By Dmitry Filipoff
Introduction
In October 1944, the navies of Imperial Japan and the US met within the remaining main fleet-on-fleet fight engagement of WWII. The U.S. invasion of the Philippines prompted Imperial Japan to sortie its fleet in a determined bid to guard very important territories and inflict a decisive blow in opposition to Allied forces.1 The following battle featured separate but mutually reinforcing clashes between a number of maneuvering naval formations. The battle finally resulted in a decisive defeat for the Imperial Japanese Navy, which ceased to be an efficient combating power for the rest of the conflict.
The battle triggered an abundance of controversy concerning the decision-making of the senior American and Japanese commanders. Specifically, Admiral Halsey’s choice to depart the vital San Bernadino Strait unguarded afforded Admiral Takeo Kurita a lucky likelihood to strike on the uncovered invasion forces on the Leyte Gulf beachhead. However Kurita’s highly effective power of heavy floor warships encountered a modest power of a number of escort carriers and their gentle escorts, a unit referred to as Taffy 3. Misidentifying these forces as bigger capital ship models, Kurita believed he had come throughout a profitable alternative to assault a number of U.S. Navy fleet carriers at shut vary. In the middle of conducting a combating withdrawal beneath heavy hearth, the power of escort carriers and destroyers was in a position to divert Kurita’s consideration away from the Leyte beachhead for a number of vital hours, finally inflicting Kurita to finish his pursuit and abandon the beachhead bombardment goal altogether.
What if Kurita had pressed onward towards the beachhead and ignored the forces of Taffy 3? May Kurita have reached the beachhead and had sufficient time to savage the vital logistics and transports of the invasion power? Taffy 3’s pleas for assist prompted a number of main naval formations to reverse course and steam towards the battle. A lot of them have been by no means in a position to intercept Kurita, who had already withdrawn. But when Kurita had dedicated to a press towards the Leyte beachhead, it will have precipitated a number of new main engagements that would have affected the broader influence of the battle. An in depth examination of the vital components of time and distance outlines the sorts of clashes and tactical interplays that may have been set in movement had Kurita pressed on.
The State of Play
The Battle of Leyte Gulf featured a number of interconnected but geographically separate naval battles occurring throughout the neighborhood of the Philippines. These battles have been separated by a whole lot of miles, which constrained U.S. choices for sending forces to help the beleaguered Taffy 3. Commensurately, these distances afforded Kurita a chance to doubtlessly arrive at Leyte Gulf earlier than being intercepted by intervening forces. The precise components of time and distance, and the way they arrive collectively to dictate choices for maneuvering forces into engagements, reveals an alternate sequence of occasions.
The primary main battle of Leyte Gulf occurred within the Sibuyan Sea on October 24, the place Kurita’s power was noticed on its means heading east to the San Bernadino Strait, from the place it may then push south towards the Leyte beachhead. Kurita’s power, dubbed the Heart Drive, was intensively engaged by 5 fleet carriers and one gentle service of the third Fleet.2 The Heart Drive suffered heavy losses, together with the notable sinking of the tremendous battleship Musashi (sister ship to the Yamato). Kurita reversed course, inflicting Admiral Halsey to consider the Heart Drive was decisively overwhelmed into full retreat.
However later that day Kurita subsequently reversed course once more and resumed his transit towards the San Bernadino Strait.3 Kurita’s Heart Drive transited the strait at roughly midnight on October 25.4
For a naval power touring close to the coast of the Philippines, the journey from the Strait to Leyte Gulf is roughly 260 miles (or about 225 nautical miles). Kurita’s chief of workers, Rear Admiral Tomiji Koyanagi, acknowledged they anticipated to reach on the Leyte beachhead at 1000.5 Nonetheless, in post-war interrogations by U.S. personnel, Kurita indicated the night time transit via the Strait occurred at a velocity of 20 knots, and that the utmost velocity of a few of his forces on the Battle off Samar was roughly 25 knots.6 Within the strait transit the power was steaming as a cohesive formation. Throughout the pursuit within the Battle off Samar, Kurita licensed his heavy models to maneuver at will at no matter prime velocity their particular person platforms may muster. Given the 225-nautical mile distance and a presumed 20-knot velocity for formation steaming, Kurita would have extra probably arrived at Leyte Gulf at round 1130.
Earlier that morning to the south of Leyte at Surigao Strait, a Japanese floor power steamed instantly into an elegantly laid entice by Admiral Jesse Oldendorf. A mixture of heavy floor gunfire, patrol boat assaults, and destroyer torpedo runs shattered the Japanese power at little value to the People. By 0430, the Battle of Surigao Strait entered the pursuit and mop-up section after a decisive American victory.7 Surigao Strait is roughly 60 nautical miles south of Leyte Gulf.
On the Battle off Cape Engaño to the north, U.S. forces fell for a ruse that gave Kurita his vital alternative. The Imperial Japanese Navy had little in the best way of service plane after struggling heavy attrition on the Battle of the Philippine Sea in June 1944.8 The remaining Japanese carriers have been subsequently organized right into a decoy power that was supposed to drag the majority of U.S. service placing forces away from the Philippines in a bid to open up a chance for Kurita to cross via the San Bernadino Strait. On this regard, the Japanese have been profitable, with Admiral Halsey totally committing Process Drive 38 to attacking this Japanese decoy power, dubbed the Northern Drive. TF 38, which operated beneath Halsey’s third Fleet, contained virtually the entire fleet carriers close to the Philippines and was the Navy’s principal placing unit within the Pacific theater. Place studies put TF 38 at roughly 480 nautical miles from Leyte Gulf throughout the Battle off Cape Engaño.9
By the point Kurita encounters Taffy 3, the Heart Drive had transited about 60 p.c of the gap towards Leyte Gulf, roughly 135 nautical miles, with 90 nautical miles to go. Kurita was sighted by Taffy 3 at round 0645.10 Right here the timing turns into vital as to when numerous naval commanders first obtain phrase of Taffy 3’s plight, after which both get orders to help Taffy 3 or act on their very own initiative to set course for the battle.
Admiral Oldendorf first receives phrase of the Battle off Samar at roughly 0730.12 Solely a number of minutes later and appearing on his personal initiative, Oldendorf reverses course and begins sending the majority of his forces northward towards the gulf.13 At 0846, he subsequently receives orders to take his total power northward to a degree close to Hibuson island, and at 0953 he receives orders to detach a big portion of his power to help Taffy 3 and ship the remainder to Leyte Gulf.14
Admiral Halsey’s TF 38 launches the primary deckload of service strike plane on the Japanese decoy service power at 0630, and doesn’t obtain a report on the consequences of their strikes till 0850.15 Halsey doesn’t obtain phrase of Taffy 3’s plight till Admiral Kinkaid of seventh fleet sends an pressing dispatch at 0822: “ENEMY BATTLESHIPS AND CRUISERS REPORTED FIRING ON TASK UNIT 77.4.3…” Halsey receives one other pressing name for assist from Kinkaid solely eight minutes later: “URGENTLY NEED FAST BATTLESHIPS LEYTE GULF AT as soon as.”16 Halsey subsequently receives a late message at 0922 that had initially been despatched by Kinkaid at 0725, which might have been Halsey’s first discover of Taffy 3’s plight. Halsey was unable to right away help. With air wings already within the air and totally dedicated to placing the Japanese service fleet, and with TF 38 a whole lot of miles from Samar, there was little Halsey may do to right away help. As he would later recall about his reply to Kinkaid, “I gave him my place, to indicate him the impossibility of the quick battleships reaching him.”17
But Admiral Kinkaid was insistent, and Admiral Nimitz at Pacific Fleet headquarters determined to weigh in. Dispatches from each reached Halsey at about 1000, inquiring in regards to the heavy floor activity power connected to TF 38 – TF 34 – beneath Admiral Willis Lee.18 Halsey subsequently indifferent this power from TF 38, and at 1115, had it reverse course for Leyte Gulf.19
After virtually three hours of pursuing the retiring escort carriers at excessive velocity, Kurita’s power started to withdraw from the Battle off Samar at round 0930.20 By the point Oldendorf and TF34 had obtained their orders to help Taffy 3, Kurita was already on his means out of the battle.
