By Aaron Barlow, Patrick Reilly, and Sean Harper
Introduction
Because the Marine Corps prepares to contest the regional superiority of the Folks’s Republic of China (PRC) within the Indo-Pacific alongside the Navy and the joint pressure, the service should strengthen its natural killchains and make sure that every new functionality acquisition aligns to the ideas that the service should execute. Whereas joint integration will rightfully stay important to profitable campaigns, the Marine Corps – because the isolatable ahead fringe of the joint pressure within the Indo-Pacific – should make sure that its presence provides credible theater fight functionality even when joint sensing, communication, and fires can’t assist the stand-in pressure. The Marine Corps ought to due to this fact concentrate on buying platforms that current a special danger profile than the joint pressure; prioritize natural possession of all parts of sure killchains from sensor to shooter; worth resilient, risk-worthy platforms over the extremely succesful however costly; and concentrate on range and depth within the varieties of munitions it brings to the combat.
Strategic Context
Over the previous 5 years, the Marine Corps has confidently and quickly altered its pressure construction to fulfill altering nationwide strategic priorities. As articulated within the 2018 Nationwide Protection Technique (NDS) and echoed in its 2022 sequel, the US should meet the 2020s as a “decisive decade” and defend U.S. nationwide safety pursuits by successfully deterring its adversaries, utilizing the Folks’s Republic of China (PRC) as a benchmark to measure the tempo of development. In an August 2024 report, the Fee on the 2022 NDS charted the Marine Corps’ modernization progress thus far, stating “The service deserves excessive marks for displaying the agility that DoD usually yearns for however not often achieves.” The report additional lauded the Marine Corps’ Power Design efforts as a “coherent method for the Marine Corps to function within the Indo-Pacific in opposition to the pacing risk whereas retaining the power to function the nation’s emergency response for crises as they materialize.”
Nevertheless, the thirty ninth Commandant’s Planning Steerage lately strengthened that modernization stays a “righteous” however incomplete journey. Utilizing the service’s Idea for Stand-in Forces as a yardstick, latest acquisitions overestimate and over-rely on the provision of joint and nationwide capabilities within the extremely contested atmosphere by which they need to carry out. Equally, different acquisition and pressure design choices appear basically misaligned to stand-in pressure imperatives like footprint, signature, and danger minimization.
The worth proposition of stand-in forces greatest manifests within the context of a hypothetical PRC marketing campaign to realize reunification with Taiwan by pressure, by which the PLA will leverage its vital regional firepower benefit to claim all-domain superiority nicely East of the primary island chain. Confronted by an adversary able to devastating maritime precision strikes, the joint pressure will doubtless withdraw the preponderance of its high-end capabilities past the vary of PRC threats. Additional, Chinese language capabilities will probably be centered on disrupting the long-range communications networks mandatory for these high-end capabilities to shut killchains from safer distances.
Nonetheless, the joint pressure will nonetheless require the power to contest Chinese language all-domain management within the first island chain. Enter the stand-in pressure, positioned on ahead areas all through the battlespace. Preventing as an extension of the fleet and joint pressure, the stand-in pressure will leverage disaggregation to create reconnaissance and concentrating on dilemmas for adversaries reliant on precision strike regimes. Stand-in forces will make use of uneven capabilities and techniques to carry adversaries in danger in a number of domains, in the end stopping the buildup of regional superiority.
The Marine Corps’ perspective on how you can execute A Idea for Stand-in Forces has advanced for the reason that mission started in 2020. The providers Power Design annual updates enable us to hint this evolution. Foundational Power Design steering initially prioritized the event of “smaller however better-connected formations that organically possess a whole killchain acceptable to echelon.” Nevertheless, the 2022 Power Design Annual Replace walked again this imaginative and prescient “from an preliminary concentrate on producing natural deadly capabilities…to a extra balanced focus that features persisting ahead in a contested space to win the [reconnaissance/counter-reconnaissance] battle and full joint kill webs.” The 2022 annual replace additionally raises unresolved questions on what this stability would possibly seem like, reiterating that “sure capabilities have to be natural to our Stand-in Forces, corresponding to natural sensors and long-range precision fires to shut kill webs when exterior capabilities aren’t current or obtainable.”
Based mostly on this steering, the stand-in pressure’s danger of isolation from the joint pressure clearly persists. How intensely ought to the Marine Corps hedge in opposition to this danger, and the way ought to the service outline the stability it seeks? Latest service acquisitions counsel that the Marine Corps has overinvested in capabilities which can be inappropriate for a stand-in pressure, on the expense of constructing strong natural killchains that present a assured functionality baseline within the occasion of isolation.
