cooperation amongst nationwide governments, worldwide organizations, and non-state actors working towards widespread maritime objectives.
The WIO – extending from the shores of Somalia to South Africa and together with key island nations – is among the many most strategically necessary maritime areas on the earth. It features as a vital lifeline for world commerce whereas concurrently occupying a central place within the contest for geopolitical affect. The area is formed by intersecting strategic ambitions: Indo-Pacific frameworks, India’s increasing regional position, and China’s far-reaching Belt and Street Initiative. Because of this, the WIO has change into a focus of worldwide energy projection, the place commerce, safety, and diplomacy are deeply intertwined.
Amid this high-stakes contest for regional affect, African coastal and island states within the Western Indian Ocean have often been relegated to the sidelines—handled extra as passive observers than energetic stakeholders in choices that immediately influence their maritime domains. This marginalization stems partially from what students confer with as wealth blindness2 – a persistent undervaluing of the strategic and financial significance of African maritime areas. Compounding the difficulty are gaps in institutional capability, technical experience, and sources. But, change is underway. The narrative is shifting, and regional actors are more and more asserting their company in shaping maritime governance on their very own phrases.
From Fragmentation to Frameworks
The piracy disaster off the Somali coast within the early 2000s uncovered deep governance deficits throughout the WIO. In response, a surge of worldwide coordination emerged – from the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS)3 and the EU-led Shared Consciousness and Deconfliction mechanism (SHADE)4 to the Mixed Maritime Forces (CMF).5 These had been efficient however externally pushed and targeted solely on piracy.
Now, that mannequin is evolving.
On the coronary heart of this transformation are two main frameworks: the Djibouti Code of Conduct with its Jeddah Modification (DCoC-JA)6 and the Regional Maritime Safety Structure (RMSA).7 Collectively, they exemplify a brand new African-led narrative that emphasizes sovereignty, cooperation, and coordination.
These frameworks mirror what students confer with as a dynamic equilibrium8—a balancing act the place regional actors interact in each cooperation and competitors with out permitting any single energy to dominate.9
What’s the RMSA?
The institution of the Regional Maritime Safety Structure (RMSA) was enabled beneath the Maritime Safety (MASE)10 (MASE) Programme, funded by the European Union and carried out by the Indian Ocean Fee (IOC).11 This revolutionary framework fostered collaboration amongst a variety of actors with a shared dedication to securing the maritime area.
The MASE Programme resulted in 2023 and given the numerous outcomes achieved by the IOC and numerous profitable operations undertaken beneath RMSA, the EU agreed to proceed funding beneath the Secure Seas Africa (SSA) initiative.12 The RMSA is anchored in two foundational regional agreements targeted on data sharing, coordination, and coordinated maritime operations (collectively known as the MASE agreements). At its core are two key regional facilities: the Regional Maritime Info Fusion Centre (RMIFC) in Madagascar and the Regional Coordination Operations Centre (RCOC) in Seychelles. These facilities work in shut cooperation with the nationwide facilities of the seven signatory states to operationalize the agreements’ targets.
Determine 1: Overview of the Two Regional Agreements and the Roles of the Two Regional Facilities (RMIFC and RCOC) throughout the Architecture13
Elevating Regional Maritime Safety via IOC Management
The IOC has solidified its position as a central actor in maritime safety throughout the Western Indian Ocean. Its contribution has considerably superior the regional maritime safety agenda on the worldwide stage. The IOC has served because the co-chair of the Capability Constructing Working Group from 2014, Chair (2018-2020) and took part within the Secretariat since 2016, when Seychelles took the presidency of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) (subsequently rebranded because the Contact Group on Illicit Maritime Actions (CGIMA) on the twenty fourth Plenary Session in 2022). This development has been achieved in collaboration with key regional states in WIO.
The IOC’s energetic participation in high-profile worldwide boards – together with SHADE, the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), the 2018 Sustainable Blue Financial system Convention hosted by Kenya, and United Nations Safety Council annual reporting – has additional amplified the voices of African coastal and island states of the WIO in world maritime governance discussions. Performing because the diplomatic engine of the RMSA, the IOC works to construct political backing for the area’s maritime facilities whereas fostering dialogue and coordination amongst a variety of companions and stakeholders.
