The Nationwide Transportation Security Board (NTSB) has printed an investigation report into an incident the place a hearth erupted within the engine room of a cargo vessel throughout bunkering operations, claiming two lives.
The incident
On January 8, 2024, about 0331 native time, a hearth broke out within the engine room aboard the cargo vessel Stride throughout bunkering operations whereas it was docked on the Barbours Minimize Marine Terminal in LaPorte, Texas. Crewmembers shut down all air flow to the engine room, and the hearth self-extinguished. Shoreside firefighters and the ship’s emergency groups eliminated three crewmembers from the engine management room who had been unable to flee the hearth; two died on scene, and one was significantly injured. No air pollution was reported. The vessel was declared a constructive complete loss, valued at $12 million.
Evaluation
On January 8, 2024, about 0330, whereas the cargo vessel Stride was docked in LaPorte, Texas, and conducting bunkering operations, a hearth broke out within the engine room. The hearth self-extinguished after crewmembers shut down all air flow to the engine room from outdoors air by closing provide and exhaust air flow dampers. Two crewmembers died because of the hearth; one crewmember was significantly injured. The hearth broke out within the engine room of the Stride about 25 minutes after the crew of the bunker barge started pumping diesel oil from the barge to the Stride. The chief engineer aboard the Stride had ordered 80 mt of diesel oil, which was to be loaded into the port and starboard DBDO tanks.
Based on the bunkering survey report accomplished earlier than bunkering operations started, the port DBDO tank had room for about 60 mt of diesel oil, and the starboard DBDO tank had room for about 37.2 mt till they had been fully full. Utilizing each DBDO tanks, there was room for about 97.2 mt of diesel oil. Subsequently, there was ample capability within the Stride’s port and starboard DBDO tanks to obtain the 80 mt of diesel oil that had been ordered. Six weeks earlier than the hearth, a alternative valve was ordered for the port DBDO tank.
The vessel’s gas oil system drawing clearly confirmed an angle cease valve for the port DBDO tank. This valve would have allowed gas to circulate by way of it in each instructions when open. Nonetheless, after the hearth, investigators found that though the alternative valve that was ordered and put in regarded comparable from the skin and was of the right dimensions, it was not the identical kind of valve specified by the vessel’s gas oil system drawing; as a substitute, an angle cease examine valve, which permits circulate in just one course, even when open, was ordered. Subsequently, even when the crew absolutely opened the valve, as put in within the Stride’s gas oil system, the examine valve function would solely enable circulate out of the tank.
Furthermore, the vessel had not bunkered diesel oil into the port DBDO tank because the valve alternative, and subsequently the crew had no prior indication that the mistaken valve kind was ordered and put in. Unaware that diesel oil wouldn’t have the ability to circulate into the port DBDO tank, engineering crewmembers on the Stride had opened the fill valves for each the port and starboard DBDO tanks to obtain the diesel oil.
Nonetheless, not one of the estimated 52 mt of diesel oil that was transferred from the barge went into the port DBDO tank; as a substitute, it went solely into the starboard DBDO tank, which solely had capability for about 37.2 mt till it was fully full. Moreover, all of the diesel oil pumped from the barge was acquired into the starboard DBDO tank at a quicker fee than anticipated, since just one tank was being crammed.
The corporate required 4 engineering crewmembers and two engine scores to be on obligation throughout bunkering operations. Nonetheless, on the time of the hearth, solely three engineering crewmembers (two engineering officers and one engine score) had been concerned. The fitter was positioned on the bunkering station on the A deck, and the chief engineer and third engineer had been the one different engineering crewmembers conducting the operation within the engine management room when the wiper reported seeing diesel oil within the engine room. Prudent marine observe throughout bunkering could be to fill slowly at first, sound every tank at frequent intervals, and evaluate readings to automated degree indicators to confirm correct operation.
As soon as a secure fill fee is established, the particular person in cost may request a rise within the switch velocity. On the Stride, a high-level alarm would doubtless have been accessible for the starboard DBDO tank, and the 2 engineering officers within the engine management room (ECR) might have been monitoring tank ranges. If the alarm sounded, it ought to have been recorded, however no such report existed.
Moreover, the corporate’s SMS procedures required native sounding throughout bunkering, but no crew members checked the tank ranges with sounding tapes or gauges, so that they didn’t understand the diesel oil wasn’t flowing into the port DBDO tank. Two minutes after bunkering started, the chief engineer rapidly requested two will increase in pumping charges, inflicting the starboard DBDO tank to fill to capability inside 25 minutes.
After the tank turned full, the incoming gas was compelled up the vent piping because the barge continued pumping. Investigators estimated that about 14.8 mt of diesel oil was pushed into the vent. The vent pipe related a number of engine room gas tank vents right into a 12-inch pipe working upward inside the funnel casing. At some unknown time, a 7-inch-by-11-inch part had been lower into the vent pipe on the D deck, however there have been no information of this alteration, approvals, or inspections of the unauthorized modification.
The cut-out part of the vent pipe had been changed with a versatile sealant and wrapped in tape. As soon as the diesel oil reached the part of vent pipe with the cut-out and sealant, the diesel oil strain exceeded the sealant’s capability, inflicting the cut-out part to be ejected onto the deck beneath. Diesel oil then poured from the opening within the vent pipe, cascading down by way of the funnel casing, onto the incinerator, the working boiler, the primary engine, lighting, working tools, and equipment.
The diesel oil ignited, leading to a hearth within the engine room. If the cut-out had not been current, the diesel oil would doubtless have exited the vent pipe on the compass deck and spilled onto the outside of the vessel and into the water, reasonably than straight into the engine room, which contained working equipment and ignition sources. Fireplace investigators said that the most well liked space of fireplace harm was on the decrease degree, starboard aspect of the engine room close to the lube oil filtration system. As a result of in depth space uncovered to the overflowing gas, it was not potential to definitively determine the preliminary ignition supply.
Classes realized
Consulting vessel drawings when ordering alternative parts
Vessel drawings comprise piping symbols for tools resembling valve sorts, sizes, and capabilities. House owners, operators, and crews ought to fastidiously notice all parts of a vessel’s drawings and diagrams to make sure that correct spare or alternative components are ordered to keep up performance.
Making certain satisfactory personnel for bunkering operations
Throughout bunkering operations, vessel house owners, operators, and crews ought to guarantee satisfactory personnel can be found to take frequent soundings, set up gas tank filling charges, and talk to the particular person in cost, so tanks are monitored and don’t overflow.
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Supply: NTSB
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