Essential Components of the Various
The primary choice that modifications within the different situation is Kurita urgent onward to Leyte relatively than committing his power to a pursuit of Taffy 3 that pulls him away from his foremost goal. This choice is enabled by Kurita having higher situational consciousness than was the case on the historic battle. Particularly, Kurita precisely classifies the flattops of Taffy 3 as escort carriers, relatively than fleet carriers. The vital issue of correct classification of the ships of Taffy 3 may have enabled Kurita to press onward, and never have his ships pulled right into a pursuit in opposition to marginally essential targets. Within the different situation, Kurita’s Heart Drive as a substitute preserves the cohesiveness of its formation, its southernly course, and its ammunition in anticipation of a heavy bombardment of the Leyte beachhead.
There are a number of different components which might be held fixed in inspecting this different. Importantly, velocity is held fixed. All the heavy floor and fleet service forces are held to be transiting at 20 knots. This lifelike charge represents an efficient stability between excessive velocity, sustaining formation cohesion, and an inexpensive gas consumption charge. A 20-knot velocity was the Heart Drive’s charge of advance via the Sibuyan Sea on the night time of October 24, and it was the velocity of TF 34 for a lot of its exercise on October 25.21 Utilizing this fixed transit velocity determine throughout all heavy floor and service forces is beneficial for making an affordable estimate of how lengthy it will have taken every formation to succeed in sure components of the battlespace and intercept Kurita.
U.S. sighting studies are held to be the identical because the historic occasion. If not for appreciable command confusion, U.S. forces would have probably noticed Kurita sooner, reacted to his power sooner, and maybe even contained his Heart Drive at San Bernadino Strait, just like how Oldendorf successfully launched a devastating strait ambush at Surigao. On this different, the overarching command confusion that delayed the U.S. response to the Heart Drive is maintained.
Kurita Intercepted: The Various Engagement
The sequence of occasions develops fairly otherwise if Kurita holds quick to the target of attacking the Leyte beachhead. By way of bypassing Taffy 3 and urgent onward, Kurita precipitates new intense engagements that probably culminate within the annihilation of his power.
At about 0655, minutes after being sighted by planes from Taffy 3, Kurita’s Heart Drive opened hearth on the uncovered escort carriers. However now Kurita precisely classifies the warships and maintains his southernly course. At this level within the battle and at a transit velocity of 20 knots, the Heart Drive is about 4.5 hours away from the beachhead.
Practically three hours after the Heart Drive is first sighted, Oldendorf obtained his orders to intercept. At this level within the battle Oldendorf is already on a northward course and is about three hours from Leyte Gulf. Oldendorf is nearer to the Gulf than Kurita, and certain has the advantage of regular sighting studies from Taffy aviation, which permits the seventh Fleet to keep up contact with the Heart Drive and supply correct place and course studies. The mix of nearer proximity to Kurita’s goal and fixed aerial reconnaissance affords Oldendorf a chance to intercept the Heart Drive earlier than it could actually deliver its weapons to bear on the Leyte beachhead. An examination of intersecting timelines strongly means that Oldendorf’s power would have intercepted Kurita at roughly 1030, about 20 nautical miles from the place Kurita would have been in a position to begin firing upon the beachhead.
Oldendorf’s power depleted a substantial quantity of ammunition throughout the Battle of Surigao Strait hours earlier, particularly torpedoes and large-caliber armor-piercing shells.22 This problem was compounded by how the battleships had been initially loaded for bombardment missions, with almost 80 p.c of their large-caliber ammunition being high-explosive rounds, and the rest being armor-piercing rounds. Prematurely of the Battle of Surigao Strait, the operational affect of this ammunition loadout resulted in Oldendorf’s command agreeing to solely open hearth as soon as targets entered inside 20,000-17,000 yards to supply a greater likelihood of scoring hits.23 The more energizing Heart Drive could have had a helpful benefit in firing off a number of highly effective salvos earlier than Oldendorf may reply in sort, and will have been in a position to outlast Oldendorf in a protracted gunfight. Resulting from his mission Kurita could have additionally had a bombardment-focused ammunition loadout, however exact figures seem unavailable.
Oldendorf’s orders from Admiral Kinkaid directed him to take one division of battleships, one division of heavy cruisers, and about half of his destroyers to help Taffy 3.25 The rest of the power would regroup inside Leyte Gulf. To intercept the Heart Drive Oldendorf shaped a particular detachment from TF 77.2, and created a power consisting of three battleships, 4 heavy cruisers, and twenty destroyers. The remainder have been to proceed to the gulf. By comparability, Kurita had the next warships within the Heart Drive by this time: 4 battleships, three heavy cruisers, two gentle cruisers, and 13 destroyers.26 Kurita subsequently had a significant benefit in heavy floor gunnery. His biggest supply of benefit in a floor motion nevertheless got here from the Japanese Sort 93 “Lengthy Lance” torpedo, which possessed double the vary of the American Mark 15 torpedo.27 At 30,000 yards of vary, the Sort 93 had an identical firing distance as extreme-range battleship gunnery.
Oldendorf could have had a helpful benefit in geography and the disposition of his forces. The timing of the interception would have probably allowed Oldendorf to have interaction Kurita’s power within the slender strait between the Manicani and Homonhon Islands, the ultimate maritime chokepoint Kurita would have needed to transit earlier than breaking into Leyte Gulf. Kurita’s westward transit via the strait and Oldendorf’s northward course would have extra naturally allowed Oldendorf to configure the disposition of his forces to cross Kurita’s T, and convey the complete weight of his firepower to bear. Kurita’s capacity to reply would have been constrained by the tight geography of the strait, a six-nautical mile-long chokepoint. If Kurita manages to reconfigure his steaming formation right into a battle line throughout the confines of the strait, a duel between parallel battle traces would have taken Kurita off track from the gulf and value valuable time.
A battle line in such tight quarters would have made for interesting targets for torpedo runs by destroyers, a significant legal responsibility to each side. Upon sighting each other, each forces would have probably loosed their gentle forces in opposition to each other to conduct torpedo runs earlier than the floor gunnery would start. It’s right here that Kurita would have probably wielded his biggest benefit within the particular context of this hypothetical battle – the Sort 93 torpedo. By with the ability to hearth torpedoes properly earlier than the People can, and by concentrating on Oldendorf’s battle line blocking the strait, Kurita’s destroyers are probably in a position to inflict heavy injury in opposition to Oldendorf’s heavy floor forces at finest, or no less than disrupt the battle line formation. Kurita’s benefit in long-range torpedo firepower subsequently disrupts Oldendorf’s ostensible benefit in disposition of forces. By organising a blocking formation on the mouth of the strait, Oldendorf could have truly set himself as much as have his personal T crossed by devastating torpedo runs.