Operational Coordination by way of Regional Facilities
On the operational core of the Regional Maritime Safety Structure (RMSA) lie two key facilities: the Regional Maritime Info Fusion Centre (RMIFC) in Madagascar and the Regional Coordination Operations Centre (RCOC) in Seychelles. These facilities act as hubs for real-time maritime area consciousness, regional coordination, and fast response to threats via coordinated maritime operations. Working in shut cooperation with nationwide facilities within the seven signatory states, additionally they keep collaborative ties with non-signatory coastal nations equivalent to Tanzania, Mozambique, and South Africa, in addition to worldwide companions together with EU NAVFOR, CMF, and United States Africa Command (AFRICOM).
Structurally, the RMSA is underpinned by a community of memoranda of understanding, bilateral and multilateral agreements, and operational protocols. Whereas this patchwork mannequin displays a range of pursuits, priorities, and actors, it additionally affords the pliability essential to adapt to the area’s advanced geopolitical and operational panorama.14 By accommodating totally different ranges of dedication and cooperation, the RMSA permits a practical method to enhancing regional maritime safety governance.
Cultivating African WIO Gentle Energy
One of many RMSA’s most impactful contributions is its position in cultivating WIO gentle energy—the capability to form maritime governance and diplomacy via legitimacy, cooperation, and strategic imaginative and prescient moderately than coercion. This method aligns with foundational frameworks just like the 2050 Africa’s Built-in Maritime Technique (AIMS)15 and the 2016 Lomé Constitution,16 each of which promote African-led maritime governance and sustainable blue economic system growth.
Somewhat than counting on externally imposed fashions, the RMSA represents a turning level towards homegrown options, rooted in native context, priorities, and political will. It affords African coastal and island states not only a seat on the desk, however the potential to convene it.
Adapting to Evolving Maritime Threats
As maritime threats proceed to evolve from piracy and trafficking to broader geopolitical tensions, so too should regional responses. The dynamic nature of in the present day’s maritime surroundings calls for fixed recalibration and innovation. On this spirit, the 2 WIO frameworks, Djibouti Code of Conduct and its Jeddah Modification (DCoC-JA) and RMSA, are actively in search of to ascertain a cooperative association. An official correspondence in 2023 confirmed this collaboration.
Going ahead, there’s a want for concerted efforts by the IOC, in shut partnership with the DCoC/JA Steering Committee, to make sure that the RMSA and its two regional facilities to construct upon, moderately than duplicate, the work already undertaken beneath the DCoC/JA framework. The latest memorandum of understanding signed between the DCoC/JA and the regional facilities stands as a concrete instance of this alignment, reinforcing the precept of mutually supportive, inclusive cooperation. Collectively, the RMSA and DCoC-JA are reshaping the narrative round maritime safety within the area from considered one of dependency to considered one of regional company and management. By amplifying African voices and reinforcing regional possession, these frameworks are serving to to drive a extra balanced, cooperative, and sustainable maritime future.
Challenges and the Street Forward
Whereas the Regional Maritime Safety Structure (RMSA) reveals sturdy promise, it’s nonetheless in its early days of operationalization with many challenges. Amongst these are limitations and disparities in nationwide capability to maintain the RMSA and reliance on donors. On the latter problem, the IOC acknowledges the necessity for sustained worldwide communities help given the shared curiosity. Whereas there’s notable curiosity from worldwide companions, mirrored in initiatives equivalent to observer standing to the IOC, making certain the long-term viability and possession of the RMSA requires transitioning from exterior dependency to self-sustained regional mechanisms. Moreover, the extraordinary efforts wanted for making certain coordination might result in a rising sense of “coordination fatigue,” amid overlapping regional and worldwide initiatives. Furthermore, restricted visibility in world coverage arenas continues to undermine broader recognition of African-led efforts.
Consultants argue that tackling these obstacles requires a coherent strategic roadmap, better funding in native experience and infrastructure, and deeper engagement with the non-public sector to make sure sustainability and innovation.
Conclusion
Within the WIO, maritime affect isn’t measured solely in fleets and surveillance—it’s additionally outlined by narrative energy. Who identifies the threats? Who proposes the options?
For many years, African coastal and island nations had been largely sidelined in these conversations. At present, via frameworks just like the RMSA and DCoC, they’re reclaiming company and rewriting the script.
At its core, the RMSA is greater than a coordination platform—it’s a automobile for regional empowerment. With a concentrate on maritime area consciousness, authorized harmonization, and multilateral motion, it provides African coastal and island states of the WIO area, the instruments to claim better management over their maritime future. The RMSA must be prolonged although.
