By Bakhtiyar Askaruly
Kazakhstan is the most important landlocked nation, relying closely on a resource-exporting financial system, with the primary path to worldwide markets going by means of Russian territory.1 For a few years, Kazakhstan didn’t expertise any interruptions whereas exporting its sources, however the Russian invasion of Ukraine now challenges Kazakhstan’s financial and safety stability. Russia has blocked Kazakhstan’s oil exports by shutting down a pumping station within the Black Sea port to attract Kazakhstan into its advantageous political stance vis-à-vis Ukraine. Kazakhstan is now exploring totally different routes for its useful resource exports. The Caspian Sea gives a promising possibility however would require sea traces of communication (SLOC). Kazakhstan ought to construct a “Fleet in being” to guard its traces of communication, guaranteeing entry to the Caspian Sea.2
80 p.c of Kazakhstan’s GDP comes from oil and gasoline exports.3 90 p.c of these oil exports go to European markets by means of Russian territory by way of pipelines.4 Kazakhstan’s reliance on power exports locations the nation in a susceptible place that’s now being exploited by Russia. In 2022, Russia shut down oil transportation a number of instances in response to Kazakhstan’s chosen overseas coverage. On March 20, 2022, excessive seas within the Black Sea allegedly broken the oil pumping station, however underneath nefarious circumstances. Throughout the two-week disruption, Kazakhstan misplaced as much as 300 million {dollars} in revenues.5 Earlier than this occasion, experiences surfaced that Kazakhstan selected to not ship troops to Ukraine to battle alongside Russian forces.6 On June 20, 2022, Russia shut off its oil pumping station within the Black Sea a second time resulting from found malfunctions. The second disruption coincided with Kazakhstan’s Presidential announcement of non-recognition of Russian-occupied Ukraine territories on June 17, 2022.7 The third interruption occurred on July 6 when a Russian native courtroom halted exports underneath the guise of an oil spill.8
In response to the oil export interruption, on July 7 Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev urged the event of different routes for oil export. He directed a research to look at the development of an underwater pipeline and using an oil tanker fleet within the Caspian Sea.9 Related proposals for an underwater pipeline happened within the Nineteen Nineties however remained blueprints and mockups. Within the 1990’s U.S. firms undertook the Transcaspian gasoline pipeline mission, which was aimed to move gasoline from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and later from Kazakhstan to European markets. The Clinton administration created a brand new place within the State Division for Caspian gasoline and oil tasks. In flip, Russia appointed two high-level authorities representatives to handle the Caspian points. Moscow additionally agreed with Iran for strategic power cooperation within the area, meant to dam any efforts for a trans-Caspian pipeline not underneath Russia’s management or affect.10 Each nations used the unresolved standing of the Caspian Sea to impede any additional growth of power switch choices.
In 2018, the Caspian Conference regional nations signed a pact to exclude Russian and Iranian vetoes over a trans-Caspian gasoline pipeline.11 This new authorized standing for the Caspian Sea permits Kazakhstan to diversify its oil export transit choices. This mission’s completion stays unsure resulting from Russia’s opposition. An alternative choice for Kazakhstan is to construct a tanker fleet and broaden port capabilities. Sooner or later, a Caspian oil tanker fleet might transfer as much as 30 p.c of oil exports by means of the Caspian Sea.12 Nonetheless, oil tankers within the Caspian stay susceptible to adversaries’ provocations with out acceptable safety supplied by the Corbettian idea of a “Fleet in Being,” offering safety to a pleasant fleet, and defending towards unwarranted assaults.
The navy stability of energy within the Caspian Sea is shared between 5 nations: Russia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan. Russia holds “native command” of the Caspian Sea with its comparatively important fleet for this remoted physique of water. The Russian Caspian flotilla consists of 28 warships, together with two guided missile frigates, eight corvettes, 4 patrol boats, seven minesweepers, six touchdown craft, and a gunboat.13 Iran’s fleet contains one frigate, two corvettes, and ten patrol boats. Azerbaijan possesses one frigate, 4 submarines, and dozens of patrol boats. Kazakhstan’s fleet contains two missile boats, two patrol boats, and one minesweeper. Turkmenistan’s fleet is even smaller.