The Worth Proposition of Natural Killchains
The disaggregated nature of stand-in pressure formations and the tyranny of distance imposed by the littoral working atmosphere mix with the character of the PRC risk as an example the worth proposition of natural killchains. For instance, contemplate the dependence of the mixed joint all-domain command and management (CJADC2) idea on the resilience and availability of joint data networks. Below CJADC2, the joint pressure and companions search to mission all-domain results by seamlessly closing killchains comprised of nationwide and joint sensors, processors, and shooters. CJADC2 represents a respectable integration problem, and thus far the providers have been inching in the direction of minimal viable capabilities.
The thirty ninth Commandant’s Planning Steerage articulates how the Marine Corps sees its contributions to CJADC2: “Marines will act because the ‘JTAC of the Joint Power’ – sensing, making sense, and speaking to the remainder of the Joint Power with an ‘any sensor, any shooter’ mindset.” Till lately the Marine Corps has adopted within the wake of different providers’ initiatives via participation within the Navy’s Undertaking Overmatch and the Military’s Undertaking Convergence, each of which have sought to develop and train the interconnectedness and interoperability required for the joint providers to share data and shut killchains. The Marine Corps has efficiently exercised buying and sustaining custody of targets with natural sensors whereas passing this data to joint command-and-control functions, lately at Train Valiant Protect, which included an Indo-Pacific Command-level train of its Joint Fires Community. These initiatives and workout routines characterize apparent technical progress, however as demonstrations of ideas, they danger overestimating the reliability and availability of joint data networks in a method that unbalances the Stand-in Power in favor of brittle kill webs.
This imbalance turns into particularly evident within the context of how the PLA plans to prosecute future conflicts. The PLA believes that fashionable warfare just isn’t “a contest of annihilation between opposing navy forces, however fairly a conflict between opposing operational techniques.” The PLA’s derived idea – Methods Destruction Warfare – prioritizes attacking “the move of knowledge inside the adversary’s operational system.” Below this paradigm, if the joint pressure envisions CJADC2 as a elementary heart of gravity that permits hard-hitting joint killchains, the PLA should view the identical system because the joint pressure’s important vulnerability and deploy proportional operational assets to focus on and disrupt it. What’s the worth proposition of the stand-in pressure if joint data networks have to be obtainable to unlock its contribution to potent joint capabilities?
To ship on its worth proposition, the stand-in pressure should retain the aptitude to carry the adversary in danger with credible killchains in contested environments when the remainder of the joint pressure can’t. When CJADC2 is uncontested and working at its peak it should make intensive use of C2 platforms within the air and area domains. Nevertheless, the questionable survivability and persistence of those platforms is partly the impetus of the stand-in pressure idea. Thus, reliance on these high-end joint networks introduces a contradiction within the stand-in pressure’s conceptual framework.
A possible overestimation of the resilience of rising industrial, proliferated low-earth orbit constellations additionally underpins the Marine Corps’ conceptual reasoning. Methods corresponding to SpaceX’s Starlink could certainly allow a extra strong space-based command and management structure in comparison with legacy techniques. Nevertheless, these constellations have more and more been touted as a communications panacea, particularly after Starlink’s success in Ukraine. In the meantime, adversaries are rigorously looking for efficient counters, attempting to find exploitation alternatives, or creating choices to take away the area layer altogether. Although a reputable Twenty first-century pressure can’t ignore rising area layer applied sciences, the Marine Corps mustn’t overestimate the resilience of business P-LEO options on the expense of natural spectrum-diverse data networks.
Earlier this 12 months, the Marine Corps initiated Undertaking Dynamis as a service bid to achieve initiative in shaping contributions to CJADC2. The Marine Corps ought to leverage this chance to refocus command and management modernization to higher align the service’s stability of knowledge capabilities with the stand-in-force idea. The service ought to particularly refine strong, various data capabilities that allow the stand-in pressure to contest adversary all-domain management in ways in which multiply fight energy via the provision of joint networks, however crucially don’t require them. Additional, the end-to-end natural possession of sure important killchains by the stand-in pressure has the twin advantage of offering a reputable technique of contesting all-domain management when the joint pressure can’t be current and offering another data path for the joint pressure inside contested areas.
