2027 Struggle Readiness Week
By Clay Robinson
U.S. Central Command poses a chance for the Marine Corps. Throughout his March 2023 testimony to the Home Armed Companies Committee (HASC), CENTCOM commander Normal Erik Kurilla said, “God forbid there’s ever a battle with China, however we may find yourself holding numerous their financial system in danger within the CENTCOM area.”1 In the identical testimony he pointed to how “72 p.c of all Chinese language oil is imported. That may make them susceptible.”2 Then Normal Kurilla zeroed in on the ocean lanes inside the Center East including, “98 percent-plus goes by by ship. That makes them susceptible.”3
The Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR) might be the contact and blunt drive that’s tasked with the mission of holding key Chinese language imports in danger within the Center East. Pressure Design must be modified to embrace this mission by including Maritime Interception Operations (MIO) to the core mission units of MLRs. The MIO mission is at the moment assigned solely to Marine Expeditionary Models, however the MLR’s low signature, platoon-sized maneuver components with natural operational mobility, mixed with a “mothership” reminiscent of an Expeditionary Cell Base (ESB) and Littoral Fight Ships (LCS), may make the MLR ideally suited to large-scale MIO.4
Pressure Design has obtained various ranges of critique, reminiscent of that from former Senator and Secretary of the Navy Jim Webb for charting a course that would “remove most of the Marine Corps’ key capabilities and completely cut back the long-standing mission of worldwide readiness.”5 One other criticism levied the priority that “A drive tailor-made to combat in a particular area of the world could discover itself unable to function successfully in a markedly completely different local weather. The Marine Corps can’t afford to have a good portion of its preventing models devoted to solely working in a particular space of the world — on this case, the Indo-Pacific area.”6 Including the MIO mission to MLRs may signify widespread floor. By increasing the mission of the MLRs to supply larger utility exterior the Indo-Pacific area, the Marine Corps can nonetheless handle nice energy threats whereas enhancing world readiness.
Throughout a PRC invasion of Taiwan, U.S. INDOPACOM may unleash a “Hellscape” of hundreds of unmanned platforms to swarm the Taiwan Strait and hold China’s army off steadiness till extra property arrive.7 In the meantime within the Center East, a extra nuanced mission of MIO requiring expertise akin to these proposed by Main Normal Dale Alford, USMC, (ret.) in his 2021 article titled, “The 4-Block Littoral Pressure,” may fall to the Marine Corps. Marines might be referred to as upon to quickly assist CENTCOM impose financial prices on China by boarding high-value ships, plucking them from close by maritime chokepoints just like the Strait of Hormuz, the Pink Sea approaches to the Suez Canal, and the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait.
This drive would type the nucleus of the prize crews that may hold the ships from reaching Chinese language ports. MLR Marines would keep management and safety of the prize vessel and might be augmented by seasoned mariners with experience in seamanship, navigation, and engineering. This extra seafaring experience would possibly come from members of the U.S. Coast Guard or a contemporary model of the U.S. Maritime Service (USMS) reminiscent of that proposed by Wade Heath who just lately advised that the USMS be codified as a full-fledged uniformed service, on par with the U.S. Public Well being Service or Nationwide Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.8
In his reimagination of Normal Charles Krulak’s Three Block Struggle, Normal Alford describes the “4-Block Littoral Pressure” as emphasizing “operations within the littorals, particularly maritime chokepoints.”9 Normal Alford’s Block 1 requires a littoral-focused gray-zone contact drive with Marines working persistently in maritime chokepoints, ready to help the fleet.10 After Block 2 (the disaster response drive), his Block 3 requires a blunting drive of platoon, firm, and battalion-level models that “may come from one, two, or maybe even all the following: a everlasting base, an expeditionary superior base, an amphibious ship, or maybe even from non-standard, improvised business vessels.”11 Normal Alford concludes with a Block 4 (destroying drive).
The contact (1) and blunting (3) blocks align nicely with the usage of MLR Marines as a cadre of highly-trained boarding events that function an acceptable steadiness of high quality and amount for the mission. The mix of each high quality and amount is the place the Marine Corps excels, making Marines higher suited to a large-scale MIO mission over boarding events fashioned by floor fleet sailors or particular operators. The previous lack each proficiency in seizing territory and the flexibility to make use of quite a lot of boarding group supply platforms, to incorporate helicopter insertion. The latter lacks the numbers that will be required to strangle an impactful portion of the Chinese language maritime financial system. There have merely by no means been sufficient assets to sufficiently prepare shipboard VBSS groups to excel utilizing quite a lot of insertion methods for what has nearly all the time been a collateral obligation mission for floor sailors. In the meantime, SEAL Groups can actually excel at small numbers of those boardings, however there are simply not sufficient of them to deal with the numbers of vessels required of this marketing campaign. MLRs are additionally higher suited to folding seized vessels into the broader littoral terrain and operations that MLRs deal with.