Oldendorf could have sought a replay of the Battle of Surigao Strait and despatched his sooner destroyers forward of the battle line to harass the oncoming Heart Drive earlier than floor gunnery was joined. Such an motion may have scored appreciable injury and disrupted the formation of the Heart Drive. However Oldendorf’s battle line would have probably nonetheless been wanted to definitively cease Kurita, and it will have been disadvantaged of the quilt of darkness that was so helpful to Oldendorf’s ambush at Surigao Strait. In going through a considerably stronger power, Oldendorf wanted to search out methods to maximise his firepower, however forming a battle line formation on the mouth of the strait could have confirmed a significant legal responsibility in daytime in opposition to main torpedo threats.
The battle line formation is fragile within the confines of a small strait that includes a pervasive torpedo risk. Due to this, Oldendorf’s interception of Kurita would have probably devolved right into a gunnery melee. Much like the a number of floor engagements off Guadalcanal, naval formations would have probably devolved into lone warships, or small teams of warships, firing and maneuvering at will in a bid to win their particular person engagements.28 Each side would have lacked cohesive formations for concentrating firepower and enhancing command-and-control. It’s a problem to discern web benefit between forces in such a melee, particularly given how injury in naval battles can knock out vital ship elements which have an outsized affect on a ship’s capacity to struggle and keep velocity. Nonetheless, given Kurita’s benefit in heavy floor models and torpedo firepower, the Heart Drive would have probably prevailed in opposition to Oldendorf in such a melee.
How lengthy may Oldendorf have delayed Kurita’s press towards Leyte? With the intercept occurring at roughly 1030, how lengthy wouldn’t it have taken Kurita’s models to inflict sufficient injury on Oldendorf’s power to permit for a renewed push towards Leyte? Taken collectively, the length of the 4 main floor gunnery actions close to Savo Island counsel that the motion between Oldendorf and Kurita would have concluded in roughly two hours, with Kurita’s forces popping out in higher form.29 Due to this fact Oldendorf in all probability may have purchased the allied forces roughly two hours of time with the destruction of his activity power.
At this level it’s 1230, and Kurita’s broken however nonetheless efficient combating power is simply an hour away from placing the beachhead beneath its weapons. Upon reaching the beachhead at 1330, Kurita then has a comparatively open-ended alternative to expend his ammunition in opposition to the beachhead. Based mostly on the speed of fireside and ammunition loadout of the primary battery of the Heart Drive’s Yamato battleship, the power would have expended most of its ammunition in a bombardment in roughly two hours of steady firing.30 Kurita additionally would have probably opted to retain some ammunition with a view to struggle his means again out of the gulf and thru the San Bernadino Strait. On this different situation, Kurita reaches the beachhead after which completes his bombardment at round 1530.
At 1115, midway via Kurita’s hypothetical battle with Oldendorf, Halsey dispatched TF 34 beneath Admiral Willis Lee on a course for the gulf. However this power was greater than 400 nautical miles away and would have taken a couple of full day to succeed in the scene of motion. Lee clearly would have been in no place to disrupt the bombardment had it occurred. On this sense, Admiral Halsey was appropriate in gauging the futility of Admiral Kinkaid’s requests for Lee’s TF 34 to intervene in a floor engagement happening greater than 400 miles away. Kinkaid’s notion that TF 34 was one way or the other inside placing distance of the Battle off Samar is a significant symptom of the command confusion that stricken the discordant seventh and third Fleets.
A number of New Engagements and Intercepts
If Kurita’s power will get the higher of Oldendorf’s power, then there isn’t any heavy floor unit obtainable to disrupt the bombardment of the Leyte beachhead. Due to this fact the remaining models obtainable to intervene with Kurita’s bombardment and egress are largely naval air forces. These embrace the forces comprising the three Taffy models, Taffy 1, 2, and three, which primarily contained escort carriers and lightweight floor models, in addition to the distant forces of Admiral McCain’s fleet service activity power, TF 38.1.
The airpower of those models stands out for its potential to have lengthy sustained the struggle in opposition to the Heart Drive no matter whether or not it defeats U.S. floor forces. After being sighted by Taffy 3, Kurita would have probably been beneath persistent air assault all through the whole thing of his journey to and from the gulf. Given how Kurita was sighted not lengthy after dawn, he may have been beneath air assault for nearly 11 hours on October 25. These assaults would have included torpedo and bomb threats that would have threatened to unravel the cohesion of the Heart Drive’s formation and power it onto programs that lengthened its journey towards the gulf. It’s vital to ask how a lot value, when it comes to attrition and time, may have been inflicted by the a whole lot of plane from these mixed service forces.
Taffy 1 and a couple of have been situated properly away from the Battle off Samar, however have been inside vary of offering some help to Taffy 3. These escort service forces weren’t well-equipped for fleet fight actions and have been primarily loaded for anti-submarine warfare and shore assist to the invasion forces.31 Nonetheless, they nonetheless carried sufficient bombs and torpedoes to pose a severe risk to heavy floor forces, as evidenced by no less than two IJN heavy cruisers that have been put out of motion inside three hours at Samar by escort service plane.32 An extra heavy cruiser was put out of motion by torpedo assaults from Taffy 3’s floor power, considerably chopping down the variety of Japanese heavy cruisers Oldendorf would have needed to face from six to a few.
If Kurita pressed onward previous Taffy 3, it will have saved his forces properly inside placing distance of the three Taffy models. As a mixed power, the Taffy order of battle comprised 18 escort carriers, which might have been in a position to area about 450 plane, assuming their air teams have been at full power.33 This was actually a substantial combating power, even when its effectiveness was hampered by the restricted availability of anti-ship weapons.
An essential corollary to Kurita precisely classifying the Taffy 3 contacts as escort carriers is Kurita precisely understanding their mission and what this implied for his or her plane loadouts. By classifying the contacts as escort carriers, Kurita perceives their roles as mainly being anti-submarine warfare and shore assist, relatively than fleet-on-fleet fight. Whereas Kurita can not rule out that the Taffy forces are fielding some measure of heavy anti-ship weaponry, he may verify that this isn’t their primary mission and have little in the best way of anti-ship ammunition. This understanding permits Kurita to reasonable the affect the aerial assaults have on his operational habits, notably limiting their capacity to drag him off track from the beachhead by compelling evasive maneuvers. Even so, on this different it’s estimated that evasive maneuvering attributable to aerial torpedo assault imposes a value of a further hour of transit time for Kurita on his means out of the Gulf.
If Kurita had continued his journey southward after being noticed by Taffy 3, he would have been beneath aerial assault for roughly six hours earlier than coming into firing vary of the beachhead, inclusive of the 2 hours his power is held up by Oldendorf. Kurita’s southward journey additionally brings him inside vary of the complete weight of the Taffy escort carriers, whereas on the historic Battle off Samar, he primarily confronted the planes of Taffy 3 and Taffy 2. In response to Taffy 3 coming beneath hearth, all Taffy models have been ordered by Kinkaid to get better their plane and transfer northward to help.34 Had Kurita pressed on to the gulf, it will have been solely a matter of time earlier than he was topic to the complete weight of the 18 Taffy escort carriers.
Nonetheless, the longer length of the choice sequence of occasions diminishes the already restricted effectiveness of the escort carriers in opposition to heavy floor forces. Within the historic battle, Taffy 2 had exhausted its restricted provide of torpedoes and semi-armor piercing bombs after solely 4 airstrikes in opposition to the Heart Drive, with the fourth strike being launched at 1115.35 The Taffy forces could have had way more alternative to strike the Heart Drive within the different, however the majority of the time would have probably been spent conducting harassing assaults of restricted impact.