An Natural and Uneven Munitions Combine
If spectrum-diverse data networks present the connective linkages for an end-to-end natural killchain, a deep and assorted arsenal of service-owned munitions should present the kinetic edge. Although the Marine Corps has lengthy constructed capabilities round a wide range of oblique fireplace munitions, the thirty eighth Commandant’s Planning Steerage prioritized the service’s first ever acquisition of a floor based mostly medium-range anti-ship missile. The service’s portfolio has since grown to incorporate Naval Strike Missiles, long-range anti-ship missiles, and Tomahawk cruise missiles, every in several phases of acquisition and with various ideas of employment. Whereas these munitions will present the stand-in pressure with the aptitude to carry high-value targets in danger, in addition they characterize comparatively high-cost, low-density investments. Deriving estimates from whole program acquisition prices printed within the Division of Protection Fiscal 12 months 2024 Finances Request, the Naval Strike Missile (90 models), Tomahawk (34 models), and lengthy vary anti-ship missile (91 models) carry models prices of $2.32M, $3.09M, and $7.02M respectively.1
The per-shot expense of those munitions raises questions on whether or not the Marine Corps can have the journal depth to essential to maintain a protracted sea denial marketing campaign. Moreover, the numerous lower-tier maritime targets that the stand-in pressure might simply maintain in danger could not rise to the brink of significance mandatory for engagement with low density munitions; if the stand-in pressure can’t have interaction these targets it forgoes alternatives for credible sea denial contributions. The acquisition of beautiful medium-range munitions shouldn’t be deserted, however higher range and depth within the Marine Corps portfolio of munitions might allow the service to function extra successfully as a stand-in pressure.
For instance, a massive arsenal of comparatively low-cost loitering munitions will present the stand-in pressure with an uneven benefit in opposition to littoral targets, since a single operator can management a number of munitions that cooperatively overwhelm adversary air defenses. Sensible munitions trade-offs might additionally scale back the quantity of knowledge trade essential to execute killchains. For instance, capabilities imbued with a layer of autonomy, corresponding to kamikaze drones and suicide floor and sub-surface automobiles could scale back the required frequency and constancy of sensor and operator inputs in comparison with conventional munitions, unburdening restricted community assets. The Marine Corps ought to due to this fact deliberately stability its high-cost fires techniques with deep magazines of efficient but comparatively cheap loitering and one-way assault munitions.
Matching Capabilities to Ideas
Because the Marine Corps considers the suitable stability of natural and joint investments, the service must also contemplate how nicely its future platforms align to the ideas the service should execute. The thirty eighth Commandant’s Planning Steerage clearly outlined the varieties of platforms acceptable to future amphibious and stand-in forces: “We should proceed to hunt the reasonably priced and plentiful on the expense of the beautiful and few when conceiving of the longer term amphibious portion of the fleet.” Equally, stand-in forces should “confront aggressor naval forces with an array of low signature, reasonably priced, and risk-worthy platforms and payloads.” The most recent thirty ninth Commandant’s Planning Steerage means that the service has not wholly altered this philosophy, reiterating that the service should “not design our personal beautiful low quantity platforms.” Nevertheless, concerns of affordability and riskworthiness don’t obtain specific point out.
The Marine Corps mustn’t compromise on price and danger right here. Because the service constructs killchains, it ought to keep away from the sample of investing in costly, beautiful, and excessively overengineered platforms that straight mirror or current the identical danger profile as current joint capabilities. The service ought to as an alternative focus acquisitions on platforms that diversify the dangers confronted by the joint pressure. Marine Corps platform attributes ought to intently resemble the unique worth proposition for Power Design and A Idea for Stand-in Forces: extremely expeditionary, risk-worthy, operationally and logistically supportable in protracted battle, and respectful of the fiscal realities confronted by the service.
As an illustrative instance, contemplate the Marine Corps’ latest acquisition of the MQ-9A Reaper platform, a part of a service unmanned aerial system technique that truly preceded Power Design. Now built-in into air fight aspect formations, the MQ-9A offers the service with a reputable natural long-endurance airborne surveillance and command-and-control functionality in competitors. Nevertheless, latest battlefield proof means that the Reaper will not be survivable when focused in battle with out extra supporting capabilities. Iranian proxy teams, most notably Yemen’s Houthi rebels, seem to have downed not less than 4 MQ-9s since October 7, 2023 (and presumably much more, with acknowledged numbers rising steadily). If affected at present, these losses would halve the Marine Corps’ present fleet of MQ-9A platforms, or quarter the projected fleet in 2025. Unmanned aerial system operations in Ukraine additionally provide insights into the utility and survivability of huge, loitering unmanned platforms in peer battle. Although used to nice impact on the outset of the warfare, latest stories have urged that Ukraine has considerably curtailed the sorties flown by their Turkish Group 5-equivalent Bayraktar TB2 drones, due partly to the deployment of a extra refined Russian built-in air protection community alongside the entrance. Additional, a platform with a 3000-foot runway requirement and a novel maintainer MOS arguably doesn’t conform to Power Design and stand-in pressure ideas like footprint and signature minimization. Lastly, although not a novel and beautiful platform, the service’s MQ-9s don’t appear fiscally risk-worthy on the present charge of acquisition, particularly contemplating latest shoot-down charges. In FY2024, the Marine Corps paid an efficient unit price of $37.5M every for 5 MQ-9A platforms, which would supply a Houthi-equivalent adversary with a number of months of goal follow. The PLA is probably going one other story, and the MQ-9A will virtually actually be a precedence goal based mostly on the platforms’ potential worth as killchain enabler.