A MLR working from an amphibious warfare ship or expeditionary cell base (ESB) and conducting distributed operations throughout a number of LCSs is likely to be able to fielding upwards of 20 Go to, Board, Search, and Seizure (VBSS) groups. CENTCOM already operates the forward-deployed ESB, USS Lewis B. Puller, and plans are nicely underway to ahead deploy 4 Littoral Fight Ships (LCS) to Bahrain starting in 2025.12 Though ostensibly deliberate to switch mine warfare vessels, these LCSs will be anticipated to ply the identical constrained, littoral waters the MLRs may use and maybe some efficiencies may end result. The MLR may additionally profit from points of Expeditionary Advance Base Operations and naval integration reminiscent of working from international vessels, non-standard vessels, and vessels of alternative which are routinely being examined and experimented upon, just like the embarkation of Marines on LCS-class ships.13,14 Past the boarding mission, MLR Marines could be helpful for the close-contact, grey zone encounters that often happen in regular state operations throughout theaters.
Conclusion
In his June 2023 replace on Pressure Design, Normal Berger reported that “The Navy and Marine Corps will proceed to prioritize our sea-based expeditionary forces to maximise their ahead presence as a keystone of our contribution to built-in deterrence. To discourage or reply, we have to be postured ahead, working from the ocean.”15 Using MLRs in maritime interception operations that may quickly seize service provider vessels, type the nucleus of subsequent prize crews, and inflict stress on nice energy rivals throughout a number of theaters can contribute considerably to deterrence. MLR Marines might be the skilled enamel that maintain Chinese language maritime commerce in danger within the Center East and elsewhere. As protection leaders search for artistic but possible choices to discourage China from a 2027 invasion of Taiwan, the vulnerability of crucial Chinese language power imports to maritime interdiction by agile MLR Marines might be a part of the answer. It’s time for Pressure Design to make the MIO mission a core contribution of the Marine Littoral Regiment.
Commander Clay Robinson is a retired U.S. Navy floor warfare officer with over twenty-5 years of expertise in naval operations and strategic planning. He’s at the moment anadjunct teacher with the U.S. Naval Group Faculty.
References
[1] Hunt, Edward. “Within the Center East, the U.S. Holds China at Threat,” Overseas Coverage in Focus, Might 16, 2023,
[2] Hunt, Edward. 2023.
[3] Hunt, Edward. 2023.
[4] Headquarters Marine Corps. “Marine Littoral Regiment,” The Official U.S. Marine Corps Public Web site, January 11, 2023,
[5] Webb, James. “The Way forward for the U.S. Marine Corps,” The Nationwide Curiosity, Might 8, 2020,
[6] Wilson, Gary, Woods, William, and Wyly, Michael. “Ship within the Marines? Rethink Pressure 2030 beforehand,” Protection Information, August 4, 2022,
[7] Rogin, Josh. “The U.S. army plans a ‘Hellscape’ to discourage China from attacking Taiwan,” The Washington Submit, June 10, 2024,
[8] Heath, Wade, “Reestablish the U.S. Maritime Service,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, October 2024,
[9] Alford, Dale, “The 4-Block Littoral Pressure: The Infantry’s assault towards Pressure Design 2030,” Marine Corps Gazette, June 2021,
[10] Alford, Dale. 2021.
[11] Alford, Dale. 2021.
[12] Renfroe, Shannon. “LCS Quartet being lined up by Navy for Center East Mine Operations,” Stars and Stripes, Might 17, 2024,
[13] Shelbourne, Mallory. “Transferring Marines Throughout the Pacific Might Be Littoral Fight Ship’s Subsequent Mission,” U.S. Naval Institute Information, September 28, 2021,
[14] Reiher, Dan and Cuomo, Scott. “The LCS Benefit for the Navy-Marine Corps Staff,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 2022,
[15] Headquarters Marine Corps. “Pressure Design 2030,” March 2020,
Featured Picture: Arabian Gulf (July 26, 2019) Marines with the Maritime Raid Pressure, eleventh Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) climb a tactical assault ladder to board the amphibious transport dock ship USS John P. Murtha (LPD 26) throughout a go to, board, search and seizure coaching train. (U.S. Marine Corps picture by Cpl. Matthew Teutsch/Launched)
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