Fleet Provider Forces Intercept Kurita
Fleet service forces have been after all current on the Battle of Leyte Gulf, however most have been totally dedicated to destroying the carriers of the IJN Northern Drive within the Battle off Cape Engaño. The IJN decoy service power was profitable in pulling Halsey away from the San Bernadino Strait and placing him on a northeast course a whole lot of miles away from the gulf. It’s subsequently unlikely Halsey’s service placing forces would have been in a position to intervene with Kurita’s advance on October 25. Regardless of the vary and velocity of service plane, the gap would have nonetheless been too nice for Halsey to deliver his firepower to bear on Kurita in well timed trend. On the Battle off Cape Engaño, TF 38 launched its remaining strike in opposition to the decoy service power at 1615.37 Darkness would have fallen by the point the carriers may have mounted one other main strike, ending the opportunity of additional air assaults that day.
Nonetheless, by concluding a bombardment at Leyte by roughly 1530, Kurita provides plentiful alternative for Halsey to strike at Kurita the following day. With night time falling and the carriers of the IJN Northern Drive completely broken by the night of October 25, Halsey could have perceived a chance to reorient the remainder of TF 38 for a significant strike in opposition to the Heart Drive. On this different, Halsey has wrapped up the Battle off Cape Engaño by 1900 and turns onto a southwestern course. Steaming at a velocity of 20 knots for 12 hours, by the following morning Halsey’s TF 38 would have been properly inside vary of launching air strikes throughout the Sibuyan Sea and over the San Bernardino Strait, the place Kurita’s power would have been transiting.38 These different timelines create one other intersection between forces, precipitating a second Battle of the Sibuyan Sea.
Within the precise historic occasion, fleet carriers did handle to have interaction Kurita’s Heart Drive on October 25 off Samar, and once more on October 26 within the Sibuyan Sea. On October 22, Admiral John S. McCain Sr.’s TF 38.1 was indifferent from Halsey’s TF 38 and despatched east to replenish on the base of Ulithi.39 Halsey’s first key motion in response to Kinkaid’s pressing requests for assist was to show McCain’s activity power round at 0930 and set course for the gulf. An hour later McCain’s power, consisting of three fleet carriers and two gentle carriers, launched an extreme-range air strike in extra of 300 nautical miles, and launched a second and remaining strike two hours later.40 The acute vary of those strikes compelled the planes to forgo heavier ship-killing loadouts, which finally resulted in negligible outcomes. However had Kurita remained in Leyte Gulf to finish a bombardment, McCain would have been in a position to drastically shut the gap, equip his planes with heavier payloads, and launch further strikes on October 25.
When Halsey indifferent Lee’s TF 34 from TF 38 at 1115, he additionally indifferent the quick service activity power TF 38.2 beneath Admiral Bogan.41 This latter power rendezvoused with McCain’s TF 38.1 on the morning of October 26 at 0500, and each activity forces launched strikes that hit the Heart Drive within the Tablas Strait west of the Sibuyan Sea.42 These strikes sunk a lightweight cruiser and a destroyer.
The actual fact these service forces have been nonetheless in vary to hit Kurita on October 26 highlights how he could have been subjected to a lot larger service air energy within the different situation, the place his westward passage via the San Bernadino Strait happens roughly 9 hours later than the historic case. Within the different, Kurita egresses via the strait on October 26 at roughly 0600, at in regards to the time of dawn, whereas within the historic case he egressed the strait at 2130 the earlier night time. This enabled the Heart Drive to cross many of the Sibuyan Sea beneath cowl of darkness and open the vary between Japanese models and American carriers.43 Within the different, the fee Kurita pays in time to defeat Oldendorf’s power, bombard the beachhead, and egress the gulf considerably expands the chance for American carriers to assault the Heart Drive, particularly the next day. On October 26, the second Battle of the Sibuyan Sea would have seen the remnants of the Heart Drive beneath aerial assault by a strong mixed power of as much as eight fleet carriers and 7 gentle carriers.
Mild Floor Forces Intercept Kurita
The Taffy forces additionally included a substantial quantity of sunshine floor models. The three Taffy activity forces featured a complete of 9 destroyers and 11 destroyer escorts, every geared up with torpedoes.44 However solely Taffy 3’s floor models engaged the Heart Drive within the Battle off Samar, with all however considered one of its seven floor escorts launching torpedo assaults.45 Solely considered one of these torpedo assaults related with a goal, blowing the bow off an IJN heavy cruiser. The first operational results of those torpedo assaults have been the evasive maneuvers they compelled, which helped break up the Japanese formation and quickly take it off track from its pursuit.
Within the different situation, Kurita’s onward press opens up the chance for extra Taffy gentle floor models to assault the Heart Drive, and to conduct larger high quality assaults as properly. A cohesive naval formation steaming on a gradual course would have made for a way more predictable goal for torpedo firing options in comparison with the extra disaggregated power that flexibly chased Taffy 3. The sunshine floor models from Taffy 1 and Taffy 2 would have had greater than sufficient time to succeed in the Heart Drive and contribute their very own assaults.
It’s tough to think about that Kurita would be capable to steadfastly maintain his course towards the beachhead whereas beneath torpedo assault. At a minimal, these assaults would have inflicted a value in time because of the evasive maneuvering they compelled. It’s also probably that Kurita would have incurred a value in cohesion by detaching his gentle forces so they might shut with the U.S. gentle floor models and spoil their torpedo runs. Mild forces function excessive velocity and maneuverability, making them difficult targets for heavy caliber weapons to strike at vary. Kurita would have probably trusted his destroyers to disrupt the assaults of the opposing gentle forces, with a view to hold his heavy models on a steadier course towards his final goal. Within the different, it’s estimated that evasive maneuvering spurred by floor unit torpedo assaults imposes a further hour of transit time on Kurita’s egress.
It’s attainable that not all 20 of the Taffy floor models would have contributed to an assault on the Heart Drive, even when there was an abundance of time and alternative. These models have been primarily meant to display screen their respective escort carriers. Screening roles and inclinations don’t sometimes provide gentle floor models the proximity and independence wanted to launch torpedo runs. Within the historic occasion, Taffy 2’s floor models have been properly inside vary of reaching the purpose of contact and launching torpedo assaults, however the Taffy 2 commander opted to maintain these forces of their screening roles.46 Within the different, it’s probably that extra however not the entire Taffy floor models would have been indifferent to carry out torpedo runs in opposition to the Heart Drive.
Heavy Forces Intercept Kurita
The additional nine-hour value in time that Kurita incurs in a press to the beachhead and again creates a vital alternative for the U.S. to intercept the Heart Drive with contemporary heavy floor forces. If Lee’s TF 34 have been to proceed straight to San Bernadino Strait after being indifferent from TF 38 at 1115, it will have been on the strait roughly two hours earlier than Kurita, at round 0400. This may have allowed Lee to successfully set the disposition of his power to dam the strait and maximize his obtainable firepower within the route of Kurita’s advance. Lee’s power would have had a significant benefit in each numbers of heavy floor models (six battleships) and ammunition in comparison with Kurita’s power, which might have been closely depleted and battered by air and torpedo assaults by this time.
Lee’s superiority would have been overwhelming. Had Lee been in a position to lock Kurita right into a decisive engagement on these phrases, TF 34 would have probably accomplished the destruction of the Heart Drive. Nonetheless, the comparatively shut timing of this early morning intercept signifies that Kurita could have had some alternative to slide via the strait earlier than Lee may have engaged. The extra time that Oldendorf and allied torpedo assaults impose on Kurita’s timetable, the larger Lee’s possibilities of intercepting and decisively destroying the Heart Drive on the strait.