Common Atomics, maybe sensing that the service lacks compelling options, seems able to upsell the Marine Corps on the extra succesful however doubtless far costlier MQ-9B within the close to future. At current, whereas the MQ-9A could function a useful enabler in competitors, the platform seems too uncommon, too succesful, and too imminently targetable to persist and survive because the stand-in pressure transitions to battle.
Think about as an alternative the applying of a special resolution paradigm to the identical drawback: the acquisition of excessive numbers of comparatively low-cost medium-size semi-autonomous unmanned aerial techniques (UAS) like Protect AI’s V-BAT or the Platform Aerospace Vanilla UAS to assist surveillance, command and management, and concentrating on missions. Distributed all through contested areas, launched from austere areas beneath vertical/brief takeoff and touchdown regimes, and operated in swarms with a special payload on every airframe, these platforms might assist or closely increase massive, low-density techniques like MQ-9A in battle. In a single-to-one comparisons, medium UAS clearly can’t match the aptitude of bigger techniques like MQ-9A. Nevertheless, when operated at scale and particularly when built-in with different long-range littoral sensors, medium UAS platforms can present an appropriate resolution to the stand-in pressure’s surveillance and command and management necessities whereas presenting an uneven price and concentrating on dilemma to adversaries.
Whereas now we have centered on the MQ-9, the Marine Corps portfolio is replete with platforms that carry comparable contradictions when examined via the Power Design and stand-in pressure lens. As a substitute of replicating the acquisitions of the previous, Marine Corps ought to particularly develop capabilities round various, risk-worthy, high-density, and comparatively low-cost platforms and contemplate lowering investments in extremely succesful however overly treasured and concentrated capabilities that mirror these within the joint pressure.
The Way forward for Power Design
The thirty ninth Commandant’s Planning Steerage reiterates that “Power Design stays our strategic precedence and we can’t decelerate.” Power Design offers the Marine Corps a novel alternative to distinguish itself from previous working ideas and acquisition choices whereas constructing an uneven worth proposition within the joint combat in opposition to peer adversaries. The Marine Corps can’t afford to personal each node of each kill internet, however selective end-to-end possession of particular killchains will allow related and credible service contributions to the joint pressure in competitors and on the onset of a protracted battle. Furthermore, a Marine Corps with enhanced journal depths and a plethora of reasonably priced, risk-worthy platforms working ahead in first island chain will problem adversary all-domain management and set circumstances for US domination within the later phases of any maritime marketing campaign. Likewise, any enhancements that the Marine Corps makes within the alignment of its expeditionary capabilities to threat-informed ideas will concurrently put together the service to successfully fulfill its position as a disaster response pressure, primed for contingencies in assist of nationwide mission goals in accordance with the shifting realities of recent warfare.
Main Aaron Barlow, Captain Patrick Reilly, and Main Sean Harper are presently serving as operations analysis analysts assigned to the Deputy Commandant for Fight Improvement and Integration in Quantico, Virginia.
These views are offered in a private capability and don’t essentially replicate the official views of any U.S. authorities entity.
Notes
1. Knowledge reported for USN. USMC particular information not obtainable for FY2024.
Featured Picture: U.S. Marine Corps Lance Cpl. Terrell Chandler, left, and U.S. Marine Corps Lance Cpl. Melvin Monet, each low-altitude-air protection gunners with 3d Littoral Anti-Air Battalion, 3d Marine Littoral Regiment, 3d Marine Division, set safety with an FIM-92 Stinger throughout Marine Littoral Regiment Coaching Train (MLR-TE) at Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, Arizona, Jan. 28, 2023. (U.S. Marine Corps photograph by Sgt. Israel Chincio)
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