Kazakhstan’s current naval fleet stays inferior in comparison with the highest risk. Russian and Iranian cooperation additional compromises Kazakhstan’s already precarious place. Kazakhstan’s fleet solely patrols the littorals and gives safety for offshore oil extraction.
Within the face of latest challenges, particularly creating new export routes by means of the Caspian Sea, Kazakhstan ought to construct a “Fleet in Being” to make sure the denial of adversaries. The primary activity of Kazakhstan’s fleet needs to be targeted on fast response to any provocation on its SLOCs, that are roughly 300 kilometers in size. This might be resolved by three to 5 corvettes and dozens of smaller high-speed boats with efficient firepower, equivalent to anti-ship cruise missiles. Extra considerably nonetheless, a naval buildup may stimulate additional militarization and an arms race within the Caspian Sea. To mitigate these dangers floor ships numbers needs to be sufficient to current a reputable risk, however seem defensive.
To make sure that any adversary’s motion within the sea could be defeated, Kazakhstan may purchase ISR techniques and loitering munitions. This functionality mixture proved efficient within the second Nagorno-Karabakh Struggle.14 ISR techniques equivalent to unmanned aerial automobiles (UAVs) would be capable of present areas of ships and focusing on data, whereas loitering munitions might ship precision strikes, much like present operations in Ukraine. The primary necessities for such platforms can embrace UAVs which are capable of function past an adversary’s efficient vary whereas having the ability to relay the goal’s location. Loitering munitions ought to function sufficient explosives to cripple a corvette-sized vessel. As an illustration, the Harop drone might be used as a loitering munition designed to find and strike with 23 kg of excessive explosive. It additionally may be safely landed and relaunched.15
The mixture of UAVs and loitering munitions can keep away from an pointless arms race within the Caspian Sea. It is usually cheaper to amass and preserve them. One other benefit of this mixture is that they can be utilized in different duties in numerous areas. Loitering munitions may be operated in low altitudes above the ocean floor, making them extremely survivable. They’ll an efficient vary of 1,000 km and 9 hours of flight endurance.16 Items that function this technique might prepare in any location within the huge steppe of Kazakhstan. In live performance with the abovementioned ship capabilities, they’ll additionally present a reputable deterrent.
Conclusion
Within the face of geopolitical challenges, Kazakhstan is positioned to diversify its oil exports by means of the Caspian Sea. Nonetheless, the nation’s naval energy won’t be capable of present safe traces of communication because it was designed to patrol seashore and offshore oil manufacturing, extra just like the features of a coast guard. To make sure SLOC safety, Kazakhstan ought to construct a “Fleet in being.” That functionality might encompass further corvettes armed with cruise missiles, in addition to ISR techniques and loitering munitions. This mix guarantees to be an efficient deterrent whereas not frightening an arms race within the Caspian Sea.
Bakhtiyar Askaruly is a pseudonym for a navy officer of a Central Asian nation.
References
1. (accessed 4-30-2023)/
2. Sir Julian S. Corbett, Some Rules of Maritime Technique (Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press Reprint, 1988), 165. This passage describes what is supposed by this time period, a power than can “dispute” command of the ocean.
3. (accessed 4-30-2023)…
4. (accessed 4-30-2023).
5. (accessed 4-30-2023).
6. (accessed 4-30-2023.
7. (accessed 4-30-2023).
8. (accessed 4-30-2023).
9. (accessed 4-30-2023).
10. Fiona Hill, “Pipelines within the Caspian: Catalyst or Treatment-all?” Georgetown Journal of Worldwide Affairs (Winter/Spring 2004): 17.
11. Robert M. Cutler, The Trans-Caspian Is a Pipeline for a Geopolitical Fee, Power Safety Program Coverage Paper No. 1 (March 2020: NATO affiliation of Canada).
12. (accessed 4-30-2023).
13.
14. John Antal, 7 Seconds to Die, (Oxford, UK: Casemate Writer, 2022).
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
Featured Picture: A Russian Navy Caspian Flotilla warship fires a Kalibr-NK cruise missile throughout naval drills. (Picture by way of Russian Ministry of Protection)
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