The timing and placement of Kurita’s early morning strait transit at 0600 additionally means that the complete weight of the mixed forces of TF 38 and TF 34, that includes quite a few fleet carriers and battleships, may have been delivered to bear in opposition to the Heart Drive in these early daylight. What the choice reveals is that U.S. forces are in a position to impose a number of new engagements on the Heart Drive given the intersecting timelines created by Kurita’s longer journey to and from Leyte Gulf.
Bombardment, Attrition, and Strategic Impact
Had he pushed via, Kurita would have probably loved a prolonged alternative to bombard the Leyte beachhead, even when he would have been beneath persistent air assault. Kurita’s gunnery could have been spoiled at instances by evasive maneuvering spurred by torpedoes, however the U.S. forces that would have threatened Kurita within the 1030-1530 timeframe are unlikely to pose an awesome risk. Kurita would have had sufficient operational freedom to expend the majority of his firepower in opposition to the beachhead earlier than retiring. Nonetheless, the fee in time Kurita incurs in urgent towards the gulf considerably expands the chance for the U.S. to strike the Heart Drive, which might have probably been destroyed throughout its egress.
The added attrition Kurita may have inflicted and suffered is finally of restricted strategic impact. Kurita’s capacity to affect the course of occasions within the Pacific Battle at Leyte was eclipsed by a mix of American industrial would possibly and a brand new dominant mode of warfare that had already rendered the Heart Drive of restricted worth. A heavy bombardment of the Leyte beachhead and its transports may have hampered U.S. operations for a matter of weeks at most, however couldn’t have been decisive sufficient to attain its supposed goal – the foreclosures of the invasion.
The allied invasion of Leyte was divided into two primary touchdown websites, with the Northern Assault Drive touchdown south of town of Tacloban, and the Southern Assault Drive touchdown close to Dulag, with the touchdown websites being separated by about 12 nautical miles.47 5 days after the October 20 invasion of Leyte, allied forces had delivered 81,000 troops and 115,000 tons of provides ashore for the Northern Assault Drive, and 50,000 troops and 85,000 tons ashore for the Southern Assault Drive.48 Whereas the invading forces had made it properly inland by the point Kurita may have entered the gulf, their logistical infrastructure was nonetheless closely targeting the shore areas.
In response to Admiral Koyanagi, Kurita’s chief of workers on the battle, the Mixed Fleet Headquarters directed that Kurita’s major goal be the invasion’s amphibious transport ships.50 This was a reference to the big Touchdown Ship, Tank (LST) vessels, which have been essential to the allied conflict effort. LSTs have been wanted for carrying armored autos and enormous quantities of logistical wants for allied forces. Their amphibious functionality allowed them to ship their cargoes over shorelines, relatively than solely be restricted to port infrastructure like typical cargo vessels.
These ships have been so vital that their restricted availability had a constraining affect on allied technique, particularly with a number of allied invasions occurring on reverse sides of the globe. The D-Day invasion was postponed by a month partly with a view to have sufficient LSTs deemed adequate for sustaining the invasion.51 As Basic Eisenhower wrote to Basic Marshall, “we can have no repeat no LSTs reaching the seashores after the morning of D plus 1 till the morning of D plus 4.” After the choice to postpone was made, Eisenhower wrote Marshall once more to say “one additional month of touchdown craft manufacturing, together with LSTs, ought to assist quite a bit.”52 The Battle of Leyte Gulf occurred solely 4 months after the D-Day invasion, which had absorbed a considerable quantity of allied LST capability, suggesting that these vessels have been nonetheless in particularly excessive demand.
In response to Samuel Eliot Morison, on October 24-25 there remained 23 LSTs and 28 Liberty ships in Leyte Gulf.53 It’s unclear what number of of those vessels have been afloat or beached, however maybe they might have been in a position to escape the gulf if given a couple of hours’ discover of Kurita’s advance. The flexibility to reposition shoreside provide dumps could have been extra restricted. It’s believable that if Kurita had penetrated into the gulf, his giant and highly effective power would have had greater than sufficient ammunition and alternative to sink most if not the entire transports in the event that they have been unable to flee beforehand.
The quantity of destruction Kurita may have wrecked on the transport vessels quantities to a couple of month’s value of LST building and two weeks’ value of Liberty ship building.54 Greater than 120 LSTs participated in unloading the invasion forces between October 20-25, suggesting Kurita may have knocked out about 20 p.c of the LSTs within the neighborhood. The D-Day expertise is instructive, particularly that the initially deliberate for Could 1, 1944 invasion referred to as for 230 LSTs, however solely a month’s value of LST manufacturing was deemed vital sufficient to compel a delay to June.55 Whereas the broader availability of LSTs is unclear within the October 1944 timeframe, it’s noteworthy that even on the peak of American wartime industrial output, the restricted availability of the LST had a constraining impact on technique. It may be anticipated that the destruction of LSTs and different transports within the Leyte Gulf would have had a noteworthy impact on the Philippine marketing campaign, together with a quickly diminished operational tempo and presumably even a shift to a defensive posture till logistical capability may very well be regenerated.
Regeneration could have taken a number of weeks and occurred within the midst of the Japanese counterattacks on Leyte. The Japanese army had greater than 430,000 troops on the Philippines, however solely 20,000 on Leyte on the time of invasion.56 U.S. airpower was extremely profitable at interdicting Japanese ship transports aiming to bolster Leyte after the invasion, to the place two months later in December the Japanese have been solely in a position to reinforce their presence on Leyte to 34,000 troops.57 The Japanese have been having their very own transports harassed and destroyed, contributing to their incapacity to push the invasion power of greater than 130,000 troops again into the ocean. It’s subsequently uncertain that dropping no matter transports have been current within the gulf on October 25 would have been decisive sufficient to foment a collapse of the U.S. lodgment, a lot much less decisively foreclose the choice of a Philippine invasion.
By way of Japanese attrition, Kurita took substantial losses on the Battle of Leyte Gulf, and would have suffered much more within the different. Kurita started the battle with 5 battleships, 10 heavy cruisers, two gentle cruisers, and 15 destroyers. He ended the battle with 4 battleships, two heavy cruisers, and 13 destroyers.58 Within the different, he’s almost definitely destroyed wholesale, because of the overwhelming quantity of firepower he invitations with a lengthier operation.
Many forces that would not have interaction Kurita within the historic case would have had a chance to take action within the different. Within the different situation, the next further forces acquire a chance to impose new engagements on Kurita: Oldendorf’s detachment from TF 77.2 (three battleships, 4 heavy cruisers, 20 destroyers); Lee’s TF 34 (six battleships, three gentle cruisers, eight destroyers); Admiral T.L. Sprague’s Taffy 1 (six escort carriers); Taffy 1 and Taffy 2 gentle floor forces (as much as six destroyers and 7 destroyer escorts); and the rest of Halsey’s TF 38 service forces (4 fleet carriers and three gentle carriers). Kurita would have additionally confronted further air assaults from McCain’s TF 38.1 (three fleet carriers, two gentle carriers) and Bogan’s TF 38.2 (one fleet service, two gentle carriers).59 By urgent towards the beachhead, Kurita dramatically expands the placing alternative U.S. forces would have had in opposition to the Heart Drive attributable to an estimated enhance in operational length of solely 9 hours. Towards such overwhelming odds, it’s probably that Kurita’s Heart Drive would have been decisively destroyed, or a couple of closely broken models would have survived at finest.
The strategic influence of a steeper sacrifice from Kurita would have been marginal. The historic case of the Battle of Leyte Gulf is already broadly thought to be the battle that decisively ended the Imperial Japanese Navy as a combating power of strategic worth.60 This stems not from the in depth losses the Japanese heavy floor forces took, however from the conclusive destruction of the majority of the IJN’s remaining service forces on the Battle off Cape Engaño, the place one fleet service and three gentle carriers have been sunk.61 These carriers may solely function decoys as a result of their air wings had not recovered from the heavy attrition they suffered on the Battle of the Philippine Sea 4 months earlier. However this was unknown to the People, inflicting Halsey to justifiably focus his fleet’s placing energy in opposition to the opposing service power. As Halsey later wrote of his choice throughout the battle,
“In fashionable naval warfare there isn’t any larger risk than that supplied by an enemy service power. To go away such a power untouched and to assault it with something lower than overwhelming harmful power wouldn’t solely violate this confirmed precept however on this occasion would have been foolhardy within the excessive.”62
This enhances a rationale supplied by Kurita’s chief of workers, Admiral Koyanagi, who argued:
“In fashionable sea warfare, the primary placing power needs to be a service group, with different warships as auxiliaries. Solely when the service power has collapsed, ought to the floor ships grow to be the primary placing power. Nonetheless majestic a fleet could look, and not using a service power it’s not more than a fleet of tin.”63
Within the case of Halsey, he aggressively pursued decoy carriers, within the case of Kurita, he aggressively pursued falsely categorized escort carriers. Each side have been understandably seduced by the strategic alternative of inflicting heavy injury in opposition to service forces. They shared a typical recognition that service strike had emerged because the dominant mode of blue water naval warfare in WWII, and to destroy the handful of capital ships on the core of this new paradigm would have opened up outsized strategic potentialities.
By comparability, a navy disadvantaged of carriers would have few good choices for contesting sea management, choices that more and more depend upon vital quantities of luck and ability. These choices embrace sending submarines via dense and overlapping layers of screening forces, having floor forces hunt down decisive night time engagements, or sending floor models via a gauntlet of a whole lot of miles of service strike earlier than they will lastly deliver their weapons to bear. Such was the destiny of the tremendous battleship Yamato that sailed with Kurita, which was later sacrificed in a suicide run in opposition to the Okinawa invasion power.64
The dominant mode of warfare is why the destruction of IJN service forces on the Battle of Cape Engaño is what finally allowed the U.S. to function with out a lot concern for the Imperial Japanese Navy for the rest of the Pacific conflict. If Kurita’s Heart Drive had by no means set sail for Leyte, the impact would have been a lot the identical.
Historic Likelihood
The chance of this different seems fairly excessive. The historic case featured Kurita selecting a significant deviation from his standing orders and narrowly escaping the firepower of a number of converging naval formations. Had Kurita adhered to his authentic intent, he would have been extra prone to attain the beachhead than not, and extra probably than to not have his power destroyed. It’s estimated right here that some model of this different was truly the extra probably occasion, with the historic actuality being the much less probably end result.
The important thing issue is Kurita precisely classifying the flattops of Taffy 3 as escort carriers. An correct classification may have been enabled by numerous means and components. The Yamato battleship carried a number of reconnaissance float planes that would have been launched to supply some measure of improved consciousness, even when they might not survive for lengthy with U.S. service air attacking the Heart Drive. The Japanese battleship power had additionally suffered comparatively little attrition up till this level within the conflict and was not critically disadvantaged of skilled personnel just like the depleted naval aviation arm.
Kurita may have additionally correctly categorized the escort carriers and their escorts after being beneath assault by them for a number of hours. The quantity of Taffy 3 plane and the depth of their assaults hardly in comparison with the highly effective beating the Heart Drive took from 5 fleet carriers within the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea the day prior. The Heart Drive additionally obtained no heavy gunnery salvos in response to its pursuit, which ought to have highlighted the main improbability of a power of a number of fleet carriers one way or the other having no escorts bigger than a destroyer.
The flexibility to precisely determine Taffy 3’s flattops as escort carriers was actually difficult by its efficient ways of conducting a combating withdrawal, together with in depth use of smokescreens, maneuvering into native squalls, and torpedo assaults that compelled Kurita’s pursuing forces to quickly break contact for the sake of evasion.65 Besides, the mixture of things, particularly expertise, ought to have made an correct classification extra probably than not.
Every of the hypothetical intercepts additionally grow to be extremely possible within the different if Kurita presses on. Oldendorf’s intercept is virtually assured by advantage of proximity and the probably length of Kurita’s presence within the gulf. The Taffy forces and McCain’s TF 38.1 are additionally just about assured to have extra alternative to launch extra airstrikes than the historic case. Lee’s capacity to intercept an egressing Kurita at San Bernardino Strait is extra prone to occur than not, given the in depth value in time that Kurita pays for his drive to the gulf. Due to the identical time prices, Halsey’s TF 38 is properly inside vary of placing Kurita within the Sibuyan Sea the following day, and the mixed forces of McCain’s TF 38.1 and Bogan’s TF 38.2 even have way more alternative to strike. Each hour it prices Kurita to press deeper within the gulf converts into extra daylight placing alternative the next day by a number of converging service forces.
The potential for these different engagements essentially hinges on a comparatively small enhance in operational length. Inside an hour of Kurita being sighted by Taffy 3, American naval commanders set in movement a sequence of counter-moves that may shut in on Kurita in a matter of hours. Had Kurita held to his orders and had he precisely categorized the escort carriers, these different clashes would have been extra prone to occur than not.
Counterarguments
Kurita was pulled into an engagement with the Taffy escort carriers as a result of he noticed a decisive alternative, a notion that was inspired by the dominant mode of naval warfare and the IJN’s institutional doctrine of prioritizing decisive fleet engagements. The primary counterargument to the choice is that the chance of placing fleet carriers matches neatly sufficient with the preferences of Kurita and IJN doctrine, making the historic case the extra probably end result.
Whereas Kurita’s major goal was the Leyte beachhead, the naval workers of the Heart Drive and the workers of the Mixed Fleet Headquarters had beforehand mentioned the opportunity of a fleet engagement. It was usually agreed upon {that a} crippling blow to the enemy’s service power would have had a much more strategic impact on the conflict than closely damaging the beachhead. Kurita’s chief of workers, Admiral Koyanagi, expressed this pondering:
“Our one huge purpose was to strike the US fleet and destroy it. Kurita’s workers felt that the first goal of our power needs to be the annihilation of the enemy service power and that the destruction of enemy convoys needs to be however a facet problem. Regardless that all enemy convoys within the theater needs to be destroyed, if the highly effective enemy service placing power was left intact, different landings can be tried, and in the long term our bloodshed would obtain solely a delay within the enemy’s advance. Then again, a extreme blow on the enemy carriers would minimize off their advance towards Tokyo and could be a turning level within the conflict. If the Kurita Drive was to be expended, it needs to be for enemy carriers…Kurita and his workers had supposed to take the enemy activity power as the first goal if a selection of targets developed.”66
But Koyanagi additionally defined that the stress between these aims was affecting the power’s management. Kurita’s Heart Drive knew it will deploy deep within the battlespace with little naval air cowl and doubtlessly face devastating American service strikes, which it will definitely did within the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea. It might require steadfast willpower to topic one’s power to this punishment whereas in pursuit of an goal that was not the enemy’s primary battle fleet, particularly if that battle fleet occurred to come back inside vary of heavy floor gunnery. With respect to the Mixed Fleet’s operational coverage of prioritizing the beachhead, Koyanagi described the perspective of the Heart Drive workers: “our complete power was uneasy, and this sense was mirrored in our management throughout the battle.”
Taffy 3 subsequently supplied a chance for the Heart Drive to concentrate on its most well-liked operational purpose – a fleet-on-fleet engagement. Encountering Taffy 3 allowed Kurita to redirect his focus given how a “selection in targets” had in reality developed. The day prior to this’s heavy punishment within the Sibuyan Sea probably strengthened the need to destroy carriers. Kurita pursued Taffy 3 at prime velocity for almost three hours, presumably pondering he had encounter one of many luckiest breaks for the Imperial Japanese Navy within the conflict. As Koyanagi described the preliminary sighting of Taffy 3,
“This was certainly a miracle. Consider a floor fleet developing on an enemy service group! We moved to make the most of this heaven-sent alternative. Yamato elevated velocity immediately and opened hearth at a variety of 31 kilometers. The enemy was estimated to be 4 or 5 quick carriers guarded by one or two battleships and no less than ten heavy cruisers.”67
In truth, Taffy 3 contained six escort carriers, three destroyers, and 4 destroyer escorts. Taking Koyanagi’s higher figures, the Heart Drive overestimated the tonnage of the naval power it encountered by an element of 5.68
Whereas the Heart Drive’s robust desire for partaking in fleet battles was comprehensible, the a number of components that ought to have enabled correct classification stay believable. In addition they grow to be extra believable as time goes on throughout the Battle off Samar, given how the assaults of Taffy 3 and its escorts more and more reveal their marginal functionality in comparison with the main fleet combatants the Heart Drive misclassified them as. The institutional desire for fleet engagement is the strongest issue buttressing the historic case, however it’s nonetheless weaker than the mixture of a number of components that make the choice extra probably.
Conclusion
The Battle of Leyte Gulf was an intricate engagement, consisting of a number of separate however interconnected battles. If any of those battles resulted in numerous outcomes, it will have affected the operational habits of the forces within the different clashes. By slipping via the San Bernadino Strait, the Heart Drive exerted a strong affect over the habits of all main U.S. naval forces current on the battle, together with many who by no means obtained an opportunity to have interaction Kurita. However had Kurita not been diverted by the escort carriers of Taffy 3, he would have probably earned a chance to bombard his major goal, whereas additionally creating a chance for his power’s annihilation.
Kurita’s efforts have been finally futile no matter his programs of motion. By then the economic would possibly of the U.S. was conferring overwhelming materials superiority to the allies, as exemplified by the greater than 15 fleet carriers and 120 escort carriers that have been produced throughout the conflict years.69 That Kurita sortied in any respect is extra a testomony to the obstinate fatalism of the Japanese Empire relatively than its strategic acumen.
The Battle of Leyte Gulf stays the latest high-end, fleet-on-fleet fight motion regardless of occurring 80 years in the past. It endures as a extremely instructive case of naval warfare, whose many fundamentals can nonetheless apply immediately. Whether or not it’s command confusion afflicting U.S. operations, on-scene leaders perceiving what they wish to see in enemy forces, or fast-breaking choices defining fight outcomes, fashionable warfighters ought to acknowledge that future fleet battles could also be rife with comparable challenges. If U.S. naval forces are ever sortied in opposition to daring odds to wreck a beachhead on a international shore, they need to heed Koyanagi’s warning – “As in all issues, so within the area of battle, none can inform when or the place the breaks will come.”
Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of On-line Content material. He’s the creator of the Preventing DMO and How the Fleet Forgot to Struggle sequence. He’s coauthor of Studying to Win: Utilizing Operational Innovation to Regain the Benefit at Sea in opposition to China. Contact him at Content material@Cimsec.org.
References
[1] Martin R. Waldman, “CALMNESS, COURAGE, AND EFFICIENCY,” Remembering the Battle of Leyte Gulf, pg. 3-4 (PDF pg. 7-8), Naval Historical past and Heritage Command, 2019,
[2] Samuel E. Morison, “Historical past of United States Naval Operations in World Battle II, Quantity 12, Leyte, June 1944 to January 1945,” pg. 184-187, 1958, Little, Brown and Firm,
[3] Ibid, pg. 189.
[4] Ibid, pg. 190.
[5] Rear Admiral Tomiji Koyanagi, former Imperial Japanese Navy, “With Kurita at Leyte Gulf,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, February 1953,
[6] Interrogations of Japanese Officers – Vols. I & II United States Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific),
[7] Samuel E. Morison, “The Battle of Surigao Strait,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, December 1958,
[8] Battle Abstract No. 40, The Battle of Leyte Gulf Twenty third-26 October, 1944, pg. 14 (PDF pg. 9), Tactical and Workers Duties Division, Historic Part, Royal Australian Navy, Could 1947,
[9] Admiral W.A. Lee, Jr., “Report Of Operations Of Process Drive Thirty-4 Throughout The Interval 6 October 1944 To three November 1944,” December 14, 1944,
[10] Battle Abstract No. 40, The Battle of Leyte Gulf Twenty third-26 October, 1944, pg. 67 (PDF pg. 37), Tactical and Workers Duties Division, Historic Part, Royal Australian Navy, Could 1947,
[11] Picture “Plate NO. 60,” from, Studies Of Basic MacArthur: The Campaigns Of MacArthur In The Pacific, Quantity I, pg. 210 (PDF pg. 229),
[12] Richard Bates, The Battle for Leyte Gulf. October 1944. Strategical and Tactical Evaluation. Quantity V. Battle of Surigao Strait, October Twenty fourth-Twenty fifth, pg. 656-657 (PDF pg. 799-800), U.S. Naval Battle Faculty, 1958,
[13] Ibid, pg. 664 (PDF pg. 807).
[14] Ibid, pg. 675, (PDF pg. 818).
[15] Fleet Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired), “The Battle for Leyte Gulf,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Could 1952,
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Admiral W.A. Lee, Jr., “Report Of Operations Of Process Drive Thirty-4 Throughout The Interval 6 October 1944 To three November 1944,” December 14, 1944,
[20] Battle Abstract No. 40, The Battle of Leyte Gulf Twenty third-26 October, 1944, pg. 78 (PDF pg. 43), Tactical and Workers Duties Division, Historic Part, Royal Australian Navy, Could 1947,
[21] For Kurita, see: Interrogations of Japanese Officers – Vols. I & II United States Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific),
For Lee, see: Admiral W.A. Lee, Jr., “Report Of Operations Of Process Drive Thirty-4 Throughout The Interval 6 October 1944 To three November 1944,” December 14, 1944,
[22] Samuel E. Morison, “The Battle of Surigao Strait,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, December 1958,
[23] Ibid.
[24] Samuel E. Morison, “Historical past of United States Naval Operations in World Battle II, Quantity 12, Leyte, June 1944 to January 1945,” pg. 295, 1958, Little, Brown and Firm,
[25] Richard Bates, The Battle for Leyte Gulf. October 1944. Strategical and Tactical Evaluation. Quantity V. Battle of Surigao Strait, October Twenty fourth-Twenty fifth, pg. 675 (PDF pg. 818), U.S. Naval Battle Faculty, 1958,
[26] Eugene Cammeron, “Battle off Samar,” Navweps,
[27] Norman Friedman, “A Large Torpedo,” Naval Historical past Journal, April 2019,
See additionally: Samuel J. Cox, “H-008-3: Torpedo Versus Torpedo,” Naval Historical past and Heritage Command, July 2017,
[28] For narratives and evaluation of the naval battles off Guadalcanal, see Trent Hone, Studying Battle: The Evolution of Preventing Doctrine within the U.S. Navy, 1898–1945, Naval Institute Press, 2019, and Jim Hornfischer, Neptune’s Inferno: The U.S. Navy at Guadalcanal, Bantam, 2012.
[29] Ibid.
[30] For charge of fireside, see: Captain C.G. Grimes, Goal Report – Japanese 18″ Weapons and Mounts, pg. 50 (PDF pg. 53), Chief Naval Technical Mission to Japan, February 1946,
For ammunition capability of Yamato, see: Samuel J. Cox, “H-044-3: “Operation Heaven Quantity One” (Ten-ichi-go)—the Loss of life of Yamato, 7 April 1945,” April 2020 2020,
[31] Battle Abstract No. 40, The Battle of Leyte Gulf Twenty third-26 October, 1944, pg. 98 (PDF pg. 54), Tactical and Workers Duties Division, Historic Part, Royal Australian Navy, Could 1947,
[32] Ibid, pg. 78 (PDF pg. 43).
[33] Ibid, pg. 112-113, (PDF pg. 61).
[34] Ibid, pg. 69 (PDF pg. 38).
[35] Ibid, pg. 98 (PDF pg. 54).
[36] Picture “Plate NO. 62,” from, Studies Of Basic MacArthur: The Campaigns Of MacArthur In The Pacific, Quantity I, pg. 219 (PDF pg. 238),
[37] Battle Abstract No. 40, The Battle of Leyte Gulf Twenty third-26 October, 1944, pg. 89 (PDF pg. 49), Tactical and Workers Duties Division, Historic Part, Royal Australian Navy, Could 1947,
[38] The efficient fight radius of U.S. WWII fleet carriers was about 300 miles. For efficient vary of U.S. WWII fleet carriers, see: Dr. Jerry Hendrix, Retreat from Vary: The Rise and Fall of Provider Aviation, pg. 17-19, Heart for a New American Safety, October 2015,
Additionally see Samuel E. Morison’s description of McCain’s preliminary air strike in opposition to the Heart Drive, which at 335 miles Morison described as “one of many longest service strikes of the conflict. Samuel E. Morison, “Historical past of United States Naval Operations in World Battle II, Quantity 12, Leyte, June 1944 to January 1945,” pg. 309, 1958, Little, Brown and Firm,
[39] Battle Abstract No. 40, The Battle of Leyte Gulf Twenty third-26 October, 1944, pg. 23 (PDF pg. 13), Tactical and Workers Duties Division, Historic Part, Royal Australian Navy, Could 1947,
[40] Samuel E. Morison, “Historical past of United States Naval Operations in World Battle II, Quantity 12, Leyte, June 1944 to January 1945,” pg. 309, 1958, Little, Brown and Firm,
[41] Admiral W.A. Lee, Jr., “Report Of Operations Of Process Drive Thirty-4 Throughout The Interval 6 October 1944 To three November 1944,” December 14, 1944,
[42] Samuel E. Morison, “Historical past of United States Naval Operations in World Battle II, Quantity 12, Leyte, June 1944 to January 1945,” pg. 311, 1958, Little, Brown and Firm,
[43] Ibid, pg. 310.
[44] Battle Abstract No. 40, The Battle of Leyte Gulf Twenty third-26 October, 1944, pg. 112-113 (PDF pg. 61), Tactical and Workers Duties Division, Historic Part, Royal Australian Navy, Could 1947,
[45] Ibid, pg. 72-73 (PDF pg. 40).
[46] Ibid, pg. 76-77 (PDF pg. 42).
[47] Samuel E. Morison, “Historical past of United States Naval Operations in World Battle II, Quantity 12, Leyte, June 1944 to January 1945,” pg. 135, 1958, Little, Brown and Firm,
[48] Ibid, pg. 155-156.
[49] Picture “Plate NO. 58,” from, Studies Of Basic MacArthur: The Campaigns Of MacArthur In The Pacific, Quantity I, pg. 201 (PDF pg. 220),
[50] Rear Admiral Tomiji Koyanagi, former Imperial Japanese Navy, “With Kurita at Leyte Gulf,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, February 1953,
[51] Craig L. Symonds, “The unloved, unlovely, but indispensable LST,” Navy Instances/WWII Journal, June 6, 2019,
[52] Ibid.
[53] Samuel E. Morison, “Historical past of United States Naval Operations in World Battle II, Quantity 12, Leyte, June 1944 to January 1945,” pg. 156, 1958, Little, Brown and Firm,
[54] For LST building charge, see: Craig L. Symonds, “The unloved, unlovely, but indispensable LST,” Navy Instances/WWII Journal, June 6, 2019,
For Liberty ship building charge, see: Gus Bourneuf Jr., Workhorse of the Fleet: A Historical past of the Liberty Ships, pg. 112 (PDF pg. 120), American Bureau of Delivery, 1990,
[55] Craig L. Symonds, “The unloved, unlovely, but indispensable LST,” Navy Instances/WWII Journal, June 6, 2019,
[56] Charles R. Anderson, Leyte: The U.S. Military Campaigns of World Battle II, pg. 14, Heart of Navy Historical past, U.S. Military, 2019,
[57] Ibid, pg. 24.
[58] Battle Abstract No. 40, The Battle of Leyte Gulf Twenty third-26 October, 1944, pg. 105 (PDF pg. 57), Tactical and Workers Duties Division, Historic Part, Royal Australian Navy, Could 1947,
[59] The service Princeton will not be counted given the way it was sunk a number of days earlier than the battle. For general order of battle, see: Battle Abstract No. 40, The Battle of Leyte Gulf Twenty third-26 October, 1944, pg. 107-113 (PDF pg. 58-61), Tactical and Workers Duties Division, Historic Part, Royal Australian Navy, Could 1947,
[60] John Grady, “Panel: Classes Discovered from the Battle of Leyte Gulf Endure,” USNI Information, October 26, 2019,
[61] Battle Abstract No. 40, The Battle of Leyte Gulf Twenty third-26 October, 1944, pg. 87-90 (PDF pg. 48-50), Tactical and Workers Duties Division, Historic Part, Royal Australian Navy, Could 1947,
[62] Fleet Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired), “The Battle for Leyte Gulf,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Could 1952,
[63] Rear Admiral Tomiji Koyanagi, former Imperial Japanese Navy, “With Kurita at Leyte Gulf,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, February 1953,
[64] Samuel J. Cox, “H-044-3: “Operation Heaven Quantity One” (Ten-ichi-go)—the Loss of life of Yamato, 7 April 1945,” April 2020 2020,
[65] Battle Abstract No. 40, The Battle of Leyte Gulf Twenty third-26 October, 1944, pg. 70-72 (PDF pg. 39-40), Tactical and Workers Duties Division, Historic Part, Royal Australian Navy, Could 1947,
[66] Rear Admiral Tomiji Koyanagi, former Imperial Japanese Navy, “With Kurita at Leyte Gulf,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, February 1953,
[67] Ibid.
[68] This calculation relies on the tonnage of following widespread lessons of American WWII warship: Essex-class fleet carriers, Casablanca-class escort carriers, Baltimore-class heavy cruisers, and Fletcher-class destroyers.
[69] For fleet service manufacturing, see: Scot MacDonald, “The Evolution of Plane Carriers: The Early Assault Carriers,” pg. 47 (PDF pg. 49) Naval Aviation Information,
For escort service manufacturing, see: Ensign G. I. “Ike” Heinemann, U.S. Navy, “Carry Again the CVLs,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 2019,
Featured Picture: 24 October 1944 – The Japanese battleship Yamato is hit by a bomb close to her ahead 460mm gun turret, throughout assaults by U.S. service planes throughout the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea. (U.S. Navy photograph)
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