Ms. Pascaline Alexandre is the Deputy Secretary Normal, Africa Heart for Aggressive Intelligence (ACCI), a strategic communication and aggressive intelligence practitioner. She has been working within the maritime safety area and worldwide cooperation in Japanese, Southern Africa, Indian Ocean (ESA-IO) and Central Africa for over a decade. On this position, she has developed a broad expertise in regional cooperation via her work with the EU MASE Programme and the Contact Group on Illicit Maritime Actions (ex CGPCS) by way of the Indian Ocean Fee. Ms. Alexandre has labored intently with numerous Regional Financial Communities together with COMESA, EAC and IGAD on totally different maritime points. She was just lately based mostly in Gabon and labored for an additional EU regional undertaking, supporting the ECCAS in Central Africa in implementing their Maritime Safety targets. Ms. Alexandre holds a Grasp’s diploma in Aggressive Intelligence and Strategic Communication from the IAE de Poiters; a Grasp’s diploma in Scientific and Technical Info from the Université de Lorraine, and a BA in French and English communication from the UNISA Charles Telfair Institute.
Endnotes
1. The Western Indian Ocean (WIO) area includes the Japanese African coastal states of Kenya, Mozambique, Somalia, South Africa and Tanzania in addition to the island states of Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles and the abroad French territories of Mayotte and Reunion.
2. Ian Ralby (2017),“From Sea Blindness to Wealth Blindness,” Stimson Atmosphere Safety, February 8, 2017,
3. Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), https://maritime-executive.com/editorials/un-s-contact-group-on-somali-piracy-changes-its-mandate.
4. Shared Consciousness and De-confliction (SHADE),
5. Mixed Maritime Forces (CMF),
6. The Djibouti Code of Conduct, The Worldwide Maritime Group,
7. Raj Mohabeer and Kate Sullivan de Estrada, “Strengthening Maritime Safety within the Western Indian Ocean,” Indian Ocean Fee, 2019, .
8. Halifa Alena Kusuma, “Maritime Diplomacy within the ASEAN Maritime Safety Strategic Partnership, “Trendy Diplomacy, January 24, 2024, .
9. Miftahul Choir, Joe William and Raihan Zahirah, “The Lacking Hyperlink between Dynamic Equilibrium Doctrine and Indonesia’s Curiosity in South Pacific,” in Proceedings of Airlangga Convention on Worldwide Relations, 2018, .
10. Maritime Safety Programme, https://www.commissionoceanindien.org/securite-maritime-mase/.
11. “Operation Levante 2: A Regional Safety Mechanism,” Indian Ocean Fee, August 26, 2024, .
12. “Operation Levante 2.”
13. Mohabeer and Sullivan de Estrada, 2019.
14. Christian Bueger, “Who secures the Western Indian Ocean? The necessity for strategic dialogue,” Heart for Maritime Safety, September 19, 2024, .
15. The African Built-in Maritime Technique (2050 AIM Technique), https://au.int/websites/default/recordsdata/newsevents/workingdocuments/33832-wd-african_union_3-1.pdf.
16. Treaty African Constitution on Maritime Safety (Lomé Constitution), https://au.int/websites/default/recordsdata/treaties/37286-treaty-african_charter_on_maritime_security.pdf.
References
Bueger, Christian. “Who secures the Western Indian Ocean? The necessity for strategic dialogue.” Heart for Maritime Safety, September 19, 2024.
Choir, Miftahul, Joe William and Raihan Zahirah. “The Lacking Hyperlink between Dynamic Equilibrium Doctrine and Indonesia’s Curiosity in South Pacific,” in Proceedings of Airlangga Convention on Worldwide Relations, 2018.
Kusuma, Halifa Alena. “Maritime Diplomacy within the ASEAN Maritime Safety Strategic Partnership,” Trendy Diplomacy, January 24, 2024.
Mohabeer, Raj and Kate Sullivan de Estrada. “Strengthening Maritime Safety within the Western Indian Ocean.” Indian Ocean Fee, 2019.
“Operation Levante 2: A Regional Safety Mechanism.” Indian Ocean Fee, August 26, 2024.
Ralby, Ian. “From Sea Blindness to Wealth Blindness.” Stimson Atmosphere Safety, February 8, 2017.
Ruo-Yao Fan, Jing-Yi Xie, Jai-Jun Liu, Hui-Ying Wang, Meng-Xuan Li, Ning Yu, Ren-Ni Luan, Yong-Ming Chai, and Bin Dong, “Directional Regulating Dynamic Equilibrium to Repeatedly Replace Electrocatalytic Interface for Oxygen Evolution Response.” Chemical Engineering Journal 431, no. 2, March 2022.
Featured Picture: Leaders pictured at a ceremony the place Seychelles assumes Chairpersonship of the Contact Group on Illicit Maritime Actions (CGIMA). (CGIMA